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**The theory of hegemonic stability and Colombia's foreign policy
*viraje***

Ensalaco, Mark, Ph.D.

State University of New York at Buffalo, 1991

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**THE THEORY OF HEGEMONIC STABILITY
AND COLOMBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY VIRAJE**

A Dissertation

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the State University of New York at Buffalo
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

by

Mark Ensalaco

January 1991

ABSTRACT

This thesis develops and tests a model of the Inter-American System (IAS) based on the theory of hegemonic stability, and explores the possibility that the United States is losing the ability to shape outcomes in the Organization of American States and to control the foreign policy orientation of member states in the IAS. The IAS is conceived as a set of related regimes governing specific issues-areas such as security, peaceful resolution of conflicts, economic development and human rights. Consistent with the theory of hegemonic stability, the thesis explores the hypothesis that the decline in the economic power of the United States has led to a weakening of those regimes. In particular, the focus is upon the security regime embodied in the Rio Treaty and related instruments.

The thesis presents a focused case study of Colombian foreign policy. The Colombian case was selected for two closely related reasons. First, most analysts of Colombian foreign policy concur that Colombia historically has displayed foreign policy deference to the United States. Second, most analysts further agree that Colombia dramatically reoriented its policy in the early 1980s. Explaining this shift in policy, commonly referred to as Colombia's foreign policy viraje, is the central concern of this thesis.

The principal argument advanced in the thesis is that Colombian leaders gradually embraced a set of foreign policy principles that were incompatible with strict alignment with the United States. In other words, Colombia sought to alter the performance of the security regime of the IAS. Colombia's entrance into the Non-Aligned Movement and its participation in the Contadora Group, both of which were dramatic departures from past behavior and are signs of that country's foreign policy viraje, reflected those principles. Since the hegemony of the United States in the IAS resulted, in part, from its ability to gain the foreign policy deference of member-states, such as Colombia, Colombia's viraje is taken as evidence of the decline of United States influence.

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CHAPTER ONE

HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

I Introduction

Analysts of international relations began taking note of structural changes in the international system in the middle and late 1970s. These structural changes, defined as changes in the international distribution of power, potentially affect the processes by which values are allocated and bargaining between states proceeds (Nye and Keohane 1977, p.20.) In this context, it is common to take note of the decline of the economic power of the United States relative to Western Europe and Japan. There is a rough consensus that the United States, though remaining powerful both economically and militarily in absolute terms, has lost the capacity to lead unilaterally.

At the same time, analysts of the foreign policies of developing states have called attention to the new activism of the so-called middle powers. The more active roles of some developing states have implications for international relations theory and practice. As Stremlau (1971, p. 1) points out

How these governments choose to order their foreign policy priorities and how they decide to deploy their limited political, economic and military resources in pursuit of these objectives could have a cumulative impact on the shape of world order in the 1980s that will be as important - if less dramatic - as decisions that are taken in Washington or Moscow.

In the case of the foreign policies of Latin American states, the literature is extensive. (Pardo and Tokatlían 1988; Muñoz and Tulchin 1984; Orrego 1984; Erisman 1984; Ferris and Lincoln 1984; Bagley 1983; Drekonja and Tokatlían 1983; Drekonja 1983; Jaguaribe 1982; Selcher 1981; Erisman and Martz 1982; French Davis and Tironi 1982; Grunwald 1978; Fontaine and Theberge 1976; Bond 1977; Hellman and Rosenbaum 1975; Davis and Wilson 1975.)

The "new Latin American foreign policy" which this literature describes is essentially destabilizing and is intended to create an autonomia periférica through individual state action and multilateral cooperation. Thus, the graduation of countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and Colombia to the middle tier of the global economy portends changes in the processes of international relations because the emerging middle powers are potentially capable of altering the established "rules of the game" or international regimes. Their motivation to bring about favorable changes in existing patterns of regional and international politics is high, but their ability to do so is delimited by the realities of international power. Nevertheless, their ability to disrupt established cooperative arrangements or regimes is not negligible even if at present they lack the capability to establish new and more equitable ones such as the New International Economic Order. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that these states have demonstrated the ability to use existing

international organizations increasingly for their benefit (Krasner 1985, p. 29). As Tugwell (1977 p. 199) pointed out more than a decade ago, many Latin American States have begun to broaden their diplomatic relations, and it has become evident that there is

new inclination on the part of a number of states to dismantle, or at least modify, the U.S. designed hemispheric institutions created originally to handle Cold War problems, and to replace them with ones that (1) address the more immediate issues of development and facilitate the cooperative action needed to boost that development, and (2) tolerate diversity and ideological experimentation.

A great deal of thought has been given to the possible relationships between these changes in the structure of international power, especially the emergence of economic rivals to the United States, the breakdown or weakening of the international regimes that were created at the height of U.S. power, and the foreign policies of middle-powers. The most notable product of these efforts has been the theory of hegemonic stability which posits that strong, stable international regimes are most likely to be formed and maintained by a single dominant power with the will and capability to do so. Conversely, the decline of that power results in a weakening of those regimes.

A number of studies have been made of these hypothesized relationships, but surprisingly, none has been made of the Inter-American System (IAS.) Yet, Latin America provides an excellent opportunity to test the theory of

hegemonic stability for three reasons.

First, it would be both descriptively accurate and theoretically useful to apply concepts from the regime literature to the case of the IAS. The IAS is a fully developed and formalized system of regimes. Thus, Atkins is able to speak of a regional subsystem, noting that mutual identification involving a regional consciousness is prevalent despite much diversity and uniqueness (1977, p. 8). The origin of the system can be traced back at least to the series of Pan-American conferences initiated by the United States in 1899, and it was formalized in 1948 upon the signing and ratification of the OAS Charter in 1948 and the Rio Treaty in 1947. In the words of Atkins, "the Inter-American system of institutionalized multilateral cooperation among American states has been expressed in the development of Western Hemispheric organizations for law, peace, security and national development.". Moreover, Atkins contends, the institutions of the IAS have regulated politics in the hemisphere by "offering opportunities for and imposing limitations on the foreign policies of member states" (1977, p. 307).

Though Atkins and other analysts of the IAS rarely use the language of regimes (exceptions are Haas, 1980b and Krasner, 1981), its applicability is clear. The IAS represents a political order within which operate a number

of related regimes governing a wide range of issue-areas. The precise number of constitutive principles, the crucial mark of any regime, vary according to observers, but all concur with respect to the following four: non-intervention, peaceful resolution of conflict, juridical equality of states and collective security (Mechem, 1966 p. 475; Atkins, 1977 p. 322; Betancur in Arciniegas, 1985 p. 28). Additionally, the principled commitment to representative democracy (Atkins, 1977 p. 322) has been a key feature of the IAS and warrants inclusion.

Second, the initiative of the United States, explicitly conceiving of itself as a hegemonic power, was instrumental in the creation of the IAS. Consequently, for much of its existence it has been what Young (1983) describes as an "imposed order". This is supported by the fact that all Latin American efforts to institutionalize regional cooperation, beginning with Bolívar's abortive Panamanian conference, ended in failure, and that it was only when the United State found a Pan-American Union to be in its interest that one emerged. Although the Latin American states themselves pressed for the formalization of the IAS at Chapultepec after the Second World War, they did so in the expectation that a more formal arrangement would give them a degree of influence over their northern neighbor. However, the reality has been that the OAS has frequently served the interests and Cold War policies of the United States. According to Mechem (1966, p. 472), "the

Organization of American States is actually an association of one great power with twenty small, weak member nations in which evidences of U.S. predominance are readily apparent." Mechem goes on to make a point central to this research, suggesting that the Latin American states can be expected to exercise self-restraint both in their use of the instruments of regional cooperation and in their foreign policies until "they increase their own capacity to work with their North American partner on more equal terms..." (p. 473). Prompted by the widespread acceptance of the thesis of U.S. hegemonic decline, this research explores the possibility that the future envisioned by Mechem and others has in fact arrived.

Third, there is a growing consensus regarding the relative decline of the United States' influence in hemispheric affairs (Lowenthal, 1987; Blackman et al, 1986; Grabendorff and Roett, 1985; Farer, 1979; Fontaine and Theberge, 1976). Despite the efforts of the Reagan administration to reassert U.S. influence, the decline is real even if its magnitude is unclear and easily exaggerated: "quite clearly the supremacy, even the partnership of the United States in the hemisphere is being challenged" (Fontaine and Theberge, 1979 p. 1). A number of factors are frequently cited both to account for the decline and to provide evidence of it. The relative decline of the economic power of the United States is the most common observation:

The relative decline in America's economic power, confirmed by the rise in oil prices in 1973-1974, was a process...that grew out of the rapid growth of Japan and Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. It complicated America's weak balance of payments situation specifically, and a growing concern, generally, about America's capacity to compete and provide economic stewardship for the West that accompanied its position as primus inter pares...The United States found itself in a position in which the resources once available to deal with Latin America and to maintain its primacy were not only not available but, even if they had been available, would not have been usable in the same way as they had been in preceding decades (Grabendorff and Roett, 1985 p. 223).

In the terminology of hegemonic stability theory, the economic decline of the United States resulted in its loss of rule-making and rule-enforcing power.

Political factors are cited as well. The United States' decision to support Great Britain in the Malvinas war, despite provisions of the Rio Pact and the even Monroe doctrine, alienated most Latin American states (Kryzaneck 1985, p. 205). Similarly, the policy of the Reagan administration in Central America, though intended to reimpose the United States' influence, has gained few adherents in the hemisphere. To the contrary, several Latin American states have joined forces in the Contadora Group to block the full implementation of the Reagan administration's policy. Recalling Tugwell's quotation cited earlier, it could be that Latin American states are now both motivated and able to alter the institutions created by the United

States in the pursuit of its Cold War objectives.

Although a substantial body of mainstream literature openly refers to U.S. hegemony, few analysts examine United States-Latin American relations in an explicitly theoretical manner (Needler, 1987; Blackman et al, 1986; Karl and Fagen, 1986; Kryzanek, 1985; Greene, 1984; Blasier, 1976). Therefore, it would be worthwhile to apply rigorously the theory of hegemonic stability in order to understand more adequately the historical behavior of the United States and its regional partners, and the future prospects of the IAS. Based on this premise, the research reported here explores the relevance of propositions derived from the theory of hegemonic stability to Colombia's recent foreign policy reorientatation in an effort to assess the utility of the theory.

The theory of hegemonic stability as applied to the IAS focuses attention on a complex set of causal and reciprocal relationships involving, inter alia, the United States' loss of economic preponderance, the efforts of several Latin American states to pursue autonomous foreign policies and to break out of the the orbit of the United States, and changes in the performance of the regimes comprising the IAS. In general, the theory posits that the relative decline of United States power has changed the context of hemispheric relations. Many Latin American leaders, having perceived this change, recognize fewer constraints upon their range of autonomous action, and are less willing to defer to the

United States' political hegemony in regional affairs. This applies especially to those countries that have achieved a degree of economic development because such development both motivates and enables states to take advantage of new and expanding foreign policy opportunities.

The argument rests on the assumption that Latin American leaders want "to convert themselves from mere objects of the historical process into important subjects" (Farer 1979, p. xxii). The argument also reflects the assumption that "as their economic power increases, secondary states change their assumptions" and are no longer compelled "to accept a one-sided dependence which, no matter how prosperous, adversely affects governmental autonomy and political status" (Nye and Keohane 1977, p. 45).

The focus is on the deference shown by Latin American leaders to the United States' hegemony in political affairs, and its interpretation of the principles of the politico-security regimes of the IAS. Needler (1987, p. 48) points out that "in general, the United States, as a hegemonic power, is interested in the maintenance of a set of norms under which capitalist economic activity can go forward secured and unhindered; politically, the United States is concerned that the governments in question give general support, normally voting with the U.S. in the U.N., and that it not identify itself with the United States' rival in

international politics, today the Soviet Union." In this study, the concern is with compliance with the United States' preferred policy with respect to those highly charged political matters usually associated with the East-West conflict and reflecting an anti-communist posture.

II The Basic Contours of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability

This section outlines the theory of hegemonic stability. First, the theory is sketched with attention to its basic concepts and propositions. Then, attention is focused on terminological and conceptual ambiguities that have led, prematurely, to a downgrading of the theory.

A number of theorists individually are responsible for what Keohane (1980) subsequently termed the theory of hegemonic stability (principal among them are Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin 1975, 1981; Nye and Keohane 1977; Keohane 1980, 1984). Essentially, the theory adopts the basic assumptions of realism about the centrality of power and interest in the interactions among states, but adapts the realist framework by relating power and interest to the possibility of the formation of an international "order". According to Gilpin, "in international society the distribution of power among (states) determines who governs the international system and whose interests are principally promoted by the functioning of the system" (1981, p. 29). In other words, order, to the degree that it has existed at various times throughout

history, has been the reflection of the interests and vision of a single, militarily and technologically superior power (Keohane, 1984, p. 31).

The primary concern of theorists working from these assumptions has been to explain the emergence of, and changes in, patterns of international cooperation. Gilpin's application of the theory has been the most ambitious. The theory of hegemonic stability, in his view, provides a parsimonious explanation not only of the proliferation of multi-national corporations in an international political economy supported by American power (1975 p.4) but, more broadly, international change (1981).

[T]he study of international political change must focus on the international system and especially on the efforts of political actors to change the international system in order to advance their own interests. Whether those interests are security, economic gain, or ideological goals, the achievement of state objectives is dependent on the nature of the international system (i.e., the governance of the system, the rules of the system, the recognition of rights, etc.). As in the case in any social or political system, the process of international political change ultimately reflects the efforts of individuals or groups to transform institutions and systems in order to advance their interests. Because these interests and the powers of groups (or states) change, in time the political system will be changed in ways that will reflect these underlying shifts in interest and power.

In contrast to Gilpin's broad historical overview, Kindleberger and Keohane have made less sweeping applications of the theory. Kindleberger (1973) attempted to explain the Great Depression, and argued that the

principal cause was the decline of British power which in turn lead to the weakening of existing international economic arrangements. For there to be stability in the international political economy, Kindleberger argued, "there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (1973, p. 305). Great Britain had played the role of stabilizer prior to the First World War, but was unable to do so thereafter. The United States, on the other hand, was unwilling to do so and the result, according to Kindleberger, was instability and ultimately economic collapse.

Keohane found Kindleberger's account plausible and cited the economic difficulties experienced by the United States to account for the instability of international economic relations in the middle and late 1970s. Building on previous work done in collaboration with Nye (Keohane and Nye, 1977), Keohane (1980) developed the the theory of hegemonic stability in a systematic way for the first time. The apparent association of the the relative decline of U.S. economic power and changes in the regimes governing money, trade and energy, initially suggested the utility of the theory.

Essentially, the theory postulates that the concentration of power, especially economic power, is conducive to the creation and maintenance of regimes as elements of a larger hegemonic order. Regimes are defined following Krasner as "a set of implicit or explicit

principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge on a given issue-area". This postulate reflects the assumption that only preponderantly powerful states have both the power to establish regimes, and an interest in doing so. Conversely, the fragmentation of power in the international arena leads to a weakening of regimes because hegemonic orders are not self-sustaining; they are maintained only through the initiatives, bargaining and sanctions of the dominant state (Gilpin, 1975 p.).

In order to explain the apparent association between the existence of a dominant state and the emergence of an international order, Gilpin, Kindleberger, and Keohane rely, to varying degrees, on the concept of collective goods and the theory of collective action. The concept was incorporated into the theory because it suggests a reason why regimes are more likely to be formed when a dominant power is able to assume the burdens of leadership. It also elucidates the interests of all parties in participating in regimes. Keohane (1980, p. 136) addresses these issues: .pa

Both hegemonic powers and smaller states may have incentives to collaborate in maintaining a regime. The hegemonic power gains the ability to shape and dominate its international environment while providing a sufficient flow of benefits to small and middle powers to persuade them to acquiesce. Some international regimes can be seen partially as collective goods, whose benefits (such as stable money) can be consumed by all participants without detracting from others' enjoyment of

them. In so far as this is the case, economic theory leads us to expect that extremely large, dominant countries will be particularly willing to provide these goods, while relatively small participants will attempt to secure "free rides" by avoiding proportionate shares of payment.

The concept of collective goods initially suggested that the existence of a great power was a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for cooperation. The rationale for this can be traced to the "free-rider" problem associated with the provision of collective goods. Olson (1971, p.19, 42-43) forcefully demonstrated that self-interested, utility maximizing actors have no incentive to cooperate in the common provision of a collective good. Since it is not feasible to exclude non-contributors from the use of a collective good, no rational actor will contribute to its provision as long as there exists the possibility of benefiting from it without incurring any of the costs. A dominant power, however, is able to bear the costs of providing collective goods such as a stable economic order and/or security. It bears those costs by maintaining open markets and acting as lender of last resort in periods of economic difficulty, or by providing the bulk of the military forces to an alliance (Kindleberger 1973). Gilpin goes a step further, and stresses that a dominant power, somewhat like a central authority within a nation-state, will be able to exact minimal contributions from others to ensure provision of the goods above and beyond what it is

willing and able to provide unilaterally. If the existence of order is itself considered a collective good, the hegemonic power will demand, inter alia, the foreign policy compliance of other states as a form of contribution to the maintenance of that order.

The second contribution of the concept of collective goods is to provide an insight into the interests of states in joining regimes that is consistent with cost-benefit analysis basic to realism. The dominant and subordinate states have intersecting, though not identical, interests. In each instance, calculations of self-interest prevail. The hegemonic state gains disproportionately from the existence of an international system in which collective goods flow freely: "the benefits to (the dominant state) of a secure status quo, free trade, foreign investment, and a well-functioning international monetary system (are) greater than the associated costs." Thus, it will continue to provide them until the costs outweigh the benefits. More importantly, the dominant state consents to provide collective goods in order to induce other states to cooperate, and to reduce the need to coerce them.

The theory, then, posits that subordinate states are motivated to participate in imposed regimes primarily by the prospect of marginal benefit, and secondarily by the fear of coercion. The theory generally dephasizes coercion. Snidal (1985a) suggests that hegemonic stability theory is provocative because it inverts the basic assumptions of

realism by positing that the smaller states are able to "exploit" the hegemon. This gives them an incentive to participate independent of the possibility that non-participation will result in the imposition of sanctions. Nonetheless, the asymmetry of power is the defining characteristic of a hegemonic order, and coercion is always an alternative available to the dominant state.

The provision of collective goods has advantages over coercion because the provision of benefits to all regime members (although not an equitable distribution of those benefits) has the potential to create a belief in the legitimacy of the regime. As Young (1983 p. 101) points out "there is no reason to assume that dominant actors must continuously coerce subordinate actors to ensure conformity with the requirements of imposed orders." "Hegemony" Keohane adds, "rests on the subjective awareness by elites in subordinate states that they are benefiting" (1984, p. 45).

This cognitive dimension of hegemony is crucial, and is stressed in this research. It involves not only the subjective belief in the benefits of involvement in a system dominated by a single state, but a consensual belief in the principles and norms that comprise the regime. This, in turn, involves conceptions about causality and about rectitude (Krasner, 1983 p. 2). So, for example, the emergence after the Second World War of a liberal international economic order with its associated regimes

governing trade, finance and money, was possible because the leaders gathered at Bretton Woods shared a basic consensus about the soundness of liberal economic principles and the economic causes of the war. The existence of this consensus, coupled with the capacity and volition of the United States to assume the burdens of leadership, evinced by the reconstruction of Europe, made the Post-War Order possible.

Just as the existence of a dominant power was conducive to the creation of international regimes, its decline is expected to have consequences in terms of their deterioration. Again, the concept of collective goods, and the difficulties associated with their provision, figure highly in this context. As the hegemon's economic preponderance begins to diminish, collective goods will be supplied to a "suboptimal degree" (Russett, 1985 p. 207), the incentives for states to coordinate their policies will begin to disappear, and regimes will weaken. For its part, the hegemonic power will be less capable and less willing to supply collective goods, insisting that other states begin to shoulder a greater percentage of the financial burden (Nye and Keohane, 1977 p. 45). Consequently, the pressures that make collective action difficult in the first place without the exercise of hegemony will reassert themselves. Subordinate states could find it necessary to pursue independent policies to safeguard their interests as they recognize that unless they "defect" as other subordinate

states are increasingly motivated to do, they alone will be adversely affected.

The example of protectionism illustrates the point. In the absence of a dominant economic power capable of maintaining open markets in difficult times, subordinate states cannot be expected to resist the temptations of economic protectionism. Leadership in resisting the slide toward protectionism is the responsibility of the hegemon which is uniquely able to take effective measures to safeguard the liberal economic order by keeping open its own vast market.

The belief in the legitimacy of a hegemonic system is also subject to change. The suboptimal provision of collective goods will alter calculations of interest. Subordinate states that have resented the privileged position of the hegemonic power and its claim of special prerogatives could take advantage of instability to promote their own interests. Eventually, consensus could emerge around an alternative set of principles and norms. All of these developments have important implications for regime change as hegemonic decline begins to occur.

The effects of hegemonic decline on regimes can range from a weakening of the regime to its demise. The former scenario is more likely. The crucial measure of the strength of a regime is the degree of respect for, and adherence to, the principles, norms, rules, and decision-

making procedures which together constitute the regime. (Krasner, 1983 p. 2). The regime has weakened when significant departures from prevailing practices become common. The deterioration of established patterns of international cooperation produces instability. The theory derives its name from this concern for stability.

When regimes no longer guide state policy, they can be modified or replaced. Krasner (1983, p.4) distinguishes two types of regime-change. It is possible to conceive of changes within a regime. This results when participants attempt to salvage the regime and stabilize those international relations it covers by amending its rules and decision-making procedures. A change of regimes is more fundamental and less common. It occurs when states abandon the basic principles and norms of the regime and embrace alternative principles and norms. Fundamentally different patterns of inter-state behavior would result. For example, were the developing nations able to compel their developed counterparts to institute the New International Economic Order, a change of regime will have transpired. One of the questions raised in this research relates to the nature of the changes in the regimes comprising the IAS sought by the Latin American members of the system.

III Conceptual Ambiguities in the Theory

This, in outline, is the theory of hegemonic stability. As a variant of realism (distinguished only by its emphasis on order rather than conflict, and the employment of the concept of collective goods) it is parsimonious. But the theory is not without its detractors. McKeown (1983, p. 89) pointed out that the theory "is plagued by numerous conceptual ambiguities and omissions." Snidal (1985a) argued that the concept of collective goods, which he views as the principal contribution of the theory of hegemonic stability and what distinguishes it from mere realism, is frequently misapplied¹. These criticisms need to be addressed, and the conceptual ambiguities resolved.

The first ambiguity is terminological and involves the usage of the terms "international system" or "order", "international regimes", and "international organizations." As Haggard and Simmons (1987) correctly point out, a great deal of confusion surrounds the term regime, and this confusion is intensified when it is applied to specific cases. Stein (1983, p. 115) observes critically that regimes are either defined so broadly as to include "all international relations or all international interactions within a given issue-area" or so narrowly that the study of regimes becomes nothing more "than the study of international organizations". Keohane does not contribute to conceptual precision, insisting that both formal and

informal regimes fall into the purview of relevant cases and that the strength of a regime is more important than its degree of formalization (1980, p. 133). Some critics of the theory of hegemonic stability are equally at fault. Cowhey and Long (1983), for example, attempt to test the common hypothesis relating hegemonic decline to patterns of trade by examining the world auto trade, although it is inappropriate to consider trade patterns within a single economic sector as constituting a regime. The ambiguity that surrounds this suggestive concept places the entire theoretical structure at risk by inviting misapplication and premature rejection of key propositions.

Krasner (1983, p. 2) introduced what has become the standard definition of regimes, conceiving of them as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." By contrast, an international order, created in the image of the hegemonic state, is more comprehensive, and contains a variety of regimes concerned with different issue-areas. Keohane expressed the relationship clearly, indicating that "regimes constitute elements of an international order" (1980, p. 31). To give an example of this conceptual distinction in common usage, it is common to refer to the Bretton Woods international economic order established at the end of the Second World War under the leadership of the United States. The Bretton Woods order itself contains

regimes for trade (the G.A.T.T.), money (the I.B.R.D), and finance (the I.M.F.).

Many regimes influence the interactions among the participants in the IAS. Those regimes reflect a declared acceptance of the principles of Inter-American law, the peaceful resolution of conflict, collective security, economic and social development, and human rights to name only the most important. Those principles imply certain norms of behavior, and both the principles and norms have been codified in specific treaties and protocols. For example, the principles of juridical equality and inviolable sovereignty of states are codified in the Charter of the Organization of American States. The associated norms of non-intervention, peaceful resolution of conflict and collective security were incorporated into the Treaty on Pacific Settlements, or the Pact of Bogota, and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty.

Regimes are essentially subjective, but generally have international organizations associated with them. Keohane's point that some regimes are entirely informal has some validity, but regimes should not be confused with the international organizations that embody them. The Organization of American States is the organizational embodiment of the IAS. The OAS is composed of numerous committees, councils and specialized organizations that are concerned with specific issue-areas, and each of these

organs operates according to agreed upon rules and decision-making procedures. General political matters are handled by the General Assembly, crises situations are often handled by the Consultation of Foreign Ministers, human rights issues are brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, social and economic issues are the concerns of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and so on.

In the following chapters, the term IAS refers broadly to the series of regimes influencing the interactions of participants, and the organizations that have been developed to facilitate and regulate those interactions. All interactions among members, including unilateral foreign policy actions directed at a member by another member, and all bilateral and multilateral activities, are construed to be processes occurring within the IAS. Membership in the IAS is operationally defined as membership in the OAS. The term regime is reserved for the principles and norms codified in the treaties and protocols of the Organization of American states, and it is assumed that they reflect the subjective beliefs of national leaders. The term international organization refers exclusively to formal organizations, especially the OAS and its organs, but occasionally also to organizations such as the Andean Group, the Contadora Group or the Group of Eight.

The foci of the research are foreign policy deference and the performance of the IAS. Deference to the United

States in the design and implementation of foreign policy is considered a process occurring within the IAS. Performance is understood to involve both the degree to which a specific regime effectively guides the policies of members, and the nature of those policies. Accordingly, the questions addressed are: Do Latin American states still defer to the United States' hegemony on salient foreign policy issues, and is the United States still capable of controlling the outcomes of the bargaining occurring within the organs of the OAS to ensure that the regimes they are concerned with perform in its interests?

A second issue in need of clarification relates to the hegemonic states' interests and behavior. Kindleberger and Gilpin differ sharply over these issues. Although both employ the concept of collective goods, Gilpin stresses hegemonic self-interest much more than Kindleberger. In fact, Kindleberger avoids the term hegemony, and prefers "responsible leadership." The distinction is important because it has to do with whether the hegemonic state's behavior is benevolent or coercive (Snidal, 1985a; Lake 1983). Snidal stresses the importance of this distinction. He argues that a coercive hegemon's ability to maintain order is adversely affected by the relative decline in its economic fortunes whereas a benevolent leader must suffer economic decline in absolute terms before the consequences of its decline are felt.

Kindleberger's perspective is not entirely satisfactory. Great powers do not act only in the hope of gaining prestige: calculations of tangible material benefit predominate. Insofar as the behavior of the United States is concerned, the "coercive" version of the theory represents a more accurate depiction of the the reality of United States-Latin American relations. The coercive version of the theory focuses attention on efforts by the United States to gain the compliance of Latin American states on political issues as a form of exchange for the "goods" that it is uniquely able to provide. Gilpin stresses that the hegemonic state exercises its power to gain minimal contributions to the maintenance of the order. The argument here is that foreign policy deference represents the contribution exacted. Thus, it is the relative decline of United States economic power rather than its absolute decline (which has not occurred) that is theoretically important in the case of the IAS.

The third ambiguity surrounds the concept of collective goods, the incorporation of which Snidal asserts is the key contribution of the theory. The problem is that few exponents of the theory have adequately identified what collective goods a hegemonic power actually provides. The practical problem for this research involves the identification of collective goods provided in the context of the IAS. Collective goods have two distinctive characteristics. First, once they are provided, it is not

feasible to exclude anyone from enjoying them. Second, one individual's enjoyment of the good does not diminish another individual's enjoyment of it. These properties, non-excludability and non-rivalness, lend themselves to the free-rider problem, and create the theoretically fascinating contradiction between individual self-interest and the collective interests of society.

In the broadest possible conceptualization, international cooperation is itself considered a collective good. A cooperative atmosphere would be one from which all states could derive benefit. But, it is not in the power of a single state to create such an atmosphere, though it could finance international organizations that facilitate cooperative regimes. Most exponents identify two collective goods: security and a stable economic order. Whether it be a "Pax Romana" or a liberal international economic order supported by Great Britain or the United States, all nations benefit from these conditions. Security is provided by the hegemonic power through its disproportionate contribution to collective defense. A stable economic order is provided, as Kindleberger asserts, through maintenance of open markets and provision of credit in times of economic contraction and difficulty.

The issue posed for this research relates to the identification of collective goods provided to members of the IAS by the United States. If collective security and a stable economic order are considered collective goods, Latin

American nations would seem to benefit from them because they participate in a security regime with the United States under the Rio Treaty, and because they are incorporated into a global economy stabilized by the United States. But it is possible to question whether these examples meet the requirements of non-excludability, and to a lesser degree, non-rivalness.

First, although the United States provides tremendous amounts of security assistance to Latin America, it is feasible for the United States to exclude any country it decides to exclude from the benefit of collective security. In fact, the United States historically has been the major threat to the security of many of the nations of the region. Less dramatically, the United States determines which countries receive assistance and in what amounts. The provision of security assistance to some countries in greater proportions than to others raises the issue of non-rivalness. Second, although the United States historically has played the role of stabilizer in the international economy, Latin American states generally do not enjoy many of the benefits of a well functioning liberal economic order. The case of the liberal trade regime is most important. Latin American states have been excluded from U.S. markets. Protectionism affects all the nations of the region, not just those that have attempted to break from the United States sphere of influence and have suffered economic embargoes as a consequence.

These points challenge the characterization of security and economic stability as collective goods, at least insofar as the IAS is concerned. But a countervailing argument can be formulated. In the case of security, it can be argued that any Latin American country facing the real or potential threat of a leftist insurgency will almost certainly receive security assistance from the United States (which is the only member of the IAS capable of providing it in massive amounts). Given the United States' preference that continental regimes be non-communist, it would be irrational (therefore, unfeasible) for the United States to deny military aid to a friendly government. The United States' hegemony depends on the ability to gain political compliance, and this creates the imperative to protect deferential governments and isolate non-compliant ones. This would elucidate the logic behind the provision of assistance to governments known to engage in human rights violations regardless of how detestable that fact may be to the United States' leadership. The imperative to maintain the order outweighs humanitarian considerations. Thus, any government, willing to exchange Cold War alignment and an anti-communist posture with the United States can expect support when challenged by a leftist insurgency.

Similarly, the fact that some countries receive security assistance in greater amounts than others does not violate the criterion of non-rivalness unless both countries

face a comparable threat but only one receives U.S. assistance. The enjoyment of the benefit of security assistance by a country that needs it does not rival the enjoyment of a country that does not also need it. The degree of threat is the overriding factor. The collective good is the availability of security assistance and the willingness of the United States to provide it. Unless the United States reduced or ended its substantial security commitments to Latin America because of an unwillingness to continue to assume the burdens of leadership, or unless Latin American countries refuse to exchange deference for the privileged access to such assistance, security from subversive threat is a collective good provide in the context of the IAS.

A similar argument holds with respect to access to United States markets. Those countries that have been systematically excluded, Cuba, Nicaragua, (and briefly, Panama), are those that have refused to exchange political compliance. Conversely, the United States has granted preferential access in order to sustain its regional hegemony. The Alliance for Progress and the Caribbean Basin Initiative are the two prime examples of such efforts.

The implementation of protectionist measures in the 1980s could be explained differently. This new wave of protectionism can be interpreted as both a result, and indication, of the loss of economic preponderance. The theory posits that the loss of economic preponderance

diminishes the hegemonic power's willingness to bear the excessive costs of economic leadership. Protecting the position of domestic producers in the hegemonic state's market is one way of doing this. The implementation of protectionist measures, then, indicates the sub-optimal provision of the collective good of unhindered (and in some instances, preferential) trade traditionally promoted by the United States both globally and regionally.

Collective security, economic stability, free trade, and stable money can all be considered collective goods once provided by the United States to members of the IAS. However, the concept does not necessarily possess the pivotal importance Snidal and others attach to it, because not every example of cooperation in the IAS involves the provision of collective goods. In those cases in which collective goods are involved, the availability of the concept is useful. But, the remaining concepts of the theory possess utility independent of the concept of collective goods.

The theory provides a useful framework within which to describe, analyze and explain United States-Latin American relations, even if the concept of collective goods is not central to those efforts. The theory's other principal concepts possess obvious validity when applied to the IAS. More importantly, the theory's central proposition (that the preponderance of economic, military and political power

creates the conditions for the hegemony of a single state) is one that appears to explain many aspects of United States-Latin American relations, regardless of whether the exercise of hegemony has ever involved the provision of collective goods. For these reasons, the misapplication of the concept criticized by Snidal, does not reflect an inherent flaw in the theory.

The fourth ambiguity is one of most critical because it involves the definition of hegemony itself. Disagreement over the definition of the theory's central concept is obviously problematic, but the problem is not simply one of a lack of common usage. Ultimately, the lack of agreement will complicate efforts to develop a model of Inter-American relations consistent with the theory.

Keohane defines hegemony as a "preponderance of material resources". More specifically he asserts that hegemony as economic preponderance involves control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets, and competitive advantage in the production of highly valued goods (1984, p. 32). Starting from the premise that hegemony defined this way facilitates cooperation, Keohane attempts to explain the instability of the international economy in terms of the loss of economic preponderance, or what he calls fragmentation of economic power. When economic power is not sufficiently concentrated, regimes deteriorate and instability ensues.

Gilpin, by contrast, distinguishes economic power from political leadership and control, and defines hegemony in terms of political leadership. For example, in the context of a discussion of the formation of a liberal economic order, Gilpin notes that "the champions of an interdependent world market economy have been politically the most powerful and economically the most efficient. Both elements, hegemony and efficiency, are necessary preconditions for a society to champion an interdependent market economy." (1981, p. 129). Note the theoretically significant juxtaposition of the concepts political hegemony and economic efficiency.

The crucial difference between Keohane and Gilpin relates to their understanding of the relationship between economic power and political control. The fact that they conceive of economic power differently is not important. Gilpin defines economic power in terms of efficiency whereas Keohane defines it in terms of preponderance of resources, but this difference is merely operational and can be resolved on methodological grounds. What is important is that for Gilpin economic power is not to be equated with hegemony, and therefore that the nation possessing the most powerful economy is not necessarily hegemonic. Thus Gilpin points out that "national economic efficiency without a corresponding political-military strength may not be able to induce other powerful societies to assume the costs of the market system" (1981, p. 129).

The problem with Keohane's conceptualization is that it does not fully specify how economic preponderance actually translates into political control. Keohane is not the only analyst to confound power with resources. As Organski (1964 p. 98) correctly notes, "wealth is so frequently used as an instrument of power that we tend to think of it as bringing power automatically..." Keohane does give some consideration to these matters. He minimizes the importance military power in his scheme, primarily because he is concerned with the international political economy where the use of force is counterproductive. He notes only that "the military conditions of economic hegemony are met if the economically preponderant country has sufficient military capabilities to prevent incursions by others that would deny it access to major areas of its economic activity" (1984, p.40). Following McKeown (1983), Keohane emphasizes the role of economic pressures. Nonetheless, Keohane's explication of the relationship between economic strength and political influence is incomplete.

Gilpin also discusses these issues, and his treatment is more adequate. He contends that great powers are motivated by economic, and not merely ideological, considerations to attempt to establish world order. This argument turns on the premise that economic systems rest on political foundations (1975, p. 4). Thus the quest for political control derives from the desire to prosper. Gilpin found that economic powers historically have been

able to establish political order because their economic power, which provided a basis for military power, made it possible for them to do so. But, there is nothing inevitable or automatic about the translation of economic power into hegemony. Thus, in his discussion of these matters, Gilpin avoids confusion between economic power and political control.

Based on these considerations, economic power and hegemony are distinguished here following Gilpin's conceptualization. Hegemony is defined as one state's ability to exercise control over outcomes within a system of interactions. An obvious implication of this formulation is that it is tautological to assert that the hegemonic power exercises political control. At the same time, this formulation directs attention to the theoretically interesting question as to how an economic power translates its economic advantages into political outcomes. Another consequence, discussed in Chapter Two, is that hegemonic decline is modeled as a dependent variable affected by, *inter alia*, the loss of economic preponderance.

A fifth issue relates to doubts about the theory's predictive power. When Keohane and others first developed the theory, international economic regimes were in a state of flux. If the cause of the disruption was the relative decline of the United States' economic power, then the deterioration of economic regimes supported by the United

States should have proceeded apace. That did not occur. This fact has generated a considerable amount of research attempting to explain the fact of continued cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane, 1984; Snidal, 1985a, 1985b).

Contrary to Kindleberger's contention that collective leadership is destabilizing ("it is better to have a car driven by one poor driver than by two excellent ones"), analysts increasingly concur that governments, acting rationally and habituated to patterns of cooperation, will find it in their interest to continue to cooperate. More importantly, they will be able to do so. This is a plausible account of what is happening in the case of cooperation between Western Europe, Japan, and the United States in money and trade. Ruggie, emphasizing the cognitive or subjective dimension of regime dynamics, (1983) would attribute this to the enduring influence of "embedded liberalism".

The fact that these efforts to explain continued cooperation have utilized some of the basic components of the theory should attest to its utility. Upon closer examination it becomes apparent that nothing in the theory suggests that the relationship between fragmentation of economic power and the deterioration of regimes is a straightforward or linear one. This is especially clear if the subjective dimension of regime dynamics are taken into consideration, because adherence to basic principles is likely to endure even after changes occur in the

distribution of power.

Even so, there has been a move by many to downgrade the theory. Though both Gilpin (1981) and Krasner (1985) continue to employ the theory of hegemonic stability, Nye and Keohane have been more circumspect. Recently they have acknowledged that the result of much of the research generated by their initial formulation "has been to increase skepticism about the validity of the the hegemonic stability theory " (Nye and Keohane, 1987, p. 741.) Keohane (1984, p. 39) cogently summarized the downgrading of the theory.

The crude theory of hegemonic stability establishes a useful, if somewhat simplistic, starting-point for an analysis of changes in international cooperation and discord. Its refined version raises a looser but suggestive set of interpretive questions for the analysis of some areas in the history of the international political economy. Such an interpretive framework does not constitute an explanatory systemic theory, but it can help us to think of hegemony in a different way -- less as a concept that helps to explain outcomes in terms of power than as a way of describing an international system in which leadership is exercised by a single state.

The downgrading of the theory to an analytical framework by one of its principal exponents is significant. It is also premature.

Three observations are forthcoming. First, the characterization of the IAS as a hegemonic system is "descriptively" accurate, thus this framework is applicable

and potentially useful even in the more modest sense lately suggested by Keohane. In fact, in the same passage in which he discusses what he views as the diminished significance of the concept of hegemony, Keohane goes on to pose questions directly addressed in this research: "theories of hegemonic stability should seek not only to analyze dominant powers' decisions to engage in rule-making and rule-enforcing, but also to explore why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon" (1984, p. 39). This research examines the relationship between the United States and one of its Latin American partners in a regional system in which deference to the United States' leadership has been an historical fact and a source of tension.

Second, despite Keohane's loss of confidence in the explanatory power of the theory, it is possible to combine its key propositions with some of the propositions suggested by the comparative foreign policy literature in order to generate the a more fully specified model of foreign policy deference, and regime change and performance. As Snidal (1985a, p. 580) points out, "hegemonic stability theory does point toward fertile ground for analytical and empirical investigation of international politics" and "a revised formulation... offers the prospect of a better understanding of regime performance."

Third, and most important, the cases that have generally been examined, economic regimes facilitating cooperation between the United States, Western Europe and

Japan, do not provide the best tests of some of the hypotheses that can be inferred from the theory. Continued cooperation between these industrialized states after one of them has lost ground relative to the others is not a major puzzle. The industrialized giants have much to gain from a perpetuation of the prevailing system, and much to lose from its collapse.

The expectation that the relative decline of the United States would result in foreign policy reorientation and regime change is much more appropriate in the case of the IAS. The members of the IAS are developing nations which support efforts to alter existing international economic and political regimes because of the assessment of their leaders that existing regimes favor the industrialized nations to their detriment. The IAS represents a special case because all but one of its members are subordinate both in the sense that they are secondary actors in a hegemonic system and in the sense that they are economically dependent on the hegemon. This means that the concept of dependency must figure prominently in a model of Inter-American relations.

Thus, it is not surprising that Latin American countries increasingly find it in their interest to participate in the Non-Aligned Movement, UCTAD and other fora, and join in the call for a New International Economic Order. These facts evince a mounting dissatisfaction with existing arrangements, and a rejection of some of the

principles on which they are based. If regimes are essentially subjective, the rejection of certain economic and political principles, and their substitution with others is extremely important.

The conflict is just as sharp with respect to the politico-security regimes of the IAS, the focus of this research. Increasingly, Latin American leaders perceived that to the degree that the United States determines the political and security agenda, participation in an IAS entails costs in terms of political autonomy and economic dependence. Thus efforts to change existing rules and decision-making procedures, if not underlying norms and principles themselves, could follow the reality or perception of the United States' loss of influence.

IV Outline of the Dissertation

All these considerations suggest the usefulness of applying the theory of hegemonic stability to the IAS. This research is intended to accomplish two related objectives. First, it will give to the study of United States-Latin American relations a theoretical orientation that it currently lacks. Second, it will either provide additional empirical corroboration to the theory, or it will raise another challenge to its utility.

The study is structured as follows. Chapter Two presents a model of Inter-American relations based on the

theory of hegemonic stability. This model reflects a synthesis of the conceptualizations and propositions of the various proponents of the theory whose work has been discussed in this chapter. However, the model also incorporates variables which reflect the considerations just discussed. More specifically, economic dependence on the United States is included in the model. Most notably, hegemony is modeled as a dependent variable rather than as an independent variable as is generally the case. Foreign policy deference and regime performance (the foci of this research) are modeled as intervening variables.

It is argued that economic preponderance is a necessary condition for hegemony, but it is not a sufficient one (it is not itself hegemony). Hegemony exists only when one state is able to command the foreign policy deference of other states, and to utilize the international organizations associated with specific regimes to its advantage. Deference and regime performance, in turn, are influenced by the perception of the leaders of subordinate states of fewer constraints on, and enhanced opportunities for, the development of a more autonomous foreign policy pursued through unilateral actions and in the OAS. The factors that are hypothesized to influence these perceptions are loss of economic preponderance, the hegemonic power's loss of the will to assume the burdens of leadership, the diversification of economic dependence, the level of economic development or more broadly, economic viability,

and adoption of alternative principles and norms.

Chapter Three presents a case study of the evolution of Colombian foreign policy, and offers this case as an example of the partial diminution of United States hegemony in conformity with propositions one and two stated in the next chapter. More specifically, it describes and analyzes a much noted reorientation (viraje) in Colombia's foreign policy in an effort to answer the question posed by Keohane as to why subordinate states defer to the leadership of a hegemonic power, or in this case, why they cease deferring to that leadership. Special attention is given to the period between 1966 and 1988, a time-frame which encompasses six presidential administrations.

The Colombian example was selected for a focused case study because Colombia had once been among the United States' most deferential ally's in the IAS. This research demonstrates that dramatic initiatives undertaken after 1982 during the administration of president Belisario Betancur Cuatras (1982-1986) were the result of a gradual yet discernible evolutionary process. More specifically, it is argued that Colombian foreign policy has changed notably along two dimensions, the level of diplomatic activity and the degree of foreign policy autonomy vis-a-vis the United States. The latter is crucial because it impinges directly on the issue of the deference to the United States' leadership in hemispheric affairs.

Chapter Four is the first of two chapters intended to interpret Colombia's foreign policy viraje employing the model elaborated in Chapter Two. Guided by propositions three and four stated in that chapter, economic data are analyzed to ascertain whether, and to what extent, Colombia's departure from a clear historical pattern of deference to the United States was associated with greater economic capacity and reduced vulnerability to United States pressure. Section two focuses on Colombia's overall economic performance and viability, and its level of economic development. Subsequent sections focus on the degree of Colombia's dependency on United States markets and assistance.

Chapter Five focuses on the evolution of Colombian leaders' cognitions in order to contribute (together with Chapter Four) to an explanation of the foreign policy reorientation described in Chapter Three. In conformity with propositions five and six stated in the next chapter, this chapter provides evidence of changes in the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and orientations of Colombian foreign policy-makers. This evidence was obtained through a content analysis of the Colombian Foreign Ministry's Memorias published between 1966 and 1988.

The analysis focuses on four specific themes. First, the analysis was conducted to determine the nature and derivation of the principles and norms thought to be

important by Colombian leaders. The concern was to determine whether the principles espoused lent themselves to deference to the United States' leadership. Second, the analysis focused on Colombian leaders' attitudes about, and orientations toward, the United States. These include evaluations of United States policy, and assessments of Colombia's actual and proper relationship with the United States. Third, the texts were examined for signs of perceptions of constraint upon, or opportunity for, greater involvement in regional and international politics. Especially important was the perception of the potential for greater autonomy vis-a-vis the United States. Fourth, the documents were probed for signs of the Colombian leadership's conception(s) of Colombia's role in regional and international affairs.

The thrust of the argument advanced in this chapter is that Colombia's foreign policy reorientation was prompted, in part, by altered perceptions of interest with respect to continuing to defer unconditionally to United States leadership, the gradual adoption of principles reflecting a Third World orientation that is inconsistent with automatic allegiance to the United States, and perceptions of expanding opportunities for, and a increasing need to, pursue a more active and autonomous foreign policy in the region and in the world.

Chapter Six presents the conclusions of the study. The findings are reviewed in an effort to assess the utility of

the theory of hegemonic stability. Areas of potentially complementary research are suggested.

NOTES

1. More importantly, Russett (1985) and Strange (1987) have challenged the thesis of U.S. economic and political decline. This is an empirical question, rather than a conceptual ambiguity, and will be taken up in Chapter Three.

2. A wide range of cases have been studied, including nuclear non-proliferation (Nye, 1981), civil aviation (Smith, 1981), international shipping (Cafuny, 1985), trade (Finlayson and Zacher, 1983), finance (Cohen, 1983) and even security (Jervis, 1983).

CHAPTER TWO

A MODEL OF INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

I Introduction


This chapter presents a model of Inter-American relations based on the theory of hegemonic stability, and states propositions derived from that model which guide the research reported in subsequent chapters. The model is depicted in Figure 2.1. It is an adaptation of hegemonic stability theory in the sense that it reflects modifications that make it applicable to the case of the IAS. Nonetheless, the model accurately reflects the assumptions and propositions of those authors whose work was summarized in the previous chapter.

II THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

(1) HEGEMONY

It has become almost commonplace to assert that the United States has declined. Although immensely powerful, it is no longer hegemonic. Hegemony exists when one state is able to command the deference of other states with respect to issues of importance to it, and is able to utilize international organizations to its advantage. If the United States was ever a hegemonic power, Latin America was the site of its greatest and most enduring influence. The purpose of this research is to explore the popular thesis of the decline of the United States in the IAS.

FIGURE 2.1
A MODEL OF THE IAS



Regimes contribute to hegemony because they reflect in large measure the interests of the hegemonic power. The principles and norms they encompass institutionalize its advantages. The international organizations that are created to put regimes into practice are instruments at the disposal of the dominant power, though they can also be utilized by other regime participants.

Regimes are important also because to the degree that their principles and norms are accepted, and adhered to, by the leaders of other states, hegemony is made easier. The dominant state does not need to pressure or coerce leaders who share its values and objectives. Deference is an attitude which reflects consensus, although it can also be a form of behavior that reflects fear of sanctions imposed by a great power.

When the preponderance of power diminishes or disappears, changes in patterns of international relations can be expected. Deference could end altogether if the deferential behavior of subordinate states had been compliant rather than consensual. The adoption of alternative principles and norms to those that had supported consensus and produced deference could be a factor influencing the decision of subordinate states to act more autonomously. Recognizing that there is power in numbers, those states are likely attempt to use existing organizations to their advantage.

When these changes occur, hegemony has ended. Having lost its preponderance, the once dominant state is no longer able to command deference either through consensus or enforced compliance, and finds that previously subordinate, but now increasingly revisionist, states have seized the organizations it had formed to legitimize its hegemony.

These are the central propositions of the theory of hegemonic stability. Accordingly, in the model presented above, hegemony is modeled as a dependent variable. This conceptualization differs sharply from Keohane's. He equates hegemony with preponderance. Following Gilpin's differentiation between economic and military power, and governance of the system, hegemony is conceived as the consequence of one state's ability to command deference and control performance of international organizations associated with regimes. Hegemony, then, is a dependent variable in the sense that its existence is dependent on the creation of those conditions.

(2) REGIME PERFORMANCE

In order to establish their hegemony, powerful states promote regimes and the formation of international organizations to oversee their operation. So, regimes facilitate hegemony, they are not products of it. Keohane implicitly shares this view. He argues that in creating regimes, "the hegemonic power gains the ability to shape and

dominate its environment..." (1980, p. 136). This evidently means that regimes serve as one of the many instruments at the hegemonic state's disposal to maintain control. Similarly, Gilpin holds that "the rights and rules that govern or at least influence the interactions among states" serve to facilitate the hegemonic power's control since these rules reflect its interests first and foremost (1981, p. 34). Krasner (1985) contends that by creating regimes and international organizations, dominant states seek to legitimize the existing order. The implication of this is simply that the loss of control over the performance of regimes translates into the beginning of the loss of hegemony.

The creation by a dominant power of international organizations in the process of institutionalizing a regime is a hazardous undertaking as Krasner (1983; 1985) clearly demonstrates. Although instituted to reflect and serve its interest, a regime is likely to acquire a degree of institutional autonomy, and to serve as a forum in which subordinate states can voice their grievances. It thereby becomes a power resource for subordinate states. There are limits to the autonomy of developing states, even the so-called "middle powers". For this reason, developing states rely on international fora such as the United Nations or the OAS to give them additional leverage. This suggests that subordinate states will attempt to utilize existing organizations to their benefit, and to neutralize the

hegemonic power. Their aim is to alter the performance of the regime. When the dominant power begins to lose its preponderance, the probability that those efforts will be successful will increase.

Krasner found that this is most likely to occur in those cases in which developing states have access to an existing organization, the legitimacy of that organization is still acknowledged by the dominant power, and the developing states are unified. To give the most important example, Third World states have demonstrated their ability to use the UN to advance their agenda in an institution the United States did so much to legitimize.

The OAS is a superb candidate for this kind of seizure for all the reasons suggested by Krasner. First, the Latin American states have access to all the organs of the OAS and the United States has no formal veto power. Thus, unlike international economic institutions such as the IMF, Latin American states have a presence in this organization which at least affords them the opportunity to utilize it to their best individual and collective interests. Second, it is not politically feasible for the United States to withdraw from the OAS or any of its organs the way it withdrew, for example, from the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) or from the International Court of Justice at the Hague during the Reagan administration. In this case, the rhetorical commitments made to the organization as well as

to the idea of a "special relationship" between the United States and its Latin American neighbors constrains the United States. Ironically, the OAS enjoys legitimacy in large measure because the United States conveyed legitimacy upon it, though it did so originally in the expectation that the organization would serve its purposes. This legitimacy gives additional leverage to those Latin American states attempting to use the OAS to advance its demands for change. Third, with few exceptions, Latin American leaders themselves accept the legitimacy of the IAS and the utility of the OAS (though not the ascendancy of the United States), and they frequently express a sense of regional identification and a desire for greater regional cooperation. Thus, they are unified with respect to their interests regarding the IAS, and understand that their individual interests are best served by regional cooperation as unilateral action remains difficult.

The essential point to be emphasized in the context of the IAS is that the United States and its weaker Latin American partners shared neither identical reasons for assenting to the formalization of the IAS nor equal capacity to control the performance of its organs once the OAS had been created. The contrasting and often conflicting interests of the United States and the Latin American members of the IAS have important implications for the future of the IAS and more specifically the political bargaining taking place within the OAS.

If Latin American leaders recognize the need for regional cooperation to support their own individual efforts to obtain their objectives, they also share a corresponding interest in transforming the IAS. This interest derives from the fact that the United States' dominance of the OAS has inhibited Latin American efforts to realize both political and economic objectives. Although the United States sought diplomatic support for its actions within the organization, these diplomatic maneuvers only obscured the unilateralism characteristic of U.S. hemispheric policy. This has created antagonism and a desire for change. It is reasonable, therefore, that Latin American states would attempt either to gain greater control of the regional organization or to develop alternative ones, be they ad hoc or permanent, as a consequence of the long simmering dissatisfaction with the performance of the IAS. The thrust of the argument based on the theory of hegemonic stability is that, recognizing the weakened position of the United States, they perceive an opportunity to redress their grievances utilizing, inter alia, the OAS itself.

The argument is not that Latin American leaders intend to jettison the principles of non-intervention, peaceful resolution of conflict, juridical equality of states and collective defense that underlie the IAS, or that they want to dismantle the system. To the contrary, Latin American statesmen have been among the most active in developing these principles of international conduct and among the most

vociferous in their defense. The problem from the Latin American perspective pertains not to the philosophical basis of the system, but to the violation of its norms by the United States in accordance with its own interpretation of its hemispheric role as guarantor of the IAS. Although most Latin American leaders recognize the legitimacy of the IAS, that grant of legitimacy does not extend to continued United States domination of it.

This suggests that any change that does occur will not be fundamental. To employ Krasner's distinction, the expectation is one of changes within rather than of the regimes of the IAS. Latin American states at present lack the power to transform hemispheric politics dramatically, but there are opportunities for significant change, and it is in their individual and collective interests to avail themselves of these opportunities.

These considerations suggest the following proposition. Proposition #1. The United States has lost, or is beginning to lose, its ability to control the outcomes of bargaining within the OAS.

The next chapter presents some evidence of Colombia's activity within the OAS both in support and in opposition to United States initiatives and policies. Additionally, Chapter Five presents evidence of the evolving conceptions of Colombian leaders with respect to the OAS which supports the view that Colombia, in concert with other Latin American

states, is attempting to alter the performance of the IAS and has had some success in doing so. However, a systematic attempt to confirm this proposition must await future research. The contours of such research are suggested in the conclusion (Chapter 6).

Foreign Policy Deference

The theory of hegemonic stability was developed to explain the apparent weakening of post-war economic regimes. Consequently, all empirical tests of the theory's utility have focused on regime formation and change. Less attention has been focused on foreign policy. When foreign policy behavior is examined within the framework of hegemonic stability theory, it is generally the foreign policies of the United States or Great Britain that are examined, and the discussion usually centers on how these hegemonic powers have managed or should manage their decline.

But the foreign policies of regime participants warrant examination for two reasons. First, regime performance, formation or change presuppose the foreign policy decisions of individual states based on calculations of national interest and conceptions about their appropriate national roles. The model reflects the reciprocal relationship between foreign policy and regime performance. The relationship is reciprocal in the sense that the extent and nature of participation in a regime reflects prior foreign

policy decisions, and membership in international organizations reinforces unilateral foreign policy measures. Second, as Keohane suggests, it would be worthwhile "to explore why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon" (1984, p. 39).

The foreign policy deference of subordinate states on salient political issues is the second condition that must be created for there to be hegemony. Deference is required by the dominant power in exchange for the benefits of participation in a regime. This is especially relevant in the case of imposed orders like the IAS. But it is relevant in the case of systems in which members are nominally "equal". It is not uncommon for regime participants to recognize one state's position as primus inter pares, and consequently to defer to the leadership of that state. The example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization illustrates this unequivocally. Despite the nominal recognition of the juridicaequality of states within the OAS, and the fact that the United States does not possess formal veto power (as it does in the U.N. Security Council), the ascendancy of the United States historically has been obvious.

When collective goods are involved, their provision gives subordinate states an incentive to participate in a regime. Subordinate states will not pay in proportion to their benefit, that is, they will attempt to secure a free-ride. But the ride is never entirely free. One function of

the hegemonic state is to exact some contribution to the maintenance of the system. In other words, some form of revenue is exchanged (Gilpin 1981, p. 184). The form of exchange may not only be material: hegemonic states also require some degree of deference to its political hegemony because every economic system rests on a political base, thus the key to the continued economic dominance of the hegemonic state is the maintenance of a political order (Gilpin 1981, p. 24).

Deference is a complex phenomenon. Leaders of subordinate states will defer to the leadership of a great power when there exists between them a consensus with respect to the soundness and legitimacy of the great power's foreign policy agenda. This is generally the product of a common ideology, or the perception of a common threat. When the unique capabilities of the great power are recognized, the consensus is likely to extend to the propriety of that state's hegemony. Consequently, specific roles and role expectations devolve upon members of the system.

Deference is not always the product of consensus. Overtly deferential behavior on the part of subordinate states is frequently an example of foreign policy compliance. Compliance occurs when subordinate states deliberately bring their foreign policies into line with those of the hegemonic state in order to avoid negative repercussions. Vast asymmetries of power can produce this

kind of foreign policy adjustment despite the fact that subordinate states do not agree with the dominant power regarding foreign policy objectives, do not support specific actions of the dominant power, or reject the propriety of superordinate-subordinate role relations.

As a final resort, a hegemonic power can apply pressure to ensure that its agenda for international or regional relations is adhered to by the states within its orbit. But an enduring hegemonic order is one in which participants share a common set of assumptions, principles and values promoted by the hegemonic power, including beliefs about the necessity and/or propriety of the exercise of leadership by a dominant power.

Keohane (1984), Haas (1980), Ruggie (1983), Puchala and Hopkins (1984) and others correctly stress this cognitive or attitudinal dimension of regime dynamics. Attention to attitudes helps to avoid a problem common to many studies of the foreign policy compliance of weak or subordinate states. Moon (1985) first underscored the problem when he noted that most studies of foreign policy compliance fail to take into account the possibility that similar voting patterns in international fora (the most frequently employed measure of foreign policy compliance) could reflect an underlying ideological affinity and thus foreign policy consensus. Where consensus exists, the question of compliance is irrelevant.

Latin American leaders have shared with the United States a strong anti-communist ideology. This, in turn, has motivated them to support many of the actions of the United States, and to accept United States leadership in the recognition that it alone can provide certain security guarantees. The declarations of Caracas (1954) and Punta del Este (1962) which isolated on ideological grounds the governments of Guatemala and Cuba, respectively, are the most prominent examples of this.

Only when consensus begins to breakdown, for whatever reason, does the compliance of subordinate states become an issue. The lack of agreement about fundamental principles could motivate a subordinate state to strike a more independent course. If the dominant power judges this to be prejudicial to its interests, it could apply pressure designed to gain compliance. This pressure does not have to be applied overtly. In fact, the subordinate state could anticipate a negative reaction on the part of its more powerful partner and, lacking the resources to assert its autonomy, could refrain from pursuing a more independent policy. In this case compliance is invisible.

The proposition that subordinate states will yield to foreign policy compliance after consensus has disappeared, is derived from the rationality assumption basic to realism and shared by hegemonic stability theory. The leaders of subordinate states will recognize that the benefits of participation in a regime, and this means also compliance

with the preferences of the hegemonic state, outweigh the uncertain gains of striking an independent foreign policy course. These benefits follow from the hegemon's economic preponderance, and come in the form of access to markets, capital, economic and military aid. More significantly, in imposed orders non-participation might not be a viable option. The only alternative to participation and deference to the hegemonic leadership could be complete exclusion and enmity. The expulsion of Cuba from the IAS represents a case in point.

The diminution of the power of the dominant state has implications for foreign policy compliance. The perception of the expansion of opportunities and the contraction of constraints could motivate states to seek greater autonomy and independence of action. Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 45) address these issues.

As their economic power increases, secondary states change their assumptions. No longer do they have to accept a one-sided dependence which, no matter how prosperous, adversely affects governmental autonomy and political status. As autonomy and status become possible, these values are taken from the closet of "desirable but unrealizable goals." ...Thus, as the rule-making and rule enforcing powers of the hegemonic state begin to erode, the policies of secondary states are likely to change.

These considerations suggest a second proposition.

Proposition #2: The Latin American members of the IAS are less inclined to defer to the political leadership of the United States as indicated by their pursuit of more active and autonomous foreign policies, and more broadly, by the prevalence of the so called New Latin American foreign policy, that has been documented by so many analysts.

This proposition guides the focused case study of Colombian foreign policy presented in Chapter Three which presents the Colombian case as an example of a more active and autonomous foreign policy, and thus of the diminished capacity of the United States to gain the foreign policy deference of its partners in the IAS.

III The Independent Variables

(1) Fragmentation of Economic Power, and the Diversification of Dependency

Central to hegemonic stability theory's explanation of change is the proposition that the loss of economic preponderance affects the processes of international relations or what Gilpin terms interaction processes (Waltz, 1979 chapter 5; Gilpin, 1981, p. 28). The model incorporates the concept of power fragmentation, taken from Keohane (1980, p.134 and 136). Power fragmentation involves changes in "the relative power resources available to major states" and the economic competition that occurs between them (Keohane, 1980 p. 134 and 136). In other words, it is

not the economic decline of the United States per se that is important (in fact, the economic power of the United has increased in absolute terms) but the changes in the distribution of power among major states. As Snidal points out, "understanding the impact of hegemonic decline requires information about the size distribution of states that goes beyond mere preponderance or nonpreponderance of the dominant state" (1985a, p. 604). Hegemonic stability theory posits that structural change of this nature has the potential of affecting the political processes of the international system, if not yet the nature of the system. Especially relevant in the context of the IAS is the increasing magnitude and importance of economic contacts between Western Europe and Japan, and Latin America (Lowenthal, 1987; Grabendorff and Roett, 1985; Goldhamer, 1972).

The fragmentation of economic power is important in two respects. The first has to do with the effects of the loss of economic preponderance on the domestic political processes of the hegemonic state, and more specifically the effects on the consensus among foreign policy elites about the prudence of continued leadership. The second has to do with the fact that fragmentation of economic power potentially makes available to Latin American states alternatives to U.S. markets, finances and other highly valued goods and services, thereby permitting them to diversify their economic dependence. The practical

importance of the diversification of dependence is the reduced vulnerability to economic pressure imposed by a single state to gain foreign policy compliance. Although this research does not directly address either the effects of these structural changes on the domestic politics of the hegemonic state or the causes of these changes, a brief discussion of these points is warranted.

The change in the distribution of economic power, specifically the growth of Western European and Japanese economies relative to the economy of the United States, is a phenomenon attributable, in part, to the policies pursued by the United States in the immediate Post-War period. The reconstruction of Europe and Japan was a priority of the United States and was possible only because the United States, possessing a clear preponderance of material resources, saw to its realization. In the meantime, the United States created a liberal international economic order in which these reconstructed market economies could thrive. European and Japanese economic recovery meant that the vast asymmetries between the United States' economy and the economies of its new allies would eventually diminish, and that economic preponderance would disappear. This eventuality would have important consequences in terms of continued U.S. hegemony. The economic strains associated with economic and political leadership, the consequences of what Stein calls the hegemon's dilemma (1983), were almost certain to lead to changes in the dominant country's

perception of interest in continuing to bear the burden of leadership.

The increasing economic strains associated with hegemony can produce a debate about existing commitments, with some foreign policy elites advocating the need to scale back those commitments, and others asserting the need to continue to provide leadership even in the face of higher costs. Kindleberger, Gilpin and Keohane all discuss this point in terms of its implications for United States policy. If this policy debate leads to a breakdown in the consensus that guided the foreign policies of the hegemonic state, hegemony as political control, will be directly affected. The leadership of the hegemonic state, after assessing its costs and determining that continued hegemony is not feasible and potentially dangerous in the long-term, can unilaterally decide to cease leading. Great Britain's decision to scale back its political and military commitments in the Mediterranean in the late 1940s represents such an example. The direct effect of the loss of willingness to lead on hegemony is depicted in the model.

The breakdown of consensus due in part to the perception that the costs of leadership outweigh its benefits could also affect the willingness to employ military force (George, et al., 1971 p. 223; Tucker, 1981). Keohane minimizes the importance of military capabilities, but they figure prominently in Gilpin's work because he

found that a state's reputation for the use of force contributes significantly to the hegemonic power's ability to retain control over the order it established (Gilpin, 1981 p. 31; Keohane, 1984 p. 40). This point is important in the context of the IAS because, in the past, the United States did not hesitate to use military force to assure compliance, usually by intervening to install friendly governments. But as Nye and Keohane (1977) suggest, the use of military power has costs and American leaders are increasingly reluctant to incur those costs. In short, the political climate in the United States, due to the compromised economic position, together with the difficulties associated with employing coercive policies as effectively as in the past, emboldens Latin American leaders.

The breakdown or weakening of the consensus among the foreign policy elite of the dominant power can also have an indirect effect on the possibility of continued hegemony. Deference (and ultimately hegemony) can be affected by the perception of Latin American leaders of the inability of the United States effectively to enforce compliance due to debilitating effects of a sharp debate over the ends and means of foreign policy. This was the practical importance of the "Vietnam Syndrome" for United States foreign policy in the 1970s. This perception would encourage them to play more autonomous roles in regional and global affairs, and even to challenge the United States on issues important to

it -- if they were so inclined. For example, the absence of a bipartisan foreign policy consensus potentially translates into an inability to take decisive and sustained action. The inability of the Reagan administration to garner and sustain significant congressional approval for its support of Nicaraguan insurgents perhaps represents an example of this phenomenon.

Turning now to the second point, fragmentation of economic power, conceived as the emergence of economic competitors to the United States, increases alternatives to United States as a source of markets, finances, and highly valued goods and services. Keohane conceived of economic preponderance in these terms. Such preponderance is a potential instrument of power, as the threat of economic embargo makes clear. A substantial reduction of that preponderance would have favorable political consequences for a subordinate states contemplating a more autonomous foreign policy. As Spiegel (cited in Richardson, 1978 p. 83) points out "the emergence of competing middle range contenders for influence such as Japan, West Germany and France" translates increasingly into the inability of the dominant states to manipulate weak ones in its orbit. Similarly, Jaguaribe contends that changes in the international economic, political and military systems have produced a "degree of permissibility" so that the more economically viable countries of the region can attain a relatively high degree of autonomy (cited by Van Klaveren,

1984 p.5). The effect on deference is again mediated through perception. The perception that threats by the United States to restrict their access to its vast markets or to curtail financing is counterbalanced by the existence of alternative suppliers increases the probability of a foreign policy reorientation.

In short, power fragmentation is important to the degree that it facilitates Latin American efforts to achieve the "diversification of dependency". According to Cocharane (1978 p. 457) Latin American states are seeking to gain a degree of autonomy through the diversification of dependence which involves the reduction of their "dependence on a single large country (the U.S.) by expanding their international contacts...securing export markets in a number of countries, acquiring imports from various supplier-countries and attracting development assistance from as large a number of countries as possible." Bitar (1984), Russell (1985) and others agree that this is both the strategy that Latin American states are pursuing individually, and a process that is currently occurring.

Seabold and Onus (1981) advance the contrary argument. They speculate about the possibility of the emergence of international capitalist "corporatism" capable of controlling developing nations. Snidal (1985a) similarly (although on very different grounds than Seabold and Onus) contends that a coalition of secondary states conceivably could continue the coercion exercised by the hegemon. But

it is highly unlikely that two or more great powers could agree upon specific foreign policy preferences. To be sure, industrialized nations share a common interest in precluding the kinds of fundamental changes in the international system represented, for example, by the calls for a NIEO. But European competitors to the United States certainly do not share the United States' interest in isolating the hemisphere from foreign economic and political penetration. To the contrary, because they are non-members of the IAS and because they have emerged as economic competitors with the United States for a share of the potentially lucrative Latin American markets, pursuit of their economic interests tends to counterbalance the influence of the United States in the region.

It is not surprising, therefore, that some Latin American leaders have sought greater European participation in hemispheric affairs or that Europeans have taken positions at variance with those of Washington. The Franco-Mexican declaration regarding the Central American crisis is perhaps the most dramatic recent example of the political ramifications of the expanding European presence in the hemisphere. According to Drekonja-Kornat (1985 p. 72) this joint declaration appeared to "Latin America's intellectual avant-garde" to offer the prospect of a long-hoped for political alliance between Latin American and medium Western European powers, aimed at the weakening of "the rigid structure of the American system."

All this suggests a third proposition.

Proposition #3: Deference to United States leadership varies according to the degree of economic dependency on it. Those Latin American countries with the most diversified markets and sources of capital will exhibit the least deferential foreign policies.

This proposition is taken up in Chapter Four.

(2) Level of Economic Development.

The level of economic development has been included in the model because no matter how important systemic factors are in explaining the foreign policy of economically dependent states, these alone cannot account for all of the observed variance. As Jaguaribe (1984) suggests, the design and implementation of more autonomous foreign policies is a feasible option only for the most "economically viable" Latin American states.

It has been established that a relationship exists between national capacity and foreign policy activity (Van Klavaren, 1984; Ferris and Lincoln, 1984). A number of studies surveyed by McGowan and Shapiro (1973) support the proposition that the more economically developed a nation is, the greater its level of activity in the international system (p. 108). Alker (1964) found that economic

development is positively related to the self-determination dimension of voting in U.N. General Assembly. Wish (in Walker, 1987 p. 102) concluded that "national attributes are both directly and indirectly related to foreign policy behavior" inasmuch as they constitute a nation's resources and provide "one of many sources of national role conceptions." Cochrane (1978, p. 459) points out "a country's level of power and capability contributes very greatly toward defining what goals it can reasonably pursue in its international relationships...(and) the means that can reasonably be employed to gain objectives." Cochrane notes also that historically the relatively low levels of power capabilities of Latin American states dictated "that they pursue foreign policy objectives of a more or less limited, modest nature and requires them to concentrate on matters of immediate, fundamental concern." (Also see Atkins, 1977 p. 48.)

Two factors are important in this context. First a nation with a moderate or high level of economic development will be less vulnerable to economic pressures exerted by the United States. Second, a developed state will possess the resources necessary to play a more active role in regional and international affairs. Currently, no Latin American state is sufficiently powerful economically to discount entirely the desiderata of Washington, nor does any country in the hemisphere have at its disposal adequate resources to develop the extensive foreign relations conducted by great

powers. Moreover, economic development in the 1980s has been retarded in virtually all of the countries of the hemisphere. Notwithstanding these facts, it is plausible that the more active and autonomous foreign policies exhibited by several of the largest Latin American states can be attributed, in part, to the level of economic development, or more broadly, the degree of economic viability, they have already achieved.

Like the other independent variables hypothesized to affect foreign policy deference, regime performance and ultimately hegemony, the effects of the level of economic development are mediated through the perceptual variable in the model (discussed below). Although the studies cited above generally posit a direct relationship, the importance of perceptions and attitudes is stressed in this research because of the subjective dimension of regime participation. Another feature of the model that warrants mention is the possible relationship between diversification of dependence and the level of economic development. However, since this research is not concerned with dependency per se, no effort is made in here to explore such a relationship.

The fourth proposition follows from these considerations.

Proposition #4: The degree of foreign policy deference will vary with the level of economic development of individual Latin American countries. This effect, though not entirely

independent from the effect of diversification of dependency, is distinct from it. Thus, two countries with similarly diversified markets and sources of finance, but with different levels of economic development, will exhibit different degrees of deference.

Chapter Four also explores the applicability of this proposition to the case of Colombia.

(3) Perceptions of Leaders

The model depicted in Figure 2.1 explicitly incorporates the perceptions of Latin American leaders. This reflects the emphasis on the cognitive or subjective dimension of regime dynamics. Perceptions are broadly defined as "the cognitive, evaluative and affective awareness of inputs from the external environment" (Choucri, 1969 p. 57). Defined in this way, this variable includes attitudes and orientations shaped by a regime's principles and norms.

The inclusion of this comprehensive variable is important for four reasons. First, although it is common to assume that changes in the international distribution of power automatically alter calculations of national interest, and that foreign policies are reoriented accordingly, no such assumption is made here. It would be useful to analyze how leaders of subordinate states actually perceive changes in the international environment, including the decline of the hegemonic power.

Perceptions of environmental change can be conceived of as perceptions of constraint or opportunity. Obviously, this is just a question as to whether the environment is favorable at a given juncture. The model presented here specifies that perceptions with respect to two environmental factors and one domestic factor influence the calculations of Latin American leaders. The first involves perceptions about the dominant state's commitment to maintain its influence through coercion if necessary. This can be considered their perception of the degree of permissibility. The second environmental perception relates to extent of dependency on that state. The perception of reduced dependency could conceivably counteract the constraining effects of the perception of the dominant state's commitment to preserve its hegemonic status. The third consideration is influenced by Latin American leader's perception of their own capabilities. Even in a permissible environment, the lack of resources will constrain foreign policy. By contrast, the recognition by the national leadership that it possess some of the resources necessary to develop a more active, and perhaps autonomous, foreign policy, could influence the design and implementation of foreign policy.

The second reason for incorporating this cognitive variable relates to the need to distinguish consensus from compliance. The apparent alignment of a weak state with a great power is difficult to interpret. Alignment, whether measured by votes in international fora or in a focused case

study such as is presented in Chapter Three, is generally assumed to reflect the compliance of the weak with demands of the strong. But, the possibility of a single state exercising ideological hegemony cannot be discounted. Far more interesting than examples of coerced compliance are those cases of deference resulting from basic agreement about the dominant power's agenda, and the propriety of its leadership.

A third reason for focusing on perceptions and attitudes stems from the fact that regimes are essentially attitudinal, and the theoretical framework employed in this research is applicable to cases in which foreign policy behavior is influenced by, and conforms to, regime principles and norms. Perceptions of the environment are important as intervening variables between environmental changes and deference and regime performance. But attitudes, reflecting regime principles and norms, can have an independent effect on foreign policy. By focusing attention on attitudes and orientations, it is possible to detect evolutionary changes of the thinking of foreign policy-makers. If deference is no longer granted, and international organizations are seized by once subordinate states, then it is possible that the principles that shape foreign policy decisions are no longer those that were conducive to deference. The loss of consensus should result in the end of deference, unless compliance can be enforced.

A fourth and final point merits attention. Regimes, as a set of attitudes and beliefs, and foreign policy role conceptions and expectations held by leaders are closely related.¹ As Rosenau points out:

Conceiving the values encompassed by regime boundaries in terms of unique role expectations...makes it easier to breakdown and analyze the conduct of those actors, such as chiefs of state and foreign secretaries who are active in a multiplicity of regimes. For such officials, regimes take the form of role conflicts, the analysis of which seems likely to be as revealing of the nature of the regime as the conduct of officials (cited in Walker, 1987, p.49).

All these points suggest the utility of focusing on attitudes and perceptions as part of an effort to explain the changes many analysts have noted in the foreign policies of Latin American states. Historically, deference to the United States has been a consequence of the wide acceptance of the ideological hegemony of the United States, as much as it has been the product of fear of its coercive power. Acceptance of the principles of the IAS, and the commitment to adhere to its norms, contributed to the hegemony of the United States to the degree that it reflected the "western hemisphere idea" and generated the expectation that a "special relationship" exists among the members of the IAS. The idea of a "special relationship" implied alignment with the United States, and when the IAS was formalized in 1948, that meant agreement on Cold War issues. Since the nations of the hemisphere agreed on basic issues such as the

incompatibility of communism with the IAS, and since the United States was the only power capable of providing security, its leadership was natural.

The IAS served the strategic interests of the United States by permitting it to concentrate on developments in Europe and Asia secure in the knowledge that the United States' Latin American neighbors were firmly in its orbit. There was little need to coerce or compel them to remain there since consensus on basic principles ensured deference. In terms of role expectations, the United States assumed the role of guarantor of the system, and cast its neighbors into the subordinate role of supporters. As long as these roles were accepted, foreign policy deference and satisfactory regime performance followed logically.

There is reason to think that this situation has changed. A number of analysts have noted the emergence in the 1960s and 1970s of a distinctly Third World orientation among Latin American leaders. Tercermundismo, as this orientation has been called, represents a challenge to the "western Hemisphere Idea" and possesses the potential to unify Latin American leaders. In short, it represents a new set of principles and norms with potentially important foreign policy ramifications.

Examples of the importance of Tercermundismo for U.S.-Latin American relations can be drawn from both economic relations, and political or diplomatic relations. The wide

acceptance among Third World leaders of the basic assumptions of dependency theory has contributed to a rough consensus about the nature of the problems confronting their societies and possible solutions. The call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) reflects this view, and it should be emphasized that Latin American scholars associated with the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) played a formative role in the development of this intellectual and now quite political movement (Grunwald, 1978 p. 15).

Tercermundismo, informed by dependency theory, represents a direct challenge to the principles of both the Bretton Woods order and the IAS. First, it offers a plausible alternative explanation of the cause of Third World underdevelopment which conflicts with the liberal principles underlying the international economic order created and fostered by the United States in the post war period. Principles, it should be recalled, reflect beliefs about cause and effect. Second, it challenges the legitimacy of these arrangements.

Just as a broad consensus about the soundness and legitimacy of Keynesian economic principles enabled American and European leaders to assent to formation of the Bretton Woods order, wide acceptance of dependency theory has provided Third World leaders with the intellectual basis for challenging that order. With Latin American leaders increasingly disposed to look to other developing nations

rather than the United States as their natural partners, they have a powerful motivation to alter the performance of the IAS and to use it as a forum in which to advance a distinctively Third World political, economic and social agenda.

In terms of diplomatic relations, the acceptance of Tercermundismo has had implications for alignment with the United States. Several Latin American nations have joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a fact with considerable importance for foreign policy deference. Non-Alignment stresses the danger of the Cold War, and membership implies "equidistance from the superpowers." This is the opposite of alignment, and a fundamental challenge to United States regional hegemony. If consensus between the United States and Latin America has disappeared on basic political issues, changes in foreign policy are to be expected -- unless the United States is able to force compliance.

In this model, therefore, consensus with respect to basic principles and/or a common understanding of what adherence to those principles means in terms of actual foreign policy, represent independent variables. Inclusion of this component is consistent with Keohane's emphasis on ideological hegemony derived from Gramsci, and the cognitive or subjective aspects of regime dynamics stressed by Haas, Krasner and others. Propositions five and six reflect these considerations:

Proposition #5: The more active and autonomous foreign policies of the Latin American members of the IAS reflect their leaders' perceptions of a greater degree of permissibility, the diversification of economic dependency, and enhanced national capacity to act.

Proposition #6: The erosion of United States hegemony (propositions one and two) is partially the result of the loss of consensus regarding those principles and norms most conducive to foreign policy deference and the adoption of alternative principles and norms associated with Tercermundismo

Both proposition are explored in Chapter Five which presents content analysis of Colombian foreign ministry documents.

IV Summary.

In summary it is worth mentioning that Russell (1985 p. 80) sees most of the factors mentioned above playing themselves out in hemispheric relations.

From the point of view of European-Latin American relations, the most important change that has taken place over the last two decades has been the proliferation of political world power. This has been caused by the relative erosion of North American hegemony in the international capitalist system, accompanied by the rise of Germany and Japan, and the emergence of China. Added to this has been the new phenomenon of countries moving from an underdeveloped or developing status into the

so-called international middle class, with their own ideas of playing a differentiated role in world relations and diversifying their sources of capital goods, technology and financing.

Unfortunately, Russell makes no effort to distinguish cause and effect in this passage. The model developed here incorporates all of Russell's points, and specifies the nature of the relationships between erosion of hegemony, the emergence of middle size competitors to the U.S. in the region, the diversification of sources of technology, capital goods and financing, and increases in level of economic development. Moreover, additional variables have been specified with the result that the model represented in Figure 2.1 accurately reflects the basic propositional structure of the theory of hegemonic stability and, at the same time, improves upon it by adding much needed specificity and clarity.

NOTES

1. Several analysts have recognized the applicability of role analysis to the study of foreign policy and international relations. Most notable among them are Kolsti (1970), Walker (1981; 1987) Rosenau (1966; 1986) and Wish (1980). Its usefulness is best appreciated when the definition of a role expectation is compared to the standard definition of a regime. As noted, regimes consist of the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge on a given issue-area. Moreover, they involve beliefs about fact, causation and rectitude (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). Role expectations consist of beliefs, expectancies, subjective probabilities and elements of knowledge" and furthermore generally involve "rights, privileges, duties and obligations" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968 p. 497).

CHAPTER THREE
FROM APERTURA TO VIRAJE:
THE EVOLUTION OF COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1966

I Introduction

This chapter describes and analyzes the evolution of Colombian foreign policy since 1966, with special attention to those activities and initiatives that have direct bearing on the question of Colombia's deference toward the United States and its use of the OAS. There is a consensus that significant changes have occurred in the design and implementation of Colombian foreign policy over the past several decades, and a considerable amount of literature has appeared attempting to sketch those changes (Pardo and Tokatljan, 1988; Pardo, 1987; Bagely and Tokatljan, 1985; Silva Lujan, 1985; Cepeda, 1985; Palacios, 1983; Bagely, 1983, 1986; Drekonja, 1982, 1983; Tokatljan and Schubert, 1982.) However, none has attempted to explain those changes in an explicit, systematic manner. Thus, the intended contributions of this research are to analyze and interpret the Colombian case using an explicit theoretical framework for the first time, and provide a preliminary examination of the relevance of propositions one and two elaborated in the previous chapter. In the final analysis, the intent is to lend support to the broad proposition that the IAS is undergoing significant changes.¹

As noted in Chapter Two, the proposition that hegemonic decline will affect the foreign policies of subordinate states is compatible with the theory of hegemonic stability. Most of the research guided by the theory, however, has concentrated on regime decay despite the theory's potential for generating hypotheses regarding foreign policy deference. Keohane (1984) suggested the need to examine what motivates subordinate states to defer to the leadership of the hegemonic state. The Colombian case appears ideally suited for such an effort.

Colombia, as many analysts have observed and more than a few have lamented, traditionally has been among the United States' most loyal allies in the western hemisphere. Its leaders adopted North American conceptions about anti-communism and the Cold War, about hemispheric solidarity and the need for U.S. leadership in the defense of the West (Pardo and Tokatlian, 1988, p. 100; Drekonja, 1982 p. 70; Silva Lujan, 1985 p. 68.) The convergence of attitudes, explored in detail in Chapter Five, is the most interesting feature of the relationship because it suggests that Colombia did not so much comply with Washington's dictates as it concurred with North American conceptions. The importance of this distinction between consensus and compliance was underscored in Chapter Two.

Given the nearly unconditional loyalty which Colombia has until recently shown to the United States, the example

of that country's departure from traditional practice affords a superb opportunity to examine changes in the IAS. As the United States' most loyal ally, Colombia represents a test case of deference to hegemonic leadership. If Colombia's policy has changed dramatically, then there can be little doubt about a corresponding erosion of the ability of the United States to exercise political leadership and to count on the deference of its partners in the system it created.

Throughout the 1980s, Colombian foreign relations have been characterized by an unprecedented degree of diplomatic activity in regional and international affairs and greater autonomy vis-a-vis the United States. These two phenomena, the expansion of activity and the pursuit of autonomy, are related but not identical. For example, the decision taken by Colombian president Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) to create an "opening" (apertura) to the Caribbean (and more generally to Asia and Africa) generated unprecedented diplomatic activity there with far-reaching consequences. But this opening was motivated, at least initially, by economic considerations and did not immediately or directly signify a more autonomous posture vis-a-vis the United States. In fact, Colombia's ongoing effort to broaden and deepen its economic and political contacts with the insular Caribbean led president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala in 1982 to adopt economic commitments there which complemented the Reagan administration's highly political Caribbean Basin

Initiative.

Colombia's active involvement in the Contadora Group, however, is clearly indicative of greater autonomy in the design and implementation of its foreign policy because Contadora fundamentally challenged the United States' agenda in Central America. The development of a more autonomous regional policy was a logical, if not an inevitable, consequence of Colombia's prior diplomatic and economic opening to the Caribbean Basin. Without the expansion of that activity, Colombia probably would not have been as motivated to involve itself in the Central American crisis, much less to resist United States policy there.

Colombia's foreign relations in the 1980s, then, have contrasted noticeably with those of previous decades both in terms of activity and autonomy. Few observers doubt that a change of direction (viraje) has occurred, especially after 1982. But this implies neither a complete break with the United States, nor the desire on the part of Colombian foreign policy elites to initiate such a break. In fact, when compared with trends in the foreign relations of several of its Latin American neighbors, Colombia's foreign policy reorientation appears tentative and timid.

Since the 1970s, several Latin American states have sought to reorient and broaden their international relations. Confident that their expanding and increasingly diversified economies gave them negotiating power (poder

negociador), they sought to gain a degree of autonomy on the periphery of great power politics (autonomía periférica). Pursuit of this autonomy on the periphery is especially relevant to U.S.-Latin American relations due to the historical role of the United States in the region (Drekonja, 1983 chapter 1).

Conceptually, this "new Latin American foreign policy" reflects a distinctively Third World orientation. It challenges the status quo in regional affairs and undercuts the ideological basis of the IAS. This is so because the concept of autonomía periférica does not comport well with the so-called "Western Hemisphere Idea" which suggests that a "special relationship" exists between the United States and the other states of the hemisphere. (On the importance of the Western Hemisphere Idea, see Whitaker, 1954 p. 1). Thus, Drekonja correctly concludes that this orientation is potentially destabilizing. Increasingly, Colombia's foreign policy reflects this political current, but its policy in pursuit of this autonomía periférica has been timid and even its adoption of the language of the new Latin American foreign policy has been mild. This is due, in part, to a special set of circumstances that historically have distinguished Colombia from many of its neighbors.

Colombia, like its neighbors, is able to chart an independent course only within certain parameters. Those parameters are determined both by the availability of

adequate national resources to implement an active and autonomous foreign policy, and the degree of dependency on the United States. But, in contrast to many of its neighbors, Colombia has a distinctive tradition of strict alignment with, and deference to, the United States which places additional, ideological or cognitive limits on the degree of genuine autonomy that can be achieved in the short and medium term even though it makes what change has occurred appear all the more dramatic. There still exist broad areas of consensus among North American and Colombian elites. This was evinced by the apparently retrogressive pro-United States policies of the Turbay administration (1978-1982).

The crucial point is that Colombian leaders find themselves in the difficult position of needing to choose either to end unequivocally the tradition of nearly automatic alignment with the United States and to participate more fully in the movement gaining momentum elsewhere on the continent, or to pay the increasingly high costs that strict alignment entails in terms of the inevitable diplomatic estrangement from its neighbors. The dilemma is formidable.

There is a powerful incentive for Colombia to maintain a deferential relationship with a superpower capable and willing to provide security guarantees. This became evident when Colombia welcomed the United States' diplomatic and

military support after the Sandinistas laid claim to the Colombian islands of San Andres and Providencia. Support of the Reagan administration's Central American policy did not appear to be an excessive price to pay in return for U.S. assistance, particularly since the Turbay administration shared with Ronald Reagan certain conceptions about the cause of the disturbance in the region. Yet, resistance to change and continued deference to the United States also entails costs in terms of diplomatic isolation and the loss of prestige. The same Turbay administration that had welcomed U.S. support in the face of Nicaraguan territorial claims discovered this harsh fact after the Colombian delegation to the OAS failed to give diplomatic support to Argentina during the Malvinas crisis. Colombia's position resembled the United States' position so closely that its neighbors sharply criticized Colombia for blindly following Washington's lead.

Ultimately, this raises the issue of national interest. Is Colombia's national interest better served by a close relationship with the United States even if this means deference approaching unconditional loyalty? Or, would it be more prudent for Colombia to join forces with its Latin American neighbors, and more generally, with its Third World counterparts, in seeking to alter the status quo? The evidence presented in this chapter and in Chapter Five will indicate that, gradually, Colombian leaders opted for the second of these alternatives.

II The Historical Context

The reorientation of Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s is best understood when put in historical context. It is important to appreciate that deference to the leadership of the United States, and the foreign policy of strict alignment this entailed, reflected a clearly articulated foreign policy doctrine. The Colombian case, then, illustrates how a dominant power is able to create the perception among national leaders that its leadership is both natural and beneficial.

Colombia, like Mexico and Nicaragua to cite just two other examples, was once a victim of United States military intervention. The events surrounding the seizure by the United States of Colombia's northern department of Panama in 1902 decisively influenced the attitudes of its leaders with respect to the United States. Thereafter, Colombia's foreign policy would bear the imprint of that attitude. But whereas Mexico and Nicaragua have been fiercely nationalistic and have been defiant in the face of the United States' hegemonic aspirations, Colombia's reaction to its loss of territory and its subsequent relations with the United States have been entirely different.

The attitude adopted by the Colombian foreign policy elite was pragmatic rather than defiant. They concluded that because the United States was an emerging world power, strong economic and political ties were inevitable and would

be beneficial, and that the United States would not tolerate a defiant state to the south of the strategically important canal. Moreover, since the United States could easily provide for Colombia's security, there was little need to be active in regional much less international affairs.

Moreover, the Colombian case represents a clear example of how economic penetration results in, and is complemented by, cultural penetration. Economic realities created and reinforced a Colombian political and economic elite that accepted North American leadership nearly unconditionally. This process began in the interwar period and was largely completed before the outbreak of the Second World War. During this period, the United States supplanted Great Britain as the dominant economic power in the region (Lowenthal, 1988), a fact with obvious importance for the theory of hegemonic stability. Nowhere was this economic reality more evident than in Colombia. According to Drake (1989 p. 31) Colombia "had switched economically from Great Britain to the United States earlier and more decisively than had its neighbors further down the Andes." Consequently, "Colombia fell into the U.S. orbit in the Caribbean."

The gradual process of economic penetration began in earnest with the first Kemmerer mission to Colombia in 1923 ((Drake, 1989 p.38). This team of North American economic and financial experts advised Colombian leaders on virtually

every aspect of their economy. Substantial reforms ensued. The economic ties forged between Colombia and the United States in this period were so close that the Colombian currency became pegged to the North American dollar (Drekonja, 1982 p. 6). At the same time, Colombia was experiencing an economic boom (the "dance of the millions") made possible by the payment by the United States of an indemnity of twenty million Dollars in gold for the seizure of Panama, and by substantial private North American investment. Concomitantly, the Urrutia-Thompson treaty (1921) granted Colombia special transit privileges through the canal that had been constructed across what was once its national territory (Fluharty, 1957 p. 31). The treaty did much to quell anti-American sentiments that had resulted from the seizure of Panama.

Throughout the twenties and thirties, the men who governed Colombia generally welcomed United States investment and were even prepared to accept United States hegemony regardless of party affiliation. Thus both conservative president Marco Fidel Suarez (1918-1921) and Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera actively supported the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty and pushed legislation favoring United States commercial interests through the Colombian Congress (Bushnell, 1967 p. 2-3). The election of Olaya, who was characterized by some of his critics as naively pro-American, was particularly surprising because it followed by only two years the bloody suppression of a strike by banana

workers against the United States based United Fruit Company (Randell, 1977 p. 13).

Obviously, critics could be found in both of the traditional parties, but they "tended to be weak in influence and few in number among Colombian elites" (Randell, 1977 p. 11 and 15). Concerns about economic and cultural penetration and even territorial absorption were voiced. Twice president Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938; 1942-1945) was among the most vocal critics. But Lopez Pumarejo's reformist efforts (known as la Revolución en Marcha) never seriously challenged American interests, in large measure because of successful United States diplomacy and the influence of pro-American elites. So, when Eduardo Santos succeeded Lopez Pumarejo in 1938, it was clear that active cooperation with the United States would be the rule with few exceptions.

Military contacts complemented the already substantial economic ties and completed the process by which Colombia became strictly aligned with the United States. In 1939, the first U.S. naval and aviation missions arrived in Colombia thereby supplanting European advisors. Just as the Kemmerer Mission's economic recommendations were implemented, so too were U.S. recommendations relating to the reorganization of the Colombian armed forces (Bushnell, 1967 p. 13). The importance of the establishment of such ties, and especially the exclusive nature of American military influence, cannot be underestimated. Having

replaced British and to a lesser extent German military missions to Colombia, the United States was now the sole supplier of much needed equipment and highly valued training. The United States had therefore created within the Colombian armed forces an elite fully cognizant of the importance of close relations. Economic dependency was now reinforced by the dependence of the Colombian military on the United States.

The consequence of all of this was the deliberate adoption of a foreign policy of strict alignment at the cost of autonomy. Based on calculations of asymmetrical power relationships that were certain to endure for some time to come, this policy was elevated to the status of a doctrine. Marco Fidel Suarez had already enunciated the doctrine as early as 1914. The doctrine of "Respice Polum" urged that the United States be considered the "Pole Star" and that Colombia follow its lead.

El norte de nuestra política exterior debe estar allí, en esa poderosa nación, que más que ninguna otra ejerce decisiva atracción respecto de los pueblos de America. Si nuestra conducta hubiera de tener un lema que condensase esa aspiración y esa vigilancia, el podría ser respice polum, es decir, no perdamos de vista nuestras relaciones con la gran Confederación del Norte. (Cited in Bushnell, 1967 p. 2).

United States hegemony, then, came to be regarded as natural and beneficial in the interwar period. However, it

was not until after the Second World War that extent of Colombia's deference towards the United States became manifest. The formation of the OAS and the onset of the Cold War provided the opportunities for Colombian elites to demonstrate the degree of their alignment.

The Cold War and the formal institutionalization of the IAS are related. The principal objective of the United States in assenting to the formalization of the IAS was to insulate the hemisphere from East-West competition, and thus to secure the United States' southern flank (Connell-Smith, 1966 p. 317). For its part, "Colombia has actively supported the institutional structure of the Inter-American system and the Cold War policies of the United States" (Randell, 1977 p. 167). Washington welcomed Colombia's self-imposed isolation and passivity, which earned it the title "Tibet of South America". Not coincidentally, the first Secretary General of the OAS, Alberto Lleras Camargo, was a Colombian whose deference to North American political leadership was well known (Drekonja, 1983 p. 74).

Tibet of South America is not the only epithet given to Colombia by Colombians themselves. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, who would serve Colombia as Minister of Foreign Relations and eventually President, bitterly characterized his country as a "peon of the Cold War", and so it was. Colombia, in 1948, broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc after the assassination of populist leader Jorge Eliecar Gaitán and the violence (known as the

Bogotazo) which followed the murder, attributing the events to communist agitation. Notably, Colombia was the only Latin American country to send troops to the Korean conflict (Ramsey, 1967), and in 1954 Colombia's OAS delegation endorsed the Caracas Declaration which denounced communism as incompatible with the norms and principles of the IAS. Armed with this declaration, the United States had the juridical basis and diplomatic support for its successful, covert efforts to topple the government of Guatemala².

Similarly, Colombia like the majority of its neighbors, voted to exclude Castro's Cuba from the OAS and other regional fora and broke diplomatic relations with that country. When president Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in order to foreclose the possibility that Castro's revolution would gain popularity and spread throughout the region, Colombia became the showcase of the program of economic aid. More importantly, the Colombian military adopted the National Security Doctrine conceived in Washington and accepted the military assistance that complemented the economic aid of the Alliance for Progress (Klare and Arnson, 1981 p. 9). Thus, Colombian elites shared the ideological fundamentals on which the ambitious program was based.

Colombia, then, was not pressured into becoming the peon of the Cold War. Throughout the post-war period, Colombian leaders shared with their American counterparts a set of

attitudes and beliefs about the nature of international relations and the role of each country in regional and international affairs. The belief, held by many Colombian elites, about the necessity of deference to United States leadership was a product of the pragmatic calculations and was reinforced by the economic benefits of deference. The complementary belief about the propriety of United States leadership took hold in the Cold War. Essentially, the form of Pan-Americanism promoted by Washington gained favor in Colombia. This meant that the United States was to play the role of the dominant partner responsible for the security and well-being of its regional partners largely through unilateral actions. Colombia's role, ipso facto, was limited to a supporting one.

This orientation characterized Colombian foreign relations throughout the National Front period (1957-1974), and in effect, represented its foreign policy component (Silva Lujan, 1985 p. 67). The National Front refers to a constitutional arrangement made in 1957 whereby the two dominant, traditional parties, the Liberal and Conservative, would share political power by alternating the presidency and sharing seats in the Congress and posts in the bureaucracy. Forged in an effort to end the La Violencia that plagued the country for more than a decade following the assassination of Gaitán, this arrangement placed a premium on political stability and further entrenched the traditional elites in leadership positions in Colombia.

Though formally superseded, the effects of the National Front's arrangements are still felt. The importance of this for this research, which covers the period of the supposed transition from the National Front (1966-present), is that, as Colombians strive to open their political system in order to channel social and political forces that found no expression in the National Front period, it appears necessary for the Colombian leadership to make related changes in the country's foreign relations, because the crisis of the National Front implies the illegitimacy of the foreign relations it prescribed (Silva Lujan, 1985 p. 67).

III Apertura

Colombian foreign policy in the 1980s contrasts dramatically with the policy and overall orientation just described. This is especially true of the policies of Belisario Betancur who was intent on reversing the policies of his immediate predecessor, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala. But the foundation for much of what occurred since Betancur took office was laid much earlier by presidents Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970), and Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978) and quietly continued by Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970-1974.) When viewed in broader historical perspective, the events of the 1980s appear to be the logical, (although by no means inevitable) consequence of decisions taken a decade or so earlier.

In the twelve years between 1966 and 1978, Colombia would become much more active throughout the region. The first efforts were made among the Andean nations and then in the Caribbean basin. Prompted initially by economic motivations, the expansion of Colombia's economic contacts led Colombia to concern itself with the politics of the region. As Lleras' Foreign Minister stated the issue in his report to Congress in 1967, "the need to extend our international relations to those parts of the world with which we have not yet cultivated relations" is both "political and economic in character."

The numbers tell part of the story. Table 3.1 depicts the expansion of Colombia's international relations. The figures presented reflect both full diplomatic relations and consulates abroad. In the twenty years between 1967 and 1987 Colombia expanded its contacts at the diplomatic and/or consular level by thirty seven percent, from sixty three nations to ninety six. These figures are important in several respects. First, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc, the Peoples Republic of China and Cuba is politically significant because it involves recognition of countries estranged as a consequence of the Cold War. Second, the figures are significant in that they reflect the expenditure of resources to establish or upgrade consulates. So, it is not the decision to recognize a nation so much as the decision to invest in a relationship that is crucial.

TABLE 3.1
Colombian Diplomatic or Consular Relations
By Geographic Area

	1966	1974	1987
Western Hemisphere	18	19	21
Caribbean Area	6	7	11
Europe	19	21	21
Eastern Europe	5	7	10
Asia	6	8	12
Africa	5	6	13
Middle East	4	8	8
Total	63	76	96
Source: <u>Memorias del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores</u> 1968, 1975, 1987.			

President Lleras immediately set out to change the situation he encountered in 1966. Economic considerations motivated the diplomatic overtures. Initial efforts were directed at the Soviet bloc where the Cold War had prompted Colombia to shun potentially lucrative markets. In November, Colombia reestablished ties in Eastern Europe, except for the Soviet Union, citing the need to expand trade relations. This was followed in March of 1967 by the opening of trade talks with an official Soviet delegation

visiting Bogota. These were the first high level contacts with the USSR since diplomatic relations were broken in 1948. This, in turn, led in rapid succession to the resumption of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in January 1968, the establishment of a permanent commercial mission and diplomatic ties with Romania in September and the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Czechoslovakia in December of that year. The estrangement with the Soviet bloc was now officially ended.

Just as important, if less dramatic, were the new contacts in the Third World. Though the number of states with which Colombia has consular relations is not large, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Colombia doubled its contacts. In Chapter Six the importance of Colombia's growing sense of identification with the Third World will be demonstrated when the political themes of the Foreign Ministry's Memorias are examined. Here it should be noted that, around this time, Alfonso Lopez Michelson, Carlos Llera's second Minister of Foreign Relations, enunciated the doctrine of *Respice Similia*. This policy urged that Colombia look not to the "Pole Star" but to nations more like Colombia, i.e. in the Third World. The diplomatic outreach observed in Table 3.1 is indicative of the effort to do just that.

Most important is Colombia's outreach in the Caribbean. In 1966 Colombia listed Consulates in the Dutch Antilles,

and in various French and British Possessions. The addition of five states in the insular Caribbean reflects the recent independence of several of the states. But, it is also consistent with the new emphasis Colombia would place on the area. Though Colombia is itself a nation of the Caribbean basin, Colombia retreated from active involvement in the area after the loss of Panama in accordance with its policy of deference to the United States. The heir to Nueva Granada then chose to abdicate responsibilities that otherwise would have naturally devolved upon Colombia.

The Lleras administration did not stop at forging or upgrading bilateral contacts. Recognizing the need to expand and diversify markets for Colombia's export products, Lleras attempted to promote the integration of regional markets. The influence of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America was crucial in this respect. Accordingly, President Lleras was instrumental in the creation of the Andean Pact, a development with considerable importance in terms of the evolution of Colombian foreign relations because it signaled Colombia's willingness to adopt a leadership role. In this sense, the leadership provided by Lleras in the creation of the Andean Pact foreshadowed the successful efforts of Betancur to organize the Contadora Group. Certainly, Betancur's initiative was more dramatic in that it represented an effort to play a more autonomous, and not merely more active, role vis-a-vis the United States on an issue clearly important to

Washington. Nonetheless, expanding activity in the region was a necessary prerequisite to more ambitious foreign policy actions.

President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978) gave additional impetus to the evolution of a more active and autonomous Colombian foreign policy. In an action that was indicative of his attitude, already articulated clearly when he was Lleras' Foreign Minister, Lopez refused economic assistance from the United States Agency of International Development (AID). This was reminiscent of Carlos Lleras' refusal in 1966 to assent to IMF economic recommendations³. The dispute with the IMF, and now Lopez's refusal of economic aid, symbolized Colombia's concern for its autonomy.

More concretely, Lopez continued to amplify Colombia's economic ties, but was more attentive to their political ramifications than his predecessor. The expansion of Colombia's presence and influence in the Caribbean basin was accelerated. Considerable effort was made to settle questions relating to the maritime limits of the country, an issue that would emerge with respect to Nicaragua in 1980 and that continues to trouble Colombian-Venezuelan relations. Because of this, and because of the ever increasing economic ties with the insular Caribbean, Colombia soon became directly involved in the negotiation process leading to the signing of the Carter-Torrijos Treaty settling the future of the Panama canal. In the more than

seventy years since the loss of Panama, Colombia had absented itself from the Caribbean. It was now returning to avail itself of commercial opportunities and to enhance its political influence. Participation in the canal negotiations helped to accomplish this second objective, and would establish a precedent for further diplomatic activity in the Caribbean and Central America.

The Carter administration had from its inception favored a treaty with Panama to settle the future of the canal. Thus, Colombia's participation in the negotiations did not constitute a challenge to United States. But on the rhetorical level, Lopez cited Panama's claims with respect to the canal as only one example of Latin America's legitimate grievances vis-a-vis the United States. Along similar lines, he made it clear that automatic alignment with the United States was no longer a premise of Colombian foreign policy. He suggested that it is possible to be a critic of the United States without being hostile (Pardo and Tokatlian, 1988 p.105). These are noteworthy statements for a Colombian leader since nearly unconditional allegiance and deference was a matter of doctrine and tradition. Actions would support these remarks.

Lopez reopened diplomatic relations with Cuba and favored the reincorporation of that country into the Latin American Economic System (SELA) and more importantly into the OAS. Again, the Carter administration had made some

movement in the direction of normalization of relations with Castro's Cuba, but that movement was quickly reversed when Cuba became involved militarily in Angola and the Horn of Africa. Carter's successor would thereafter attempt to reinvigorate the diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba. By contrast, Colombia did not permit Castro's African adventurism to sidetrack efforts to normalize ties. Only direct, Cuban interference in Colombia's affairs could dissuade Colombia from pursuing reconciliation, though unfortunately Colombia would uncover evidence of such interference in 1981.

The reopening of ties with Cuba, important as that development was as a sign that Colombia would not conform to the United States' policy, should also be interpreted as part of a wider effort universalize Colombia's foreign relations begun under Lleras. Except for Cuba's unique status as a Soviet ally, the move was entirely consistent with other gestures in the Caribbean. It soon became evident, however, that more than the expansion of diplomatic contacts was on Lopez's foreign policy agenda: the universalization of Colombia's diplomatic contacts contributed to the expansion of Colombia's diplomatic role.

Colombian leaders for some time had been advertising in speeches before international fora Colombia's potential role as a potencia negociador. But this potential could never be realized unless allies were found. Lopez's doctrine of

Respectively Similia alluded to above contended that those allies were to be found primarily in the Third World among those nations with similar interests and characteristics. Accordingly, Colombia during this period took steps to forge ties of solidarity in the Third World. Estrangement from Cuba could not be continued. Additionally, Colombia under Lopez strengthened ties with the NAM and gave greater emphasis to Colombia's participation in UNCTAD and the Group of 77. Colombia added its voice to calls for a New International Economic Order, and oversaw the creation of the Andean Council to be put at the disposal of the foreign ministers of the members. Each of these gestures indicated a more autonomous foreign policy orientation and expanded conception of Colombia's role.

Colombia had begun a new phase in the evolution of its foreign policy which included the use of international fora either outside the IAS (NAM, UNCTAD, G-77) or within it but beyond U.S. control (the Andean Group, the Contadora Group supportive of the Panama Canal negotiations.) Lopez's conception of Colombia's position in the international and regional systems, then, was sharply at variance with the vision of Marco Fidel Suarez. And since the form of Pan-Americanism advocated by Suarez had dictated allegiance to the United States, these changes are exceedingly important.

IV Viraje

The implications of the economic and diplomatic apertura were not difficult to discern. Lleras and Lopez had created the possibility, both institutionally and politically, for even more dramatic departures from established practice. Although he did not contribute substantially to this trend, President Pastrana did nothing to curb it. Belisario Betancur Cuatras (1982-1986) would seize the opportunity to pursue both a more active and autonomous foreign policy. No Colombian president before or since has so obviously attempted to break with the tradition of ideological compatibility with, and foreign policy deference to, the United States. But before Betancur would have the opportunity to assert Colombia's foreign policy potential, the process of apertura would be slowed by Liberal president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982).

The most salient contribution of the Turbay administration in foreign affairs was to delay, if not reverse, the evolution in the direction of a more autonomous foreign policy described in the previous section. Though his policies were not uniformly deferential to the United States, by the second half of his four year presidential term, it became evident that Turbay's foreign policy was reminiscent of Colombia's traditional policy of *Respice Polum*. The potential impact on Colombia of the radicalization of Central American politics had much to do

with this; so too did the fact that Turbay's interpretation of events in the region closely resembled Ronald Reagan's, although Reagan would not come to office until near the end of Turbay's cuareenio.

When Turbay assumed office in 1978, the ultimately successful movement to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua was beginning to gather force. For the remainder of the decade, Central America would be the scene of a regional conflict that would gradually draw Colombia into diplomatic involvement. Initially, the Liberal president pursued policies similar to those of Lopez, a fact that is not surprising given their common party affiliation. More importantly, the positions Colombia adopted with respect to the insurrection in Nicaragua were in step with those adopted by the many other Latin American states. The ultimate consequence of the events in Nicaragua and more importantly the refusal Latin of American states to hinder them (and in some case active efforts to promote them) would be the failure of two decades of efforts undertaken by the United States to prevent "another Cuba".

As the situation in Nicaragua became more volatile, Colombia, acting within the Andean Group, lent its support to diplomatic efforts made by many Latin American states to compel Somoza to leave Nicaragua. Those efforts were intended also to block a U.S. plan to send a OAS peace-keeping force to Nicaragua in order to prevent the Sandinistas from gaining power. An important precursor to

the Contadora Group, this exemplified the increasing autonomy of Latin American governments and their intention to achieve political outcomes in the region contrary to those favored in Washington. Colombia's participation in these diplomatic maneuverings appeared entirely consistent with the trend begun earlier.

In this instance, however, Colombia was merely following the lead of its neighbors, especially Venezuela, and it would soon become apparent that the Turbay administration would not pursue any further this trend toward a more autonomous foreign policy. The success of the Sandinistas only generated further upheaval in Central America, and civil war soon broke out in El Salvador. As the Central American situation deteriorated, the Turbay administration drew closer to the United States than any of his three predecessors had been.

Turbay had good reason to view the course of events on the isthmus with alarm. Colombia, like its Central American neighbors, is troubled by guerrilla violence (Pecaut, 1988 p. 321). Moreover, Turbay, much like the Reagan administration, interpreted events in an essentially Cold War manner. The domestic crisis was attributed to the influence of international communism (Pardo and Tokatlian, 1988 p. 107). The explicit realignment of Colombian and United States foreign policies was a logical consequence of this common perception.

Both Nicaragua and Cuba took actions that reinforced this belief. In February 1980, the recently formed Sandinista government of Nicaragua laid claim to the Colombian islands of San Andres and Providencia. Then, in 1981, the Colombian military uncovered evidence of Cuban support for an attempted sea-borne invasion of the country by guerrilla forces of the April 19 Movement (M-19). This prompted the Turbay government to suspend diplomatic relations with Cuba in March of that year. The natural reaction to these developments was to look to the United States for the diplomatic support and security guarantees it had traditionally provided as hemispheric leader.

In the case of Nicaragua's territorial claims, diplomatic support came in the form of the ratification in July 1981 of the Vasquez-Saccio Treaty by which the United States acknowledged Colombia's sovereignty over the cays of Recondor, Quitasueño and Serrana. Since the treaty had been negotiated in 1972 but never ratified, the successful effort of the State Department to win quick ratification of the treaty after 1981 sent a signal of United States support for Colombian territorial claims against all challengers.

Colombia also sought United States military support. This included high level military to military contacts between the two countries, negotiations relating to the basing of U.S. forces on Colombian territory, and Colombian participation in joint military exercises. The Turbay

government began discussions with the Reagan administration about the possibility of granting to the United States the use of the disputed islands of San Andres and Providencia for military purposes (New York Times, March 4 1982). Around this time, the United States was creating the infrastructure necessary to implement a policy designed to pressure and eventually topple the Sandinistas. An air base on San Andres would complement the military installations then being built in Honduras for this purpose. It would also serve to deter Nicaragua from taking the kind of precipitate action that Argentina would attempt the following year in the South Atlantic.

More dramatically, in October of that same year, Colombia participated, along with Argentina, Venezuela and members of NATO in a joint military training exercise code named Operation Ocean Venture. The target of a simulated assault was an imaginary island called Amber in the Amberines which ominously invoked the name of Grenada in the Grenadines (Pardo and Tokatlian, 1988 p. 177). Colombian cooperation with the United States, then, was extensive and included a military component.

Other actions indicated Colombian deference to United States policy, and the fact that Colombia under the Turbay administration was willing to play a supportive role in hemispheric affairs. Though initially excluded from discussions in Nassau and Cancun concerned with designing

an ambitious program of economic aid for Central America and the Caribbean, Colombia nonetheless contributed economic aid to the area. The commitment of economic resources to the Caribbean basin was consistent with the economic and diplomatic apertura in the region begun by the Lleras administration, but this action also complemented the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative. For this reason, critics of Colombia's strict alignment with Washington have viewed it as another indication of Colombia's willingness to support the initiatives and objectives of the United States (Palacios, 1983 p.61). This support for United States efforts was to be demonstrated a second time in 1982 when Colombia sent an observer to the Salvadoran elections then being held under the auspices of the United States in part to undercut the political support for the Salvadoran insurgents. Like the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Salvadoran elections represented an important component of the political strategy outlined in Washington.

There were other indications of the Turbay administration's disinclination to join with its Latin American and Third World counterparts in an effort to gain greater autonomy. First, the Turbay administration slowed the movement toward full incorporation of Colombia in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Rhetorical support was given to North-South issues, but Turbay made it be known that the organization had drifted too far to the left and was in

danger of losing its "equidistance" between the superpowers. This charge had not been made by a Colombian leader since before Colombia's diplomatic apertura began in the mid-1960s.

Second, and most importantly, Colombia refused for juridical reasons to support Argentina on a crucial OAS vote during the Malvinas crisis. Although the Colombian position was perfectly consistent with its long tradition of strict adherence to juridical principles such as non-intervention and peaceful resolution of conflict, the move was politically damaging because it placed Colombia outside the current of Latin American nationalism (Drekonja, 1982 p. 86). Colombia's vote (one of only four abstentions on a resolution supporting Argentina's territorial claims) appeared to confirm the view that Colombia was the United States' automatic ally in the OAS.

The Colombian delegation at the United Nations also registered votes certain to please Washington, and once again strained relations with Cuba provided the opportunity for the Turbay administration to side with the United States. Long before suspending diplomatic relations with Cuba in March of 1981, Colombia began a prolonged effort to block Cuba's attempt to gain a seat in the U.N. Security Council. This coincided with renewed efforts by the Reagan administration to increase diplomatic pressure on Cuba. Colombia's stance in the United Nations appeared to be part

of a deliberate effort to make trouble for Cuba in international fora in exchange for military aid and assistance (Latin American Weekly Report 12 June 1981.) This apparent reluctance to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by membership in international fora to press for greater autonomy and influence over international affairs indicates the enduring and constraining influence of a foreign policy doctrine that emphasizes deference to a hegemonic power. However, the diplomatic isolation suffered by the Turbay government indicated the disadvantages associated with such a policy.

The Turbay administration had inadvertently lost much of the diplomatic prestige Colombia had gained principally as a result of Lleras' effort to forge the Andean Group. Turbay's Conservative successor, Belisario Betancur, demonstrated that the process of apertura could be slowed but not reversed. In fact, he went far beyond what any Colombian president had attempted in terms of both activity and autonomy.

Belisario Betancur moved immediately to reorient Colombian foreign policy and to end the unconditional support of the United States. The actions taken in the four years of his administration (1982-1986) contrast dramatically with those just described, and taken together constitute what some observers have called Colombia's foreign policy viraje, or change of direction (Palacios, 1983 p. 64). This change was evinced in Betancur's rhetoric

as well as in concrete actions. Betancur was quick to comment, for example, that Colombia did not desire to be the satellite of the United States (News Week, August 23, 1983). His rhetoric was sharpest in a luncheon given on the occasion of president Ronald Reagan's visit to Bogota late in 1982. President Betancur's remarks covered a broad range of issues and underscored the inadequacy of United States policy with regard to virtually each of those issues. He concluded by expressing the hope that the United States would return to the tradition of the Alliance for Progress, thereby suggesting that the United States had departed from it to the detriment of Colombia and Latin America more generally.

The change of tone is important because Colombian leaders and foreign ministers had generally tempered their remarks even when expressing disagreement with the United States. But, Betancur's actions were equally bold. The Betancur administration overcame the reluctance shown by his predecessor with respect to the Non-Aligned Movement and made Colombia a full member. This decision was important for several reasons. First, the decision to make Colombia a full member of the NAM came at a time when the president of the movement was Fidel Castro, thus it was symbolically important. Although diplomatic relations with Cuba were not reinstated, the participation of Colombia in the Havana conference nonetheless resulted in unofficial, high level contacts with the Cuban government. Betancur had indicated

that a warming of relations with Havana was a real prospect.

Second, participation in the NAM signified the demise of the the notion of a special relationship between the United States and Colombia (Vazquez, 1986 p. 196; Kaufman Purcell, 1982 p. 665). From the perspective of the United States, participation in the IAS meant nothing if not alignment. Until the middle and late 1970s many Latin American governments viewed the NAM this way. Only seven nations were full members at the time of the Havana Summit in 1979, and only one, Cuba, had been a member since the Belgrade Summit in 1961. Nicaragua and Bolivia joined in 1979. Salvador Allende had led Chile into the Movement in 1973 but Chile's membership ended with the coup that brought down the government of the socialist president. The presence of Cuba, Nicaragua and Allende's Chile gives some indication of the political meaning of Non-Alignment. Dual membership in a distinctively Third World organization and the OAS, suggests that Colombia's natural partners are other developing states. Third, and more concretely, dual membership meant that the OAS was no longer to be regarded as an instrument of United States policy but as a resource which, like the NAM or the United Nations, is at the disposal of revisionist Third World states.

In addition to leading Colombia into the NAM as a full member, the Betancur administration took other concrete measures to distance itself from the policies of its

predecessor. The most immediate issue requiring attention was the damage caused by Colombia's vote in the OAS regarding the Malvinas. Betancur reversed Colombia's official position and became vociferous in defense of the Argentina's territorial claims.

The attempt to regain Colombia's prestige did not end there. Colombia expressed its solidarity with the debtor nations of the hemisphere, and was instrumental in bringing them together in Cartagena, Colombia, in June of 1984. The Cartagena Group could not produce positive results without the cooperation of the industrialized nations, and the United States in particular, and the final communique of the London economic summit of the industrialized nations made it clear that cooperation would not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, the Cartagena Consensus created the prospect of unity, and Washington viewed the Cartagena Group and Belisario Betancur's initiatives in particular with suspicion (Roett, 1989 p. 64). Betancur's role in the formation of the Group is noteworthy because Colombia's external debt is manageable relative to the debt of some of its neighbors. Colombia has yet to miss a scheduled loan payment on principle or interest and did not participate in the first round of loan renegotiations begun in 1982 (ECLA 1985 p. 57).

Betancur also proposed reforms of the OAS in an effort to revitalize the IAS and to modify its performance. In 1985, Betancur's Foreign Minister presented five documents

to the Organization's Secretary General proposing or supporting specific reforms of both the OAS Charter and the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Monroy Cabra, 1986 p. 20). Efforts to reform the OAS were not new. An ad hoc commission was set up by the OAS General Assembly in 1973 recommended a number of reforms that were subsequently adopted. But in 1985 the prevailing attitude was one of hostility to the United States as a result of its support of Great Britain and abandonment of Argentina, and the proposals for reform implicitly reflected the determination of Latin American states to modify the performance of the IAS. The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty, was a special target of these efforts in part because it had proved useless during Argentina's war with an extra-continental power. But more importantly, the Rio Treaty codified the politico-security regime of the IAS, and as will become apparent in Chapter Five, Colombia had as early as the 1970s arrived at the conclusion that the regime was obsolescent and served only to justify United States intervention.

President Betancur, however, did not limit himself to calls for reforms, nor did he settle for the restoration of Colombia's image in Latin America. Instead, Betancur thrust himself and Colombia into a leadership role in the attempts to manage the Central American crisis (Kaufman Purcell, 1987 p. 168). Nothing evinces Colombia's departure from prevailing practices so much as that country's role in the creation of, and its ongoing participation in, the Contadora

Group.

The Contadora initiative represents a fundamental challenge to the hegemony traditionally exercised by the United States in the articulation of the political agenda of the IAS (Kaufman Purcell, 1987 p. 161; Bagely, 1987 p.183; Diaz-Callejas, 1987). According to Bagely (1987 p.183), "by its very existence the Contadora Group implied a modification of the long-standing hegemonic U.S. role in hemispheric affairs and a shift toward a more collective pattern of leadership in which Latin American regional powers would have a much greater role than in the past." Since its inception, the purpose of the OAS was to promote the Cold War policies of the United States. Though it served other ends more compatible with Latin American goals, it consistently performed for the United States when the United States took a high profile on a Cold War issue -- until the Central American crisis began to take shape in the late 1970s. The efforts made by several Latin American states (both inside and out of the OAS) to oust Somoza signaled the beginning of real change. Likewise, the creation of Contadora indicated that united efforts to block U.S. initiatives would be a reality with which the United States would have to contend.

To understand the importance of Contadora for Colombian foreign policy, Colombia's participation must be contrasted with that of Mexico and Venezuela. Through its

participation in Contadora, Colombia acquired an uncharacteristically high profile in hemispheric affairs because Colombia had never resisted the United States so openly or actively. For the other members of the Group, however, involvement in this multilateral effort served to lower their profile at a time when a lower profile appeared to be advisable due to severe economic constraints and, as a consequence, to their vulnerability to United States pressure. Prior to the formation of Contadora in 1983, both Mexico and Venezuela had been active in regional affairs. Carlos Andres Perez, the Venezuelan president, had been instrumental in the downfall of Somoza in the expectation that moderate forces loyal to Eden Pastora Gomez would dominant the new Nicaraguan regime. Venezuelan involvement continued thereafter in the form of sales of petroleum to Nicaragua at concessionary prices in order to retain some influence over the Sandinistas. Mexico had also given diplomatic support to the armed Nicaraguan opposition to Somoza, and had joined with Venezuela in providing economic assistance to Sandinista Nicaragua. More importantly, in August of 1981, Mexico and France issued a joint declaration expressing their common view that the Salvadoran insurgency represented a legitimate political opposition.

Diplomatic gestures of this sort were possible until the onset of the economic crisis that gripped Latin America after 1981. By 1982, Mexican leaders were compelled to acknowledge the sheer magnitude of that country's

indebtedness. In August, Mexico announced its inability to service its debt and was forced to renegotiate its loans with the United States. Consequently, its room for diplomatic maneuver was strictly circumscribed and Mexico behaved accordingly. Venezuela, which like Mexico, suffered from the precipitous drop in earnings from petroleum exports, was similarly influenced by the adverse economic trends. Under these circumstances, Contadora permitted Mexico and Venezuela to remain involved in regional affairs but with a lower profile (Bagely and Tokatlian, 1985).

For Colombia, however, participation in Contadora, despite its multilateral dimension, was the boldest foreign policy action of any Colombian government. The Contadora initiative complicated the efforts of the Reagan administration to win congressional support for its hard-line approach to the Central American crisis, and may have actually staved off direct United States military intervention. It is in this light that the significance of Colombia's involvement should be appreciated. On an issue of tremendous salience for the United States, Colombia reserved its right not only to disagree, but also to organize to ensure that the United States' preferred solution not prevail. The country that had once committed troops to Korea when the Cold War turned hot, now endeavored to prevent the United States from committing its own forces much nearer to both their borders. Never before had Colombia worked so openly at cross purposes with the United States.

Colombia's diplomatic efforts were not limited to the activities of the Contadora group. In December, 1982, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, extended an eighty five million dollar loan to Nicaragua. The offer of economic assistance came at a time when the Reagan administration was beginning to apply economic pressure on the Sandinistas, an effort which culminated in a full economic embargo in 1985. Whereas Betancur's predecessor had turned to the United States for security guarantees and offered diplomatic support to the United States in return, Betancur chose to demonstrate Colombia's good will toward the country that had only a few years before asserted territorial claims on Colombian possessions. This signaled not only a willingness to resist the United States, but a changed perception of the nature of the threat facing Colombia, specifically a deemphasis of communist interference emanating from abroad.

Virgilio Barco replaced Betancur as president of Colombia in August of 1986 and was faced with the decision to embrace or abandon his predecessor's initiatives. Barco, a Liberal, chose to embrace them though his diplomatic efforts have been less vigorous and flamboyant. This decision could reflect the reluctance of a new president to reverse the commitments of his predecessor in order not to create the impression that Colombian foreign policy lacked direction and continuity. But evidence presented in Chapter Five will suggest that it is more likely that Barco based

his decision to maintain the course set by Betancur on the conclusion that times had changed and that the national interest required a more active and perhaps autonomous posture. After all, Betancur did not exhibit qualms about altering Turbay's policies.

Barco immediately expressed his intention to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy (Pardo, 1988 p.4). The new president let it be known that Colombia's attitude with respect to the United States would be "pragmatic" and that Colombia was free to disagree on specific issues. Betancur ended the tradition of automatic alignment and Barco would not attempt to restore it. But neither would he assume automatically an anti-US posture. Any disagreement would relate to specific issues and policy responses rather than to general foreign policy orientations. Accordingly, Colombia differed with the United States with respect to a number of issues, ranging from narcotics trafficking to the endless Central American crisis and human rights violations in Cuba.

Like his predecessors, Barco relied principally on international organizations, the OAS, the UN and the NAM. Thus, when the Barco administration found itself in disagreement with Washington, it presented its case in one of these fora and sought the support of its neighbors. In a number of instances, Colombia adopted positions at odds with North American diplomatic initiatives.

Barco kept Colombia in the Non-Aligned Movement and, more importantly, sustained its commitment to the Contadora Process though in both cases the Barco administration's commitment was largely rhetorical (Latin American Regional Report, Andean Group Report 30 July 1987). The effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the isthmus was, in part, a projection of the administration's intention to resolve its own guerrilla problem peacefully. Betancur had been the first to perceive this link between Colombia's foreign policy and its domestic problem. Nonetheless, the effect, as previously noted, was to hinder implementation of the Reagan Central American policy. The fact that an autonomous posture was sustained by an administration of a different political party suggests that the change of direction managed by Betancur would have the potential for permanence.

The originally ad hoc Contadora Group itself showed signs of permanence, having evolved into the Group of Eight (composed of the four original Contadora member nations and the four members of the so-called Support Group). The Group of Eight has proven to be a useful platform to voice disapproval of some of the United States' policies and actions. As always, there is strength in numbers. If the mere existence of the Contadora Group is significant because it implies a change in hemispheric politics by providing a counterweight to the United States, then the expansion of both the group's membership and scope is, a fortiori,

indicative of change. The expansion of the scope of issues discussed in the annual meetings of the group is particularly important. No longer limited to the Central American situation, the issues debated and the resolutions adopted cover virtually all the concerns of Latin American nations: the external debt, narcotics trafficking, the environment, and naturally the proper role of the United States in the resolution of each of these problems.

Colombia has received substantial diplomatic support from the Group of Eight, and in at least one instance that support was carried over into the OAS. Consequently, Colombia was able to utilize this forum in a dispute with the United States. In that case, a diplomatic confrontation resulted from the angry reaction of the Reagan administration to the release from prison in January of 1988 of Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez, reputed member of the Medellin cocaine cartel. After a local judge released Ochoa, the Reagan administration hit Colombia with punitive sanctions involving Colombian passengers and exports arriving in the United States. The Barco administration then responded by calling for a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, and with the bulk of support coming from the Group of Eight, managed to gain approval of a draft resolution critical of the Reagan administration's action. The incident was finally resolved when both parties agreed on a compromise statement which credited Colombia for its many efforts directed at reducing cocaine production and which urged a multilateral

response to the drug problem. The latter is particularly important, for Colombia has always favored a multilateral response whereas the United States has preferred unilateral and bilateral initiatives aimed primarily at the supply-side of the problem. Significantly, then, the entire exercise in the OAS led to an important concession by the United States.

Narcotics trafficking has long been a source of friction between the two countries due to the fact that the United States is the principal consumer of cocaine and Colombia is its principal supplier. Colombia, like those of its neighbors that also are involved in the cultivation of coca and the production of cocaine, often resists U.S. pressures for action that appear to impinge upon its national sovereignty. Moreover, Colombia complains bitterly about North American insensitivity to the constraints upon its ability to deal effectively with the problem without increased financial assistance from the United States. Particularly irksome is the perception that the United States is neither providing adequate resources to combat the problem nor doing enough to curtail North American demand.

The narcotics issue, however, has fewer and less dramatic implications for the United States' regional hegemony than does the Central American crisis because the refusal to defer to the United States by adopting its preferred strategies does not entail a disagreement about basic political principles. The unfortunate consequence of

any disagreement about how best to deal with the drug problem is to render impossible the kind of cooperative effort necessary to eradicate it. But it is unlikely to produce a concerted effort by Latin American states to hinder the United States in its pursuit of specific policy objectives. Certainly it has not motivated Colombia to oppose openly and actively US policy. In this sense, it is unlike the Central American crisis because it does not have clear Cold War connotations despite the failed efforts of the Reagan administration to attribute the problem to "narco-terrorism" conducted by Leftists.

A much more important example of Colombia's continued tendency toward autonomous action during the Barco term relates to divergent Colombian and North American attitudes and actions toward Cuba. Although Colombian-Cuban relations have remained suspended since March of 1981, the Barco administration has not been willing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to further isolate Cuba. Turbay had been eager to do so, but in general since the late 1960s Colombian leaders have not only resisted pressures to continue applying measures designed to ostracize Cuba, they have voiced their support for that country's reincorporation into the IAS. This sentiment was expressed clearly in a resolution of the OAS Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of 1975 which gave Latin American states the freedom of action to normalize relations with Cuba (CP/RES.115 [168/75]).

The refusal of the Barco administration to defer to the United States on this issue was exemplified by its diplomatic actions in the United Nation Human Rights Commission. In March of 1988 the Reagan administration was pushing for a U.N. resolution that would condemn human rights abuses in Cuba. Although the Colombian delegation did not reject the proposal outright, it introduced an alternative version that recommended only that a team of observers be sent to Cuba to investigate charges of human rights violations there. The effect of this action was to frustrate the Reagan administration's diplomatic initiative. The contrast between Barco and Turbay on the Cuban question is striking, and lends itself to the conclusion that the continuation of a Colombian foreign policy marked by greater activity and occasionally greater autonomy is a real prospect.

V Summary

This chapter discussed the evolution and reorientation of Colombian foreign policy in terms of the implications for the United States' regional hegemony. Colombia's inclination to become more actively involved in regional politics, either via multilateral organizations or unilateral foreign policy acts, may be nothing more than an indication that the country has achieved a degree of "political maturity" (to use a phrase that appears frequently in the Memorias of that country's Foreign

Ministry). This, in turn, may simply reflect the country's increased national capacity to act. The next chapter will present evidence that the Colombian leadership's inclination to take a more active part in regional affairs did, in fact, correspond to its achievement of a degree of economic "viability".

The more important issue, however, relates to the Colombian leadership's inclination to achieve greater autonomy vis-a-vis the United States. The pertinent question is, why did some Colombian leaders pursue greater autonomy as well as more active involvement. Diplomatic or political activity and foreign policy autonomy are distinct dimensions. Colombia could be very active in regional affairs while continuing to defer to the United States' leadership. Indeed, this was the hallmark of the Turbay administration. The next two chapters attempt to answer this, and related, questions.

Figure 3.1 is intended to summarize some of the findings of this chapter, and to preface the analysis of the remaining chapters. In it, these two dimensions, activity and autonomy, are represented spatially. Selected foreign policy actions, discussed in the preceding narrative, are plotted on the graph in the expectation that this will provide some insight into the trends in Colombian foreign relations which evolved during the period examined here.⁴ An event is considered to be more or less active depending

on the amount of resources and/or diplomatic prestige devoted to it. It is autonomous if it clashes with the United States' preferences or is intended to enable Colombia to do so.

It is impossible to discuss an evolutionary process without defining its starting point. Insofar as Colombian foreign relations are concerned, that point was the doctrine of Respice Polum, and the deference that it prescribed. The following chapters will inquire whether that deference was consensual or compliant. What is important in the present context is that, by definition, the deference exhibited by Colombian leaders until very recently, meant that the policy they designed and implemented was one characterized by very low autonomy. Colombia took its cue from the United States on Cold War issues, and acted accordingly -- if it acted at all.

Deference to the United States very often meant inactivity. In this regard, the derogatory epithet "Tibet of South America" is suggestive. As long as the United States was thought to be responsible for providing the essential political leadership in the region, and to the degree that the exercise of that leadership's was judged to be in the nation's best interest, no independent activity was necessary. In a sense, diplomatic inactivity was something of a "free-ride" under acceptable conditions of United States hegemony. Colombia did not have to invest time or effort, i.e., did not have to be active, in order to

be secure.

To be a responsible partner of the United States demanded little more than casting affirmative votes on resolutions favored by the United States. The reaffirmation of the diplomatic isolation of Cuba during the Lleras cuarenio (discussed at greater length in Chapter Five) is a case in point. The same is true of Turbay's behind the scene efforts to block a Cuban seat on the UN Security Council. Generally, votes cast in international fora do not win many points in terms of activity, and the nature of these votes do not win any in terms of autonomy.

If deference generally meant inactivity, it did not necessarily imply it. The commitment of troops to the Korean war at the height of the Cold War demonstrates this unequivocally.⁵ Certainly the deployment of combat battalions qualifies as an example of high activity. More recently, Turbay's decision to involve Colombian naval forces in largely symbolic, but highly intimidating, military maneuvers, is an example of active support for an action of the United States. Similarly, the contribution of economic assistance to the Caribbean Basin as part of the Reagan administration's highly political project, was an instance of active deference.

By contrast, Colombian leaders often found it useful to make a rhetorical effort to distance themselves from the United States without actively attempting to do anything

that would effectively translate into autonomy. Thus, just as Colombian representatives cast votes in favor of resolutions supported by the United States, they sometimes cast ones which appeared to exhibit their autonomy. Even Turbay, the most deferential of the recent presidents, voted against the United States' proposal to send a peace-keeping force to Nicaragua. This action was perfectly consistent with the highly symbolic gestures of both Lleras and Lopez. Lleras' adamant stance against the IMF and Lopez's rejection of US AID assistance were both calculated to project the image of an autonomous, sovereign Colombia. But neither entailed much in the way of activity.

Barco's efforts within the United Nations to elaborate an alternative resolution relating to the Cuban human rights situation can be considered in this context as well. That episode was significant because it stood in sharp contrast to Turbay's use of the same forum only a few years before, and may even have been risky in terms of incurring the wrath of the United States. Certainly it is indicative of Colombia's less deferential stance in multilateral organizations. Nonetheless it did not require the expenditure of many political resources.

Real autonomy, however, must be actively pursued. The important foreign policy events described in this chapter are those which involved both increased activity and greater autonomy from the United States. There are two clusters of

events depicted in the figure. These events possess both qualities, but to varying degrees on the activity dimension.

In one cluster are Lleras' active role in the formation of the Andean Group, Lopez's active involvement in the Panama Canal negotiations, and Betancur's decision to lead Colombia into the Non-Aligned Movement. In the second cluster are Betancur's catalytic role in the formation of the Contadora Group which Barco later assumed, and Betancur's provision of economic aid to Sandinista Nicaragua, the archenemy of the Reagan administration. Each of these initiatives was explicitly intended to promote Colombia's autonomia periférica, and all required Colombia to become more active in order to accomplish that objective.

The formation of the Andean Group was undertaken to reduce Colombia's economic dependency with the understanding that this would enhance the country's negotiating power or poder negociador. Moreover, it provided Colombia with an institutional affiliation within the IAS beyond the control of the United States. The successful efforts of the Andean Council to force the resignation of long-time United States ally Anastasio Somoza Debalye in 1979 attests to the political potential of the Group. Betancur's decision to lead Colombia into the NAM was a clear expression of the intention to exercise Colombia's autonomy on the periphery of great power politics, and like membership in the Andean Group, provided Colombia with additional institutional capacity. Finally, Lopez's active involvement in the Panama

canal negotiations similarly reflected the determination of Colombia to win concessions from the United States. Participation in Contadora I set a clear precedent for Contadora II.

These initiatives required the expenditure of diplomatic and material resources, but not in same the amount as Contadora or the granting of economic aid to the beleaguered Sandinistas. These events represent examples of the Colombian leadership's determination either to assume a risky leadership role or to reach into the national treasury in order to realize objectives that conflict with those of the United States.

When placed in chronological perspective, it becomes apparent that Colombian foreign policy evolved in the direction of both increased involvement (apertura) and greater autonomy. In other words, once the evolution of Colombian foreign policy began to gather momentum, there was an increasing tendency for activity and autonomy to covary. The viraje, which corresponds to the upper right hand quadrant of the figure, was the result of this evolutionary process. But the actions of Turbay stand in sharp contrast to this. Turbay either did not share the view that the national interest was best served by a foreign policy that was both more active and more autonomous, or was constrained from pursuing the more autonomous line delineated by his predecessors. The following chapters are intended to determine which of these interpretations are correct.

Notes

1. Because so much has been written on the subject of Colombia's foreign policy viraje, no effort is made to prove that Colombia has in fact "veered" from its traditional foreign policy course. Key foreign policy actions merely are described and their significance underscored. In short, this chapter concerns one of the two dependent variables specified in Chapter Two. The thrust of the following two chapters chapter is to explain Colombia's recent policy initiatives.
2. This vote more than any other with the possible exception of the vote to suspend the participation of Cuba in the OAS, represented the high water mark of United States influence in the OAS, only two states, Argentina and Mexico, voted against this resolution.
3. Maullin (1972) argues that Lleras was motivated primarily by domestic concerns. According to this view, the IMF issue enabled Lleras to consolidate his political base. This argument has merit, but it is difficult to ignore the symbolism particularly in light of the fact that other actions were clearly intended to achieve greater independence for Colombia both from the United States and United States controlled international organizations (see Pecaut, 1989 p. 65). Certainly, Lopez's action cannot be attributed to domestic concerns.
4. Figure 3.1 should be interpreted as an effort to facilitate a summary of the analysis. No attempt has been made to attach numerical values to the cases, thus the location of a case on the graph is meant to be illustrative and not quantitative. The reasons for the location of a given case on the graph are stated in the text.
5. Ramsey (1967) suggests that Colombia's involvement in the Korean conflict was motivated by Colombia's strong acceptance of the principles of the United Nations which sanctioned the armed action. But, it is equally certain that the contribution of troops to the conflict was fully consistent with Colombia's adherence to Cold War principles.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEPENDENCY, DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY DEFERENCE

I. Introduction

This is the first of two chapters intended to explain Colombia's foreign policy viraje described in Chapter Three. The previous chapter presented the Colombian case as evidence of the partial diminution of the United States' regional hegemony, resulting from Colombia's increasing disinclination to defer to the United States' hemispheric agenda. Chapter Five offers an explanation for that state of affairs which focuses on the erosion of consensus between Colombian and North American leaders on basic Cold War issues due to the changing perceptions, attitudes and orientations of Colombian leaders. In this chapter, the focus is entirely on the economic factors that are thought to have given Colombian leaders the leeway to reorient Colombian foreign policy. The model specified in Chapter Two suggests what economic conditions are conducive to the foreign policy reorientation of those dependent countries that are also members of a hegemonic order.

In conformity with the model specified in Chapter Two this chapter argues that Colombia's diplomatic apertura, and eventually its foreign policy viraje, were, in part, the consequences of changes in the distribution of international

and regional power -- especially economic power. Several related changes are theorized to be important. The first has to do with a significant shift in the global distribution of economic power, or what Keohane terms the "fragmentation" of power. This involves the diminution or loss of the United States preponderance of material resources. Specifically, preponderance of material resources pertains to the vastness of its markets, the abundance of its finances, its natural energy endowments and its comparative advantage in the production of highly valued (generally high-tech) goods.

Several types of aggregate data could be presented and analyzed to determine whether, and to what extent, such a shift has occurred.¹ However, that is not attempted here because the model being tested suggests that, insofar as the IAS is concerned, a shift in the economic fortunes of the United States relative to its principal economic competitors is important only to the degree that it results in, or makes possible, the diversification of the economic dependency of Latin American states. Economic dependency is understood here to involve the concentration of trade and economic assistance.

The model also takes into account the level of economic development, and more broadly, the country's overall economic performance and viability. Generally, economic development and dependency are theorized to be related in

the sense that industrialization on the periphery is conceived by dependencistas to be "associated dependent development" which compounds the social, economic and political distortions of dependent countries. But the focus of this research differs in a significant respect. Although dependency is taken into account here, the aim is to explain foreign policy behavior not the dynamics of domestic political processes. The consequences of this difference of perspective are as follows.

First, the concern is with the dependence on the United States rather than on the industrialized nations as a whole. Stated differently, in considering the importance of economic dependency, this research focuses on dyadic relationships between two nations not on center-periphery relations. Second, insofar as economic development is concerned, the distorting effects of associated dependent development are not thought to have important consequences for foreign policy deference.² Again, dependency theory per se is concerned with the domestic effects of this external economic variable. But here what is important is only that a country achieve a certain level of economic development to enable it to pursue a more active foreign policy. It does not matter that attainment of that level distorts the economy. It is merely a question of resources to be put into diplomatic initiatives such as Colombia's involvement in the Nassau Group mentioned in the last chapter.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section a general overview of Colombian economic viability is presented with special attention to the country's level of economic development and trends in its economic performance in conformity with proposition four stated in Chapter Two. Both sections three and four focus on the question of concentration or diversification, corresponding to proposition three stated in the second chapter. In the third section, the sources of official development assistance (ODA) extended to Colombia are examined. Section four examines Colombian trade patterns. The findings are summarized in section five.

II Economic Performance and Level of Economic Development

This section assesses Colombia's overall economic performance. More specifically, the focus is on Colombia's level of economic development, and the performance of its external sector. Proposition four, stated in the second chapter, hypothesizes that the degree of foreign policy deference will vary with the level of economic development. In this section economic development is measured in terms of GDP growth, growth of manufacturing, and the participation of manufacturing in the total Gross Domestic Product.³

The rate of economic growth is of obvious importance for any leader contemplating a more active foreign policy. This main economic indicator could figure in calculations of

this sort in two ways. First, rapid and sustained growth increases a country's overall economic power and its standing in the international or regional economic and political systems. It is a sign of "maturity" that could well prompt leaders to adopt foreign policies that appear consistent with the country's altered status.

The second way the rate of economic growth could affect foreign policy calculations is very different. The deterioration of the economic performance of a country, evinced by sluggish or negative economic growth sustained over some period of time, could motivate its leaders to revise its foreign policy if its leadership were to conclude that existing arrangements and loyalties were partially or entirely to blame for the poor economic performance. This could be a reason for the economic revisionism of many emergent developing nations as evinced by their calls for a new international economic order, and their involvement in the NAM. The call for the NIEO reflects the view that the international economic order is unjust and at the root of their economic difficulties.

These are two very different ways of interpreting the importance of economic trends, and some choice among them is required if the propositions stated in Chapter Two are to be falsifiable. The general contours of the theory of hegemonic stability, as a power-as-resources model, suggests that only favorable trends are consistent with a more active

an autonomous foreign policy.

Growth of manufacturing and the contribution of manufacturing to the GDP are taken into account for several reasons. First, it is an indicator of industrialization, and industrialization has often been viewed as a key to overcoming economic dependency. Certainly there are no "middle powers" that are not also "newly industrialized countries" or NICs. Second, manufacturing often adds dynamism to a developing countries' economy, and is thus a good indicator of its economic health and potential. According to Arango, "one of the indices that provides evidence of the greater or lesser level of development of a country is the participation of the manufacturing sector in the Gross Domestic Product." (1985 p.230). This is so because "the development of the industrial sectors of the economy...generate multiplier effects, especially in agriculture, mining, transport, services in general, and above all in manufacturing itself." Thus, its catalytic effect is important. According to the National Integration Plan of 1976 (ibid., p. 230), the industrial sector demands one third of the total commercial value of agriculture, excluding coffee, 80% of mining output, 30% of industrial products, 27% of electricity, gas and water, 14% of transport and 22% of banking and insurance.

This section also assesses the performance of the external sector based on the assumption that Colombia's economic standing in the region and the world influences its

leaders' perceptions about their capacity to design and implement a more active, and perhaps more autonomous, foreign policy. Since Colombia's economic growth and vitality are closely tied to the health of the external sector, the overall balance of payments situation, the availability of capital and ample international reserves, are important indicators of Colombia's economic performance.

The key criterion used in interpreting these data relates to the existence of a favorable trend. This is based on the assumption that trends, rather than the yearly figures, affect the calculations of decision-makers. In the next chapter the perceptions of those decision-makers are examined.

Before beginning the analysis, some remarks about Colombia's "subterranean economy" are in order. Although estimates vary, it is generally conceded that narcotics trafficking generates enormous sums of foreign exchange, and that this in turn produces a ripple effect throughout the Colombian economy. The following economic analysis, however, makes no explicit effort to take this into account, for several reasons. First, accurate data is difficult to obtain. Second, data relating to Colombia's external economic performance implicitly takes narcotrafico into account inasmuch as central bank estimates of foreign exchange are included in the figures. Third, the purpose of the following analysis is not to describe the structure of

the Colombian economy per se, but to relate the overall soundness of that economy to the country's foreign policy actions. In other words, how the Colombian treasury came to be in possession of foreign currency is less important for present purposes than the fact that a favorable foreign exchange situation potentially enables Colombian leaders to act more independently. Finally, the decision not to examine data pertaining to the illegal economy reflects the assumption that Colombian leaders do not bank on narcotrafico when they contemplate foreign policy initiatives that may rankle Washington. In short, it is doubtful that Colombian leaders consciously take the growth of the trade in this illegal commodity into account when making economic forecasts.

The data provide some support for the proposition that the increased activity and autonomy were associated with favorable economic trends in the 1970s, but not so in the 1980s. The relevant data are presented in Table 4.1.

The incompleteness of time-series data makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the Lleras Restrepo period (1966-1970) insofar as overall economic performance and level of industrialization are concerned. However, no such difficulty is encountered in the following sections in which dependence on the United States is specifically examined. Moreover, this difficulty is partially off set by the fact that in this period Colombia was only beginning to

SELECTED MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS (A)													
1961	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
GDP Growth													
3.6	3.4	4.2	6.3	4.2	7	5.5	7.9	7.6	6.5	3.8	4.6	4.9	4.3
Growth Manufacturing													
1965-1968													
3.1				7.5	12.7	7.9	10	10.9	9	1.3	6.7	1.2	3.5
EXTERNAL SECTOR (Billions of Dollars)													
Trade Balance													
41	-136	23	116	-71	-115	-146	-20	125	-210	109	659	655	551
Current Account													
-21	-130	-73	-164	-210	-276	-321	-210	-74	-102	-135	193	435	294
International Reserves													
00	00	00	00	223	376	115	155	206	-132	73	639	661	676
External Debt													
00	00	00	00	00	1319	1473	1725	2022	2220	2560	2636	2113	2962
1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988				
GDP Growth													
5.3	4.3	2.3	3	1.2	2.6	2.3	5.9	5.4	9				
Growth Manufacturing													
1.2	2.3	-1	-1.6	0.5	3	3	5.9	5	2.3				
EXTERNAL SECTOR (Billions of Dollars)													
Trade Balance													
612	-126	-1726	-2219	-1970	-804	-617	1421	1025	824				
Current Account													
415	-207	-1962	-2056	-1022	-2020	-1744	201	250	-472				
International Reserves													
1550	1291	119	-722	-1212	-1261	241	1297	492	511				
External Debt													
5222	6100	7009	9020	10600	11551	12256	15266	17006	17193				

SOURCES:

GDP Growth and Growth of Manufacturing, UN Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 1970, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1989
 Trade Balance, Current Account, UN Economic Bulletin, 1975, 1976, 1981, 1985
 International reserves, Wilkie, Statistical Abstracts of Latin America, Vol. 17; UN Economic Bulletin, 1976, 1976, 1981, 1986
 External Debt, Banco, Estructura Económica Colombiana (1985); UN Economic Bulletin, 1981, 1982

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exhibit the sort of foreign policy behavior that has generated so much interest. Despite the scant data, it is important to examine what data are available in order to draw some tentative conclusions.

First with respect to the overall performance of the Colombian economy, the average annual growth of the GDP was a robust 5.7 percent between 1966 and 1970. The rate of growth for the last year of the decade (6.2%) surpassed the four year average and was a sign of things to come. The growth of manufacturing was even greater for this period, registering 6.3% annual growth on average between 1965 and 1970, and reaching 7.5 % in 1969. As will be seen below, this was the beginning of a period of exceptional growth for Colombia.

The balance of payments situation, however, was notably different. Colombia's balance of trade fluctuated between 1966 and 1970. Lleras Restrepo inherited a \$83 million dollar trade surplus. However, during his first year in office the value of imports exceeded that of exports by \$164 million. For the following two years Colombia registered a surplus, but the decade finished on a negative note. By 1970, the trade deficit had climbed back to \$115 million.

To a large measure, the steady growth of manufacturing contributed to these deficits, since imports of capital goods and other inputs were necessary to fuel industrialization. Thus, the trade deficits were neither

surprising nor necessarily incompatible with economic development and vitality. Nonetheless, here these figures are viewed as constraining.

Moreover, the balance on the current account was consistently negative during the Pastrana years. Indeed, the current account (which reflects sources of foreign earnings apart from the exports of goods and services) showed a deficit every year until 1975. These figures mainly reflect remittances abroad to foreign investors, a classic feature of economy dependency. Despite these figures, Colombia managed to increase its international reserves every year between 1969 and 1982 but one (1974). No figures are available on indebtedness for this period, but it is likely that the increase in reserves was due in large measure to the influx of borrowed capital.

These data lend some support to proposition number four which related economic trends to foreign policy deference. The fact that Colombia's foreign policy was neither very active nor autonomous during the Lleras years, is consistent with these rather preliminary findings. On the other hand, these data provide a glimpse at the emergence of favorable trends insofar as Colombia's overall economic growth, the growth of the manufacturing sector and the international reserves situation are concerned. Drekonja (1983) stresses the importance of international reserves, and there are reasons to think that international reserve transactions constitute "the" balance of payment indicator (Maisael, 1982

p.574). But, strong growth and the accumulation of international reserves alone do not constitute economic viability of the kind expected to produce dramatic foreign policy changes.

Indeed, in the next chapter Colombian leaders' perception of their economic dependency is presented. This is precisely the reason why Lleras saw apertura as important for the economic vitality of the country. After all, as stated in Chapter Four, Colombia's opening (first to the Caribbean basin and the Andean countries, then to the Third World), was initially economic in nature. So, the apertura was not initiated because Colombia already had the economic where with all to increase its involvement; it initiated the "opening" to improve its economic standing.

Colombian foreign policy showed signs of both increased activity, and to a lesser extent, greater autonomy between 1970 and 1978. This eight year period covered two presidencies, that of Misael Pastrana Borrero and Alfonso Lopez Michelsen. Both heads of state were served by a single Foreign Minister, Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, who was able to bring considerable continuity to Colombian foreign policy in this period. No doubt, Colombia's foreign policy reorientation was influenced by his thinking to an important extent. But, it is important to appreciate that Lopez Michelsen showed a more pronounced inclination to establish Colombia's autonomy from the United States than did

Pastrana. This point is important because it is not until Lopez became president that the indicators of Colombia's economic viability became positive across the board.

During Pastrana's four years as president (1970-1974), economic growth was impressive and sustained, and overall, the Colombian economy showed considerable dynamism. Growth of the GDP, which had averaged about 5.2% annually between 1965 and 1968, jumped to 6.2% in the last year of the decade, and to 7% in 1970. For the next five years it would average around 6.9%.

Manufacturing was especially dynamic in this period. The average annual rate of expansion between 1970 and 1974 was over 9 percent. Not only did the growth of manufacturing have a catalytic effect on other sectors of the economy, a substantial percentage of the economic growth of the Colombian economy is attributable to manufactures, although this varied by year and vied with coffee as the principal agent of expansion. As can be seen in Table 5.2, manufactures contributed 18.4% of the total GDP in 1970. By 1974, that figure had increased by four percentage points to 18.8 percent. The dynamism of the manufacturing sector coincided with increased exports of manufactured goods, especially within the Andean Group (UN Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 1973 p. 153). Lleras' opening was already beginning to pay dividends.

TABLE 4.2

PARTICIPATION OF MANUFACTURING IN THE GDP (Percentages)

1965	1970	1974	1978	1980	1985
18.1	18.4	18.9	18.9	23.3	22.5

Source: Arango Londono, 1985

TABLE 4.3

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE OF INDEBTEDNESS

1970-74	1974-78	1978-82	1982-85
11.6	6.7	21	10

Source: Calculated on the basis of Table 5.1

TABLE 4.4

DEBT SERVICE AS PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS

1961-70	1970-74	1974-78	1978-82
13.5	13.8	10.8	13.5

Source: UN Economic Bulletins, Various Years

TABLE 4.5

INCREASES IN THE VALUE OF EXPORTS (percentages)

Year	Total	Coffee
1970	19	35
1971	-5	-13
1972	24	8
1973	44	40
1974	31	40
1975	2	13
1976	21	120
1977	17	57
1978	15	-23
1979	26	22
1980	7.5	17
1981	-17	-41
1982	10.3	9.5

The external sector, however, still showed signs of vulnerability. Only the international reserves situation was consistently positive. Both the trade balance and the related balance on the current account were negative for the four years of Pastrana's presidency. International reserves increased every year except 1974, and "in 1972 and 1973, the gain in net international reserves acted as a factor of expansion" (UN Economic Bulletin, 1974 p. 228). But these gains came at the expense of the country's indebtedness, as Table 5.3 indicates. During this four year period Colombia's external debt grew at an annual average rate of 11.6 percent.

In one sense, the fact that Colombia's indebtedness grew is neither surprising nor troubling. The magnitude of the debt was not such that it represented a serious impediment to growth until the 1980s. Even then, Colombia's debt was quite manageable in comparison to that of other Latin American nations. Additionally, in the 1970s, real interest rates were actually negative (i.e., when the nominal rates were adjusted to reflect inflation.) Thus, the increase of indebtedness, if moderate, is not alarming.

To the contrary, the willingness of lenders to invest would have to be considered a positive factor in the calculations of a leader since the influx of capital is crucial to growth and development of a country like Colombia. To understand this, one need only note that a

major impediment to renewed economic activity and thus recuperation from the debt crisis of the 1980s has been the lack of new lending by private banks (CEPAL 1985 p.12)

Much like the data for the Lleras period, these figures do not convey the impression that Colombia was ready to assert itself in regional affairs, and especially not in a manner that would offend the United States. But the data do contain evidence of a sustainable, positive trend with respect to the external sector. Several facts merit attention. In 1972 and 1973, for example, the deficit on the current account was reduced substantially. In fact, in seven of the ten years between 1970 and 1980, coinciding with the opening of of Colombia's international relations, the deficit was either lower than in the previous year (three times), or the balance was positive (four times).

Trade exhibited a similar pattern. The value of imports surpassed that of exports only four times between 1970 and 1979, and in one year, 1972, the trade deficit was reduced substantially. Moreover, the value of exports increased in a sustained fashion during this period (See Table 5.5). This is exceedingly important because in the Colombian case, growth is closely linked to the export sector, particularly the export of coffee (UN Economic Bulletin 1971, p. 96). (This fact gives added importance to the diversification of trade documented below).

The value of exports increased eight of the nine years between 1970 and 1978. Although the increase was negligible in 1975, only in 1971 did the unit price of Colombian exports actually decline. Increases in the volume of Colombian exports, including coffee, were not sufficient to offset this drop in the price of goods, resulting in a slight decline in overall export earnings for that year. Generally, then, Colombia's capacity to earn foreign exchange was positive throughout the 1970s. This positive trend would appear to be consistent with the proposition that greater activity is associated with an improved or improving economy.

Some caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from these data for the following reason. Coffee prices played an important, perhaps disproportionate, role in this regard, although exports of manufactured goods and non-traditional agricultural products at times contributed to Colombia's economic dynamism. In every year between 1970 and 1978 but one, the value of exports would either rise or fall with the fluctuations in either the price of coffee or the volume of coffee production.

The single exception to this apparent relationship between the rising value of exports and increases in either the international price of coffee or the volume of coffee production occurred in 1972. The 24% increase in the value of exports registered that year was "mainly due to the

exceptional growth of about 55% in the sales of a number of products which are not individually of importance, but which together now represent one half of the total value of exports" (UN Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 1972 p. 59).

At this point in the analysis a question arises as to what conclusions Colombian leaders would draw about these favorable trends in the value of Colombian exports. On the one hand, the value of the exports was generally increasing. The average increase in the value of exports between 1970 and 1974 was 22.6 percent. On the other hand, much of that was due to coffee prices, and in some instances increases in the price of coffee were due to unpredictable and relatively rare circumstances. Although a dollar (or peso) earned is a dollar earned, it is logical to think that the potential vulnerability of the Colombian economy of declining coffee prices and otherwise unfavorable terms of trade, would have influenced the calculations of the Colombian leadership. Certainly, diversification of export products becomes a matter of some urgency. But potentially more important for present purposes is the possibility that Colombian leaders could conclude that the bubble would inevitably burst and moderate their actions accordingly.

Earlier it was noted that economic dependency in the classic sense of the term is less important than dependency on a single country, the United States. By the same token, it is possible in the present context to minimize the

importance of reliance on a single export product, even though this is generally understood to be one of the defining characteristic of a dependent economy. The assumption, then, is that the structural characteristics of the Colombian economy do not figure in the calculations of Colombian leaders in the same way as do perceptions of positive trends. Clearly, at some point, an insightful leader would recognize the dangers of relying on coffee as the principal earner of foreign exchange, and would seek to remedy it. For this reason, the level of economic development is measured in this chapter in part by growth of manufacturing in recognition of the contribution of industrialization to economic development and the soundness of the economy. But, the perception of enhanced national capacity to act can just as reasonably be based on the perception of favorable trends in the short and medium terms.

Another point (especially relevant to the activism evident during the Lopez years) warrants consideration. With the signing in 1975 of International Coffee Accord, Colombian leaders had solid reasons to believe that the coffee bubble would not burst. Due to the Accord's provision with respect to both the international price of coffee and Colombia's quota, Colombia's leadership could be reasonably confident that the positive trends in the value of Colombia exports would continue even if they were the result of the vitality of the market for a single product (Arango, 1985 p. 125).

Lopez Michelsen assumed office in August 1974 and attempted to put into practice the foreign policy doctrine he advocated as Lleras' foreign minister. Except for 1975, Colombia's economic fortunes were such that he could afford to do so. This will become especially evident when the direction of trade and the source of financial flows are examined closely in subsequent sections.

Colombia experienced an economic slowdown in 1975 "due to the restrictive effects of the world recession on exports" (UN Economic Bulletin, 1975 p. 128). Moreover, anti-inflationary measures implemented by the new president had the effect of slowing domestic economic activity. Manufacturing was seriously affected, as growth all but ceased. The sharp fall off in the exports of manufactured goods (5%) was an important factor in this regard.

But for the remainder of Lopez Michelsen's term in office, the situation was favorable. The average growth of the GDP rose again to 6.1 for his remaining three years of his term. Although this rate of growth was somewhat lower than the nearly 7% annual growth rate registered between 1970 and 1974, Colombia's economic potential became apparent again in 1978 when the GDP surged by nearly 9 percent. Manufacturing also regained most of the dynamism it had lost in 1975. As an indication of this, while most of the GDP growth registered in 1976 was due to increased activity in the service sector rather than in those sectors producing goods, manufacturing was the only exception to this (UN 1976

p. 110).

In a clear departure from previous years, all the indicators in the external sector were favorable. The balance of trade was positive each year with the exception of his first year in office in 1974, and the balance on the current account showed improvement each of his years in office. Having inherited a substantial deficit on the current account in 1974 (-382), the Lopez administration cut the deficit by nearly a third the following year and then registered a surplus for the next three years. International reserves grew during his tenure as well. After declining in 1974, international reserves grew again in 1975. Eventually Colombia's holding of valuable foreign exchange grew to \$676 million before Turbay assumed the presidency in August of 1978.

Unlike his predecessors, Lopez did not accumulate international reserves by resorting to external financing. During his four years in office, Lopez managed to slow the rate by which Colombia's indebtedness grew between 1974 and 1978, from a rate of 11.6% to 6.7 percent (see Table 5.3). During the same period, the service the debt as a percentage of exports of goods dropped from 13.8% to 10.8% (See Table 5.4).

On balance it would appear that the trends for the period between 1970 and 1978 were generally favorable, especially during Lopez's term. The Colombian economy grew at a rapid and sustained rate. Growth of manufacturing,

deemed to be of importance by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) was robust. The value of exports rose steadily, and the national treasury enjoyed a comfortable position with respect to international reserves. The activism of the decade, especially that of Lopez, was generally associated with economic viability. If it is correct that such circumstances encourage leaders to pursue greater autonomy, that activism should have been sustained.

In August of 1978, however, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala replaced Lopez as president and soon slowed the evolution of Colombia's foreign policy. The task here is to shed some light on this reversal. In the next chapter, evidence of consensus is examined. The aim here is to ascertain whether the deference shown by Turbay to the United States might have been influenced by economic constraints.

Several observations are forthcoming. First, what amounted to a realignment of Colombia and the United States became most evident only after 1980, and notably it was at that point that Colombia's economic fortunes begin to decline due to the onset of the economic crisis that gripped Latin America in the beginning of the decade. The effects were harsh. The rate of economic growth slowed. Between 1978 and 1982 the average annual increase was 4.4 %. But, if the 1978 figure is excluded on the grounds that it was exceptionally high and that it overlaps with the Lopez

period, the actual rate of increase is only around 3.2 percent.

Colombian industry also suffered. Manufacturing surged in 1978, but then declined dramatically (from 9.5 to 4.2 percent) and then crashed. In 1981 and 1982 manufacturing actually registered negative growth. Ironically, the participation of manufacturing in the generation of the GDP was substantially greater in 1980 than it had been in 1978. This is probably a result of the dynamism evident at the end of the previous decade. The figure may also be inflated in that it reflects the precipitous decline of non-manufacturing sectors of the economy. This is suggested by the fact that the participation of manufacturing in the generation of the GDP would drop off by 1982 despite renewed growth in the manufacturing sector.

The situation was no better with respect to the external sector. The last gasp of the economic dynamism of the 1970s occurred in 1979. In that year, the balance of payments situation was sound, and international reserves grew. Thereafter, the bottom fell out. Colombia's balance of payments went into deficit for the first time since the 1974-1975 period. Similarly, the value of exports began to slow, then went into decline. The value of exports grew by a healthy 26% in 1979, but by only 7.5% the following year. In 1981, Colombia's exports were garnering substantially lower prices. From 1979 to 1981 the trend in the price paid for Colombia goods and services, including coffee, was

distinctly negative.

International reserves grew in both 1980 and 1981 but declined in 1982. The average annual increase in Colombia's indebtedness surged in this period (to 21 percent, see Table 5.3) but even this was not enough to bolster Colombia's faltering reserve situation. Corresponding to both the surge in the average annual increase of indebtedness and the declining value of exports was the sharp increase in the relationship between debt service and the value of exports (see Table 5.7) The 10.8% average for the Lopez administration leaped to 13.5% for the 1978-1982 period.

These data suggest that the deference showed by Turbay to United States policy, especially after 1980, was due at least in part to these unfavorable trends. In other words, deference was a matter of compliance rather than consensus - - to reintroduce that important distinction. The issue of consensus is taken up in Chapter Five. But there are strong reasons to dismiss the conclusion that economic factors prompted Turbay to comply. The evidence presented in the following sections will strengthen this judgment.

First, with respect to the effect of the poor economic situation on Colombia's diplomatic activity, it must be recalled that Turbay did not permit the economic downturn to dissuade him from increasing Colombia's diplomatic presence in the Caribbean. It was precisely at this juncture that Turbay insisted on Colombian participation in the Nassau

Group, a forerunner to the Caribbean Basin Initiative. That diplomatic outreach involved a commitment of economic aid which, given the data presented above, must have required some sacrifice. This is the sort of diplomatic initiative that is expected when the national coffers are bursting at the seams, not when the economy is contracting at an alarming rate. Indeed, in the next chapter Turbay's views on this matter will be discussed. Here, by way of preview, it is worth mentioning that in announcing this initiative, Turbay acknowledged that Colombia had not been asked to participate by the United States precisely because the United States doubted Colombia had the economic wherewithal to contribute.

Second, and more importantly, the data for the Betancur cuareño are not much better, yet Betancur initiated Colombia's famed viraje. If Turbay's Caribbean initiative displayed increased activity, Betancur's certainly displayed greater autonomy. Thus, between 1980 and 1985, both activity and autonomy appear to have no clear association with positive economic trends.

Between 1982 and 1985, GDP growth continued to show the effects of the generalized economic crisis confronting the region. Although the rate of growth increased each year between 1982 and 1984, the increase was very modest and was even reversed in 1985. Manufacturing also rebounded, and even registered a strong 8% increase in 1984 before leveling

off again in 1985. Interestingly, manufacturing contributed slightly less to Colombia's GDP in 1985 (22.5%) than it had just five years earlier (23.5%).

The external sector too showed the extent of the crisis. The balance of trade was consistently negative through to mid-decade, no doubt reflecting the protectionism of the industrialized nations. However, the size of the deficit declined steadily. The trade deficit was halved in both 1984 and 1985, and overall by the last year for which data are presented, the trade deficit had been reduced by about 81% from what it had been at its worst in 1982. Similarly, a slight improvement was registered in the deficit on the current account. Again, 1982 was the worst of it. Thereafter, gradual improvement in the external sector was experienced. Although the extent of improvement was not as great as it was in the case of the trade balance, the deficit on the current account was less than half of what it was in 1982.

Not until 1985, however, did the Betancur administration manage to stem the loss of international exchange. Colombia managed to increase its holdings by \$283 million in 1985 after three consecutive years in which the Central Bank's holdings were drawn down. This represented an 81% improvement over the previous year. In 1986, the last year of the administration, Colombia's reserves grew by another 78 percent. The situation had been turned around. Finally, Betancur managed to slow the rate at which Colombia

accumulated external liabilities. The rate of indebtedness increased by an average of 10% during the Betancur years, far below the massive rate of increase registered during the early years of the crisis.

The slight improvement toward the end of the Betancur period reflects the fact that Colombia had weathered the worst of the storm. Certainly president Barco, who replaced Betancur in August 1986, inherited a better situation than Betancur had, and this may have affected his calculations with respect to the continuation of the Betancur line. But even if it is assumed that the improvement in evidence by 1986 constituted a trend, it could not have influenced Betancur's policies. Betancur initiated the viraje during Colombia's darkest hour. So some other explanation for Betancur's sharp break with the United States, or more specifically, with the Reagan administration, must be offered.

The data for the Barco period show continued improvement. First, consistent with the observation just made that by the middle of the decade Colombia had weathered the worst of the storm, Colombia's GDP grew at an annual rate of just over 5% between 1986 and 1988, the last year for which reliable data are available. Manufacturing grew at 4.4%. However, both GDP growth and growth of manufacturing were slowing down in 1988.

The recovery in the balance of payments was sustained for the three years for which data are available. The balance of trade was favorable all three years. Nevertheless, the surplus registered in 1988 was substantially smaller than the ones achieved in 1986 and 1987. The balance on the current account also showed a deficit in 1988 after two years of surplus. Thus, the current account is like the figures for GDP and manufacturing growth in the sense that the 1988 figures fell short of the gains of 1986 and 1987. Even so, the Central Bank managed to accumulate additional international reserves. But this did not come as a result of foreign borrowing. In fact, the rate at which international indebtedness grew was also slowed especially between 1987 and 1988.

III. The Diversification of Aid Dependency.

The rationale for examining the source of economic assistance is straight-forward: it is assumed that a country that depends on a single source for the bulk of its foreign investment capital will, other things being equal, exercise caution in the design of its foreign policy if its leaders are aware that the source country has strong preferences on a certain matter, and that it is willing to use economic instruments to gain compliance where consensus is lacking. In this chapter it is assumed that the United States is willing to use economic instruments to gain compliance. The historical evidence is clear and in some instances overwhelming. No effort is made to show that, in the Colombian case, political strings were attached to the United States' assistance. However, it warrants reiteration that Lopez Michelsen refused USAID assistance citing concern about undue dependence.

Figure 4.1 depicts the trends in the provision of official development assistance (ODA) granted to Colombia on a bilateral basis by the United States and by members of the Development Assistance Council (DAC) other than the United States. Official development assistance channelled through multilateral agencies will be analyzed separately. Official assistance is defined by the OECD as "those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments." This assistance is "concessional in

character" and is intended for the purpose of promoting "the economic development and welfare of developing countries".

The Lleras period is not depicted graphically due to the incompleteness of the available time-series data. This is inconsequential because the 1969 figure captures the situation prevailing in the 1960s. Between 1961 and 1964, the United States provided \$207 million in ODA, nearly 95% of ODA provided on a bilateral basis, and there is no reason to believe that the situation was significantly different between 1965 and 1969. Inasmuch as these figures reflect the intense financial commitment of the United States to Colombia, and the region, in the form of the Alliance for Progress, they also underscore the preponderance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Between 1969 and 1975, the United States provided 82% of all ODA extended to Colombia on a bilateral basis. However, the actual amount of United States aid increased only twice in this seven year period (in 1970 and 1973). More importantly, the amount of US ODA declined every year except between 1972 and 1973, and after 1973, US ODA began to decline as a percentage of total ODA provided on a bilateral basis. This process was virtually completed in 1975. Much the same occurred with respect to Colombian trade, as will be discussed below. So, whereas in 1969 the United States provided 94% of ODA, by the end of the Lleras cuareño in 1974, that figure had fallen to 68 percent, and to just over half in 1975.


Addendum

The sources for Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 were unintentionally omitted.

The Direction of Trade data are taken from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistic Yearbooks, 1977, 1981, 1986.

The data on Official development assistance are from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Geographical Distribution of Financial Flow, 1981, 1986, 1987, 1990.

FIGURE 4.1
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE



The trend for both Lleras and Pastrana, then, is clearly one of declining US assistance as a percentage of total. This is a direct consequence of the Johnson administration's neglect of the Alliance for Progress, and subsequently, the "Low Profile" policy of the Nixon administration. Despite the declining trend, both Lleras and Pastrana had to contend with the fact that the United States was still far and away the main provider of official assistance. If it is correct that perceived economic dependency on the United States influenced Colombia's foreign policy, then one of the findings of Chapter Three (that although both Lleras and Pastrana increased Colombia's diplomatic activity, they did not do much in the way of autonomy) becomes comprehensible. Chapter Five presents evidence that the Memorias of the foreign ministry began to echo some decidedly Third World themes around this time, indicting the germination of an intent to be more autonomous. Thus, the fact that Lleras and Pastrana took only minimal steps in that direction could reflect their assessment that Colombia was not yet in a position to do so, or that autonomy from the United States was not entirely desirable given the financial incentives of close alignment.

After 1975, the percentage of ODA from non-US sources surpassed US assistance. This was mainly a result of the decline of US ODA since the contributions of other DAC members were increasing only slightly until the end of the

decade. In fact, total, bilateral ODA did not achieve the 1973 level of \$128.5 million until 1980. This was deliberate. During his first few years in office, Lopez attempted to restrict net external indebtedness so that the influx of ODA would not reinforce the inflationary pressures already caused by the rapid accumulation of international reserves noted in the previous section. Lopez subsequently decided to ease restrictions on the influx of capital as part of the National Integration Plan, and foreign financing, including ODA, increased toward the end of his term. The effects of this become most evident in the Turbay period (UN Bulletin 1980 p. 15).

What is noteworthy, however, is that when these prior levels of ODA were restored, the United States no longer played a predominant role in providing the needed assistance. United States ODA continued to decline as a percentage of the total throughout the Lopez cuarenio, falling from a little over half of all ODA in 1975, to just over 28% in 1978. United States assistance would constitute only 12% in 1980 after a massive influx of non-US ODA. Dependency on United States assistance had been diminished.

It should be recalled that Lopez rejected US Agency for International Development assistance on the grounds that the political strings that United States attached to it compromised Colombia's sovereignty. The fall off of US aid evident in Figure 5.1 in part reflects that decision. But

whatever the cause, the meaning of the figures is clear. Colombia was no longer receiving the bulk of ODA from the United States, and indeed felt it could do without that aid specifically provided by the USAID. Lopez it has been noted was the most jealous of Colombia's autonomy, with the exception of Betancur. These findings give credence to the proposition that financial leeway had some effect on that fact.

This brings the analysis to the Turbay years. In the previous section it was noted that he entered office at the tail end of an impressive period of growth that may have enabled his predecessor to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Likewise, the diminution of dependency on United States official assistance also accelerated in the first years of the Turbay presidency. Not only did the inflow of external aid resume, non-US ODA surged between 1978 and 1980 from about \$70 to \$157 million. In 1980, nearly 88% of that came from DAC members other than the United States. To this point, Turbay was the least dependent of Colombian presidents insofar as the United States was concerned.

Taken together, however, the Turbay and Betancur periods present a puzzle. The facts that Turbay inherited a favorable trend from Lopez, and further that he was even less dependent on United States assistance than his predecessor had been, suggest that Turbay was in a favorable position to implement a more active and more autonomous foreign policy. This, of course, assumes Turbay was so

inclined. The question of inclination is taken up in the next chapter. In fact, events bare this out until 1980.

Until 1980, Turbay's foreign policy measures were more or less consistent with the new Latin American foreign policy being exhibited in the region. Thereafter, Turbay supported the regional policies of the Reagan administration. Yet, Turbay was not ostensibly rewarded for doing so with increased ODA. United States aid increased each year beginning in 1979, but only moderately. The decline in non-US ODA between 1980 and 1981 had the effect of increasing the importance of US aid to about one quarter of all bilateral ODA. Nonetheless, Turbay was still in a better position vis-a-vis the United States than Lopez had been. The Betancur period is no less puzzling. The provision of ample development assistance by DAC members other than the United States was restored after 1981 so that the US share fell again to 14% the year he assumed office. But United States assistance also surged during the first half of the Betancur cuareenio from about \$33 million in 1982 to \$156 million in 1984. This increase, combined with a dramatic fall off of DAC assistance, meant that by 1984 the United States was again giving 48%, or nearly half, of all ODA provided on a bilateral basis.

There are several plausible explanations for these findings. The first relates to the possibility of a time-lag between when aid was programmed, and when it was

delivered and recorded. The advantage of examining ODA is that, unlike lending from private US banks, the United States government presumably has greater control over official assistance than it does over private bank lending driven by the profit motive. In other words, it is more useful as a foreign policy instrument. On the other hand, it may not be the most responsive instrument, in the sense that it may take time for behavior to be rewarded or punished. If this is correct, the surge in US ODA recorded between 1982 and 1984 could be the late arrival of monies programed earlier as a reward for Turbay's cooperation. Further, if this line of reasoning is correct, the drop off in US ODA after 1984 could in fact reflect the Reagan administration's displeasure with the Betancur policy.

A second explanation focuses on the extent of the Reagan administration's displeasure with president Betancur's open opposition to its policies. Although Betancur announced his intention to break from the United States almost immediately upon assuming office, the United States may have taken a wait-and-see attitude, or may have dismissed Betancur's rhetoric as just that. But, Betancur's active role in the formation of Contadora and the Cartagena Groups would have persuaded Reagan administration officials otherwise. If this view is correct, the slowdown, then drop off of United States aid in the 1983-1984 time-frame can be explained as a response to Contadora. Whatever the explanation, by the time Betancur left office, US ODA had

fallen again to 27% of the total. Barco, then, assumed a favorable situation as was the case with Colombia's overall economic well-being noted in the previous section.

Many of these puzzles disappear when multilateral ODA is taken into account. It becomes apparent that Colombia had ample economic aid after 1975, and that this would have negated surges of US bilateral assistance relative to non-US ODA.

Several issues are important in this regard. First, it is important to note whether multilateral aid represents a significant percentage of total aid. The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether aid from multilateral agencies off-sets the aid given by any one nation. As noted above, for some time, the United States donated virtually all of the bilateral assistance. This fact could enable the United States to "buy" deference, unless multilateral aid constituted a significant, independent source.


There is a second consideration. Multilateral aid is not without political "strings", nor does the United States lack influence in multilateral agencies. Weighted voting in the IMF and World Bank is a crucial instrument, and, as the economic blockade of Nicaragua makes clear, the United States has been both willing and able to use that instrument. Even so, it is more difficult for the United States to block assistance channeled through multilateral agencies than to cut off unilaterally an offending country

over which it is attempting to gain leverage. Moreover, tremendous diplomatic pressure is required to influence decision-making in multilateral institutions which can be expected to resist the overt politicization of their funding programs and priorities. Thus, this is an instrument to be utilized in only the most serious cases. Sandinista Nicaragua and Castroite Cuba may constitute such cases, but an assertive Colombia probably would not.

Figure 4.2 incorporates the relevant data. Until 1976, multilateral ODA generally constituted no more than a fifth all ODA, including all assistance provided by multilateral agencies and DAC members. Only twice during that time did it amount to a third of all aid, and prior to 1974, US ODA alone was greater than or equal to multilateral assistance and all other bilateral assistance combined. The United States was the banker.

By the first year of the Lopez administration, non-US ODA and multilateral assistance combined was greater than that granted by the United States, but just barely (\$68.4 million as opposed to \$56 million). This figure does not itself give reason to believe that Colombia was free of possible economic constraints on its range of action, but it was a sign of changing times. By 1976, multilateral ODA alone constituted 59.4% of all ODA, and the total amount of ODA was reaching record levels. That figure shot up to 73% the following year. From 1978 onward, multilateral ODA increased every year except two, between 1984 and 1986, but

FIGURE 4.2
MULTILATERAL ODA



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even then, it was at tremendous levels. The average contribution during the 8 year period ending in 1985 was just under 58 percent of the total.

Put in perspective, the figures presented above indicate that not only had the United States' relative contribution of bilateral assistance declined, multilateral ODA more than off-set official United States assistance, sometimes substantially so. If it is correct that multilateral assistance is more insulated from politics than is bilateral ODA, then from the mid-1970s onward, Colombia was in an advantageous position to act more autonomously if its leadership was so inclined.


It is useful to underscore that the relative importance of multilateral assistance increased substantially during the years of economic hardship in Latin America. During those same years, the Reagan administration was in need of support for its ideological campaign against Nicaragua and Cuba whether that support was voluntary or coerced. Thus, the United States' economic leverage would have been greatest were it not for multilateral ODA. This means that no Colombian president was so deeply dependent on US aid that noncompliance with United States policy would have been disastrous. This applies to Turkey as well. Apparently, the answer to the Turkey riddle must be found in consensus.

IV. The Diversification of Trade Dependency

This section provides evidence of Colombia's ability, over time, to diversify its markets, just as over time it was able to diversify its sources of ODA. This concern reflects the importance attached to diversification of dependency in the model. Note that the relevant variable is the the diversification of markets, not with the diversification of export products. To overcome dependency it is necessary, inter alia, to end reliance on a few products. But under the assumptions here, it is not the end of dependency per se, but of dependence on a single country that is important.

Figure 4.3 depicts the diversification of Colombia's export markets over time. As was the case in the previous section, the fact that the Lleras period is not depicted graphically is inconsequential. The figures for 1969 can be taken as an indication of the situation prevailing prior to that date.

FIGURE 4.3
DIRECTION OF TRADE



There is another, similarity with Figure 4.1: until the the mid-1970s, the preponderant importance of the United States market is unambiguous but changes thereafter. Until 1974, exports to the United States amounted to over one half billion dollars, or just under sixty percent of Colombia's trade earnings. For the six year period between 1969 and 1974, average trade with the United States was 58.7 percent. Moreover, the annual increase in value of exports to the United States kept pace with increasing value of exports destined for other markets. Again, for the 1969 to 1974 time-frame, the value of Colombian exports to the United States grew at an annual rate of 14% annually, including a 32% expansion between 1972 and 1973, while those shipped to other destinations grew at a slightly higher annual rate of 15.4% during the same period.

Clearly, the United States qualified as Colombia's indispensable partner. A point made in the previous section warrants reiteration here: to a significant degree, Colombia's overall economic well-being and its potential for growth and development hinge on the performance of its external sector. Thus, to the extent that the performance of its external sector is linked to the US market, Colombia's economic development is dependent on the United States. As will be noted in the next chapter, Colombian officials openly acknowledged that plain fact even while denying that it diminished Colombia's sovereignty.

After 1974, the preponderant importance of the United States' market begins to diminish. A \$66.8 million reduction in American purchases of Colombian products between 1974 and 1975, coupled with an increase in non-US sales, translated into a substantial decline in the US share of Colombian export earnings, from 60% of Colombia's total trade to a little less than 47 percent. This trend would endure. During the next ten years, Colombia will obtain just under 40% of its total trade earnings from United States purchases.

The 1980s, however, saw the resurgence of the North American market. In 1985, the last year for which reliable data are available, the US share rose again to 65.8% of the total. Even if that percentage is transitory, the data for the 1980s reveal that the size of the United States market was perhaps less important than its degree of openness.

Between 1979 and 1980, exports to destinations other than the United States fell off dramatically. A similar drop off occurred the following year in the United States market. But thereafter, United States purchases of Colombia goods steadily rose, while the trend for non-US exports was generally downward. Obviously, these findings reflect the protectionist practices of the industrialized nations during the global recession of the early decade.

The renewed importance of United States markets for Colombian goods is reminiscent of the resurgence of United

States bilateral assistance noted in the previous section. This appears to be consistent with the theory which suggests that hegemonic powers open its doors to trade even when that might be disadvantageous in the short-term. In other words, the lender of last resort is also the one country that mitigates the worst effects of global protectionism by throwing open its own markets for trade. The trends appear to support the view that the United States was playing that role. However, it should be noted that the United States' policies were often protectionist and that this was a frequent complaint of Colombian leaders as will be noted in the next chapter.

The salient issue relates to the effect of these trends on Colombian decision-makers. After 1975 there is clear evidence that Colombia had diversified its export markets. This finding is entirely consistent with the proposition that diversification of dependency enables developing nations to pursue more autonomous policies if they perceive that course of action to be in the national interest. These findings are also consistent with the discussion of Colombian policy presented in the previous chapter.

Once again, the position of president Turbay warrants special attention because his policies were not consonant with those of his predecessor or his successors. Insofar as diversification of trade dependency is concerned, Turbay was no better or worse off than they. It is possible to argue that, as it became apparent that the world would slide into

recession in the early 1980s, Turbay (correctly) anticipated that the United States would be the only safe-haven in the approaching storm. In this case, cooperation with the United States or at least a low diplomatic profile, was adviseable.

Betancur clearly assessed the situation differently. In the first section it was noted that Betancur inherited an awful economic situation, and that he adopted a self-assertive foreign policy stance despite Colombia's economic difficulties, not because of its overall economic well-being. In the second section, a different picture emerged. Despite the overall economic problems experienced by Colombia, dependence on United States assistance had been reduced relative to non-US sources of ODA and especially multilateral assistance. The findings presented in this section are basically the same. Though the United States market was preponderantly important the year before Betancur left office, the trend over the previous decade suggested that Colombia had really managed to diversify its markets. Turbay, Betancur and Barco were all in a position to be assertive -- if they chose to be.

V Summary

Viewed against the backdrop of the discussion of the previous chapter, the economic data presented and analyzed in this chapter provide some support for propositions three and four which relate economic dependency and the level of

economic development to foreign policy deference.

The evidence is strongest with respect to Colombia's ability over time to diversify its economic dependency. Around the middle of the 1970s, the preponderant importance of the United States disappeared. This coincided with the administration of president Lopez which made a concerted effort to establish some autonomy vis-a-vis the United States. The next chapter presents evidence that Lopez, while foreign minister for president Lleras Restrepo, was already beginning to articulate a less deferential foreign policy line as early as 1969. His successor in the post, Alfredo Vazquez, embraced the new thinking. But, only limited steps were taken in the way of greater activity during the presidency of Pastrana (1970-1974). This fact is consistent with both propositions since Colombia was not yet capable of pursuing a more active, much less more autonomous policy until the middle of the decade.

At the same time, some of the findings of reported in this chapter create something of a quandary with respect to both Turbay and Betancur. Stated simply, the question that most analysts of Colombian foreign policy have sought to answer is, What motivated Turbay to slow, if not reverse, the the foreign policy reorientation initiated by his predecessors? This chapter sought to answer that question by citing economic considerations. Turbay inherited favorable economic circumstances from Lopez, and

initially appeared disposed to be follow the new line of thinking that was clearly evolving (discussed in the next chapter). But after 1980, when the economy turned downward, Turbay brought Colombia back into line with the United States. Thus, there is an apparent association between economic constraint and foreign policy deference. The most compelling counterargument relates to the data from the Betancur period. Betancur's economic situation was much worse than Turbay's, yet he did not hesitate to state his administration's opposition to the Reagan administration's regional policies. Indeed, Betancur took unprecedented steps in the direction of autonomy.

The viraje initiated by Betancur becomes intelligible within the framework of this chapter only with respect to the diversification of dependency. From this perspective, the awful economic situation he inherited from Turbay was less important than the diminished dependency on the United States which first became apparent a decade before he assumed office. But if it is accepted that the diversification of dependency is the more important economic factor, then the Turbay period again becomes a puzzle. Turbay could also count on non-US sources of official development assistance, and except for the 1979-1980 time-frame, non-US markets were providing his country with the bulk of its export earnings. All of this suggests that Turbay's more deferential policy was not at all a matter of compliance. If this is correct, an analysis of foreign

policy materials from the Turbay cuarenio should reveal signs of the renaissance of consensus.

NOTES

- 1). There is considerable debate on this point. Waltz (1979), for example, disputes the very notion that a significant shift has occurred because although the relative gap between the United States and its rivals has diminished, the United States' overall strength in the global economy remains tremendous.
- 2) Dependency theory does suggest one way in which the domestic consequences of associated dependent development could affect foreign policy-making. Evans (1979) and others have discussed how associated dependent development gives rise to class whose interests lie with transnational corporations. As a class, political and economic elites could develop an interest in maintaining a deferential foreign policy. In a sense, this is being assumed in the discussion of military training and aid. the underlying assumption is that such contacts create an interest in deference, if not consensus on security matters.
- 3) Those familiar with dependency theory would reject the equation of industrialization with development. However, that is not being attempted here. The contribution of manufacturing to the GDP is merely utilized as one measure of a country's overall economic capacity to pursue a more active foreign policy.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EROSION OF CONSENSUS AND COLOMBIA'S VIRAJE

I. Introduction

Colombia's foreign policy reorientation, documented in Chapter Three, is offered as partial evidence of the United State's declining ability to count on the deference of Latin American states. In this chapter, an effort is made to explain that reorientation in terms of the changing perceptions, attitudes and orientations of Colombian leaders.

The model outlined in Chapter Two specified the importance of this perceptual or cognitive variable. There it was hypothesized that foreign policy deference, regime performance and ultimately hegemony were all influenced either directly by attitudes (consensus regarding basic principles and norms) or by factors such as fragmentation of economic power mediated indirectly through perceptions. In an important sense, then, this is the crucial chapter of the research. However, the focus here is only on foreign policy deference, and more specifically the reorientation of Colombia's foreign policy to reflect a decidedly less deferential posture vis-a-vis the United States.

The chapter has several related objectives. The first is to determine what principles and norms guide Colombian

foreign policy, and to judge whether and to what degree changes of those principles, or in the way that they are interpreted, account for Colombia's viraje. The second objective is to discover evidence of the perceptions of Colombian leaders with respect to constraints upon, and opportunities for, a more active and autonomous foreign policy. A third objective is to learn what role conceptions Colombian leaders have developed, and to determine if the enunciation of specific role conceptions is related to the adoption of new principles and norms and to perceptions of changing circumstances.

To discover evidence of the importance of this perceptual component of the model, a content analysis of the Memorias of the Colombian Foreign Ministry was performed. The documents examined cover the twenty two year period between 1966 and 1988. Specific themes were noted and analyzed with attention to their frequency, intensity, context and significance. The analyzed themes fall into four categories.

1. The principles and norms explicitly articulated and espoused by Colombian leaders.
2. Attitudes about the United States, including evaluations of its policies and the propriety of alignment with it.
3. Perceptions of constraint or opportunity impinging on Colombia's ability to design and implement foreign policy, including the nature, source, and potential solution of problems requiring attention.
4. Conceptions of Colombia's proper and actual role(s) in regional and international affairs especially insofar as they reflect a subordinate or independent relationship with the United States.

The principles embraced by Colombian leaders and the behavioral norms they imply are obviously important. Consensus regarding constitutive principles and norms of conduct is a requisite of the stability, perdurability and performance of the system. Changes in such attitudes imply, and could eventually result in, a fundamental change in the context of hemispheric relations. Colombia's foreign relations in particular have been shaped by conceptions of belonging to the concierto americano. The gradual incorporation of new principles, or the reinterpretation of the implication of existing ones for foreign policy, would be particularly important if those changes impinged upon the rationale for foreign policy deference.

It is useful also to note themes relating to Colombian officials' perceptions of, and attitudes toward, the United States. In particular the analysis focuses on perceptions the United States power and evaluations of its policies. These are important because they influence conceptions of national interest, especially the utility of close alignment. Statements reflecting the perception that the United States' preponderant power has diminished would obviously be important if that fact was interpreted as an indication of the opportunity or necessity of a foreign policy reorientation. Criticisms of United States policy would also be important because deference results from, inter alia, the subordinate state's calculation that the dominant state's policies benefit it. Finally, statements

reflecting Colombia's sense of identification or alignment are crucial. In Chapter Four the historical and practical importance of the doctrine of Respice Polum was noted. This was an unequivocal articulation of Colombia's close identification and alignment with the United States. Any indications that this has changed would contribute to the confirmation of Proposition Five stated in Chapter Two.

A closely related category of themes relates to perceptions of constraints and opportunities. Propositions two, three and four stated in Chapter Four suggest the nature of the constraints and opportunities that are important in this context. The documents were examined for evidence relating Colombia's foreign policy reorientation to the perception of Colombian leaders that there existed opportunities for a more active and autonomous foreign policy due to the loss of the United States' willingness to lead, the diversification of Colombia's economic dependency, and Colombia's own enhanced capacity to act.

It is also important to examine perceptions of constraint and opportunity in order to distinguish consensus from compliance. It would be useful to determine the motives for foreign policy behavior. As noted in the fourth chapter, early in this century Colombian leaders adopted a pragmatic position vis-a-vis the United States, having perceived both the constraints imposed upon its range of action by an emerging power concerned about the Panama canal (as evinced by military interventions in the Caribbean) and

the benefits of deliberate subordination to the United States. It is reasonable, therefore, that changes in that country's foreign policy should be associated with changes in their perceptions of opportunity and constraint.

Finally, the content of the documents was examined for indications of the role conceptions enunciated by Colombian leaders. All the themes discussed so far -- principles and norms of behavior, the relationship with the United States, the existence of constraints and opportunities -- have consequences in terms of the potential role or roles Colombia could play in hemispheric and international affairs. The usefulness of concepts derived from role theory has not been sufficiently appreciated, but the language of role analysis is particularly applicable to regime guided behavior. Rosenau (1987, p.49) pointed out that the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures of a given regime are sustained through the role expectations of national leaders, and that "conceiving of the values encompassed by regime boundaries in terms of unique role expectations...makes it easier to breakdown and analyze the conduct of those actors, such as chiefs of state and foreign secretaries who are active in a multiplicity of regimes." Similarly, Young (1986, p. 108) contends that regimes need to be understood as social institutions, and that "social institutions are recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations

among occupants of these roles."

As noted in the previous chapter, the doctrine that had guided Colombian foreign relations explicitly cast the United States and Colombia in dominant and subordinate roles respectively. Consequently, changes in attitudes regarding the United States, and more specifically the utility and legitimacy of its leadership, imply the necessity to re-evaluate and reformulate conceptions of Colombia's own role in regional politics. Similarly, changes in the distribution of power, whether the decline of the hegemonic state's preponderance, or enhanced national capacity, could produce a change or amplification of roles. Adoption of new principles would also imply the necessity of re-examining national roles.

The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections corresponding to the analysis presented in Chapter Four. The first deals with the period from 1966-1978, covering the apertura associated with the Lleras, Pastrana and Lopez administrations. The second examines the transition from apertura to viraje which occurred after 1978 and which corresponds to the Turbay, Betancur and Barco administrations.

II. APERTURA: 1966-1978

(1). Deference and Ideological Consensus

The proposition that changes in attitudes and perceptions contributed to the reorientation of Colombia's foreign policy should not be interpreted to mean that Colombia abandoned its early adherence to the principles of the IAS. What is expected, however, is some evidence of an evolution in the way that these principles are expounded and more importantly the gradual incorporation of themes consistent with the Third World orientation of the New Latin American foreign policy described in Chapter Four. The Memorias yield considerable evidence in support of this proposition.

Beginning around 1969, toward the end of the Lleras administration, there occurred discernible changes of the principles that guide Colombia's foreign relations as a member of the IAS, coupled with changes in its interpretations as to what norms of behavior those already accepted principles implied. As Colombia's diplomatic discourse came to reflect those changes, the conceptual foundation for a genuine foreign policy shift or viraje was laid. Alignment with the United States would be affected by those shifts.

In the first years of the Lleras administration, the Memorias contain numerous references to the standard

principles of the IAS. The themes of juridical equality of states, non-intervention, collective security and peaceful resolution of conflict appear prominently, and are routinely cited in joint resolutions or communiques. Closely related and usually appearing in the same context are broad references to international law or juridical norms coupled with the assertion that all states should conform to these norms. Colombia's unconditional conformity to these rules allows it to play the role of a "moral power" (potencia moral).

The documents leave no doubt about the firmness of Colombia's adherence to these principles, and they strongly support the proposition that regimes influence foreign policy formulation. Accordingly, Colombia energetically supports the UN and the especially OAS. "Colombia is intimately linked to this institution" is the way one Colombian foreign minister put it. Moreover, in the early years of the Lleras administration there were no doubts as to Colombia's political affinities and alignment. Membership in the concierto americano, and adherence to its principles and norms, dictated alignment with, and deference to, the United States, or more broadly, the "western powers". At the same time, however, the Memorias frequently express dissatisfaction with the performance of the regimes that the United Nations and the Organization of American States were formed to oversee. This is especially true of regimes based on the principles of non-intervention

and collective security. This perception prompts numerous calls for reform of the UN or OAS charters. More importantly, dissatisfaction with the performance of these regimes is associated with criticisms of the policies and activities of the United States, although these criticisms are muted until the mid-1970s.

The crucial area where Colombian and U.S. policies converged, and where Colombia exhibited deference to the containment policies of the United States, relates to the question of Cuba in particular and Communism more generally. According to the Foreign Ministry's first report to Congress, in 1966, Colombia was in full agreement with the United States and the majority of other Latin American states with respect to the propriety of the diplomatic isolation of Cuba. The prospect of Cuban sponsorship of Castroite guerrilla movements throughout the hemisphere worried Colombian leaders: "the truth is that the movement continues and we cannot underestimate it... (thus) it is necessary to combine a vigorous policy of social improvement with prudent and intelligent repressive action" (Zea Hernandez, 1968 p.26). This prescription was essentially the same as the one offered by Washington and later embodied in the Alliance for Progress. As noted in Chapter Three, Colombia was a major recipient of aid from that program.

It is noteworthy that the report observes that the ideology of Fidel Castro has nothing to do with Colombia's policy, reaffirmed in this report, of isolating Cuba: "The

rupture of diplomatic relations (between Colombia and Cuba in December 1961) is not a result of the political and social regime adopted by Fidel Castro", but of the fact that "Cuba has openly committed itself to political aggression" (ibid., p. 26). Seven years earlier, when the issue was Guatemala, Colombia did not hesitate to cite the ideology of the government of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz as a reason for hostility. In 1954, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Relations, Euaristo Sourdís, promised the OAS that "before the danger of Communist infiltration in the New World, Colombia stood ready to fulfill the obligations it has acquired in the diverse instruments of (the IAS) which consecrate continental solidarity" (Sourdís, 1956 p.205). Membership in the IAS meant ideological compatibility and regional solidarity, and its regimes were intended to perform, inter alia, to prevent Communist infiltration. The principle of non-intervention, though routinely cited, was not interpreted to prohibit efforts by the United States, in concert with its hemispheric partners, to guarantee the ideological compatibility of the countries of the New World.

Ideological compatibility was the cornerstone of the system of principles and values embodied in the IAS. Even the Monroe doctrine, promulgated in 1823, contained the idea that ideological affinity was the key to peace, although the ideological competitor then was monarchism rather than Communism. The key passage of the Monroe doctrine is worth citing: "the political system of the allied powers is

essentially different...from that of America...We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." This principle of ideological compatibility was tacitly extended to the IAS which was formalized in the aftermath of the Second World War, at least from the perspective of the United States, as an anti-communist alliance (Slater, 1967 especially chapters 3 and 4).

Accordingly, the OAS declarations Caracas, (1954), and Punta del Este (January 1962), relating to Guatemala and Cuba, respectively, also make the connection between ideology and membership in the IAS. The Caracas declaration stated that "international communism, by its anti-democratic nature and interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom." Likewise, the Declaration of Punta Del Este (January, 1962) which provided the juridical basis for the isolation of Cuba, was explicit about Cuba's ideology: "Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the Inter-american System." Colombia shared that perspective and conducted its international relations accordingly.

In view of this, the claim in the 1966 report that Fidel Castro's ideology did not influence Colombia's policy

appears to be significant. (Below, the increasing importance of an entirely new foreign policy principle, ideological pluralism, will be discussed in connection with Colombia's changing position on the Cuban question). But in 1966, Colombia was not yet prepared to re-evaluate, much less repudiate, the tacit assumption that ideological compatibility was crucial to membership in the IAS. Two points warrant attention in this regard. First, even President Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, claimed that ideology had nothing to do with the United States' efforts (supported by its Latin American allies including Colombia) to topple the leftist regime in Guatemala in 1954. Referring to the government of Jacobo Arbenz, the Secretary of State noted "there is ample room in the Americas for natural differences of political institutions, but there is no place here for political institutions which serve alien masters (Mechem, 1963 p. 441.) But as the key passage of the Caracas declaration makes clear, Communism and aggression were equated by definition, thus it was ideology that was at issue. It would be another few years before Colombia was prepared to reject entirely this assumption. Second, it is also worth noting that the Eighth Meeting of the Consultation of Foreign Ministers which produced the Punta del Este declaration was convened at the request of Colombia.

Nonetheless, this would be the last time for quite a few years that Colombia would be party to the isolation of another Latin American country, based implicitly or explicitly, on that country's ideology. Not until Turbay cooperated with United States in its efforts directed against Sandinista Nicaragua does the notion of compatibility reappear.

(2). Ideological Pluralism and the Erosion of Consensus

Indications of change can be observed already toward the end of Lleras Restrepo's term in office. The clearest indication that an attitudinal change was occurring relates to the enunciation by Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of an alternative to doctrine of Respice Polum when Lopez was Lleras' foreign minister. The influence and near inscrutability of the doctrine of Respice Polum have already been discussed. Lopez Michelsen replaced this phrase with another, Respice Similia. This new doctrine urged Colombia to look to those nations most similar to itself (Drekonja, 1983 p. 78ff). With the enunciation of this doctrine, tercermundismo is vocalized for the first time. This signaled the growing importance of contacts with other developing nations both in terms of economic relations and political initiatives. As noted in Chapter Four, president Lleras made the opening and universalization of Colombia's diplomatic and trade relations a priority.

Related to this new foreign policy doctrine was the adoption of the principle of ideological pluralism. Disregard for the political or economic systems of another country was essential if Colombia was to enjoy broad economic and diplomatic relations, and truly was to reach out to countries like itself as the doctrine dictates. To be successful, apertura required Colombia to abandon its hard-line policy of non-recognition of the socialist bloc. Ideological pluralism is among the most frequently encountered themes in the Memorias, and warrants detailed attention because it holds the key to the evolution of Colombian foreign policy.

The earliest example of what would become the guiding principle of Colombian foreign relations appeared in the context of calls for the reform of the United Nations in the late 1960s when Colombian leaders began to speak approvingly of the principle of the "universality of the United Nations". This theme appears seven times in the Lleras Memorias. To cite an example, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1969, foreign minister Lopez Michelsen called on the organization to fulfill its role as a "coalition of peace-loving nations...regardless of the ideological differences" of its members ("Discurso ante la Asamblea General" in Lopez 1971, np). Ideological incompatibility warranted the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS, at least while it was governed by Fidel Castro, but the U.N. was a different matter. That too would change, because although the implications of this principle were not yet

drawn out, this is an important turning point. The concept of universality would give way to the broader and more provocative concept of ideological pluralism.

Soon after Misael Pastrana Borrero replaced Lleras Restrepo as president in 1970, ideological pluralism was granted the status of a basic principle of Colombian foreign relations. There is ample documentary evidence of this. For example, in 1972 Foreign Minister Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa argued that the right to base foreign relations on the principle of ideological pluralism was no longer the prerogative of the great powers: "ideological pluralism, which Colombia has incorporated into its international policy, is a basic principle for Latin America, just as it is in the relations between the great powers" ("La Crisis de la Politica Hemisferica" in Vazquez, 1975 p.6). He then noted that the adoption of this principle "in effect, enabled Colombia to seek new courses and parameters for the principles, purposes and methods of the Inter-American System" (ibid., p.6).

This representative passage communicates several messages relevant to the argument developed in this Chapter. First, the adoption of this principle indicated that Colombia, and its Latin American neighbors, had matured and were now able to play according to the same rules of the great powers. The perception of enhanced national capacity, i.e. maturity, was hypothesized to contribute to Colombia's

foreign policy reorientation. Second, the remark that adoption of this principle enabled Colombia "to seek new courses and parameters for the principles, purposes and methods of the IAS" implies that Colombian officials, while conceiving of Colombia first and foremost as a member of the IAS, would now interpret its basic principles and mission in a way that reflected its interests. This is consistent with the proposition that Latin American states intend to alter the performance of the IAS based on an interpretation of the implications of its principles for norms of conduct that diverges from the interpretation of the United States. Third, it implies that alignment with the United States on ideological grounds had restricted Colombia's range of action. From this point forward, Colombia would disregard the ideology of those nations with which it would pursue contacts and would stipulate only that they refrain from interference in its internal affairs. Note that the assumption spelled out in the Caracas declaration that Communist regimes were "by nature" interventionist has been rejected. The implications of this are obvious and far-reaching.

Ideological pluralism soon came to be regarded not just as an additional principle, but as the the essential principle of the IAS, and thus of Colombia's foreign relations since Colombia identified itself so strongly with the concierto americano. Ideological pluralism was interpreted to be pivotal because unless it gained

acceptance other principles such as non-intervention would be weakened. In particular, it was important that the United States accept it because historically United States intervention (with the blessing of the members of the IAS) had been justified on the basis of the need to guarantee ideological compatibility. The acceptance of ideological pluralism would signify nothing less than the rejection of the Cold War logic of the Declarations made in Caracas (1954), and Punta Del Este (1962). The Colombian foreign minister now made it clear that Colombia would no longer defer to United States when it came to intervention on ideological grounds. Colombia was not alone in this regard because the theme of ideological pluralism was gaining currency elsewhere on the continent. By the mid 1980s, the OAS charter would be revised to include this principle. Consensus on this issue had disappeared.

As evidence of this important reinterpretation, between 1970 and 1978 ideological pluralism was granted privileged status in a network of principles guiding Colombia's foreign policy. Especially relevant was the linkage between ideological pluralism, sovereignty, and non-intervention. The contexts in which this linkage becomes evident indicate the importance of the adoption of this principle for Colombia's reorientation and especially for its deferential posture vis-a-vis the United States. The principle is developed most thoroughly in the contexts of criticisms of United States actions directed against the government of

Salvador Allende, and in discussions about the possible reincorporation of Cuba into IAS. In the final analysis, the adoption of the principle of ideological pluralism represented the end of the dominance of Cold War attitudes, at least until the Turbay administration revived them.

With respect to Cuba, Alfredo Vazquez made it clear that the time had come for change. A substantial portion of his speech before the OAS in April 1973 was dedicated to the Cuban question. The Minister of Foreign Relations addressed the need for reforms of the IAS including the collective security regime codified in the Rio Treaty, and an end to the isolation of Cuba. His rationale is indicative of a new attitude, and of the perception of a changed international environment.

The foreign minister began by noting that Latin American states were entering a new era. More specifically he was referring to the end of the ideological hegemony of the United States, and the change of policy that fact implied. First, Vazquez noted that "the years have past in which one country alone determined the validity of political regimes" (*La Reforma del Sistema Interamericano* in Vazquez, 1975 np). He then proceeded to note that it was now necessary to overcome "the discords that had originated in the Cold War" (*ibid.*). The principle of ideological pluralism figured prominently in this context: "in Latin America, this principle should receive equal application"

(ibid.) Sooner or later, he argued, reconciliation with Cuba would have to occur because "the Cuban question was eroding the Rio Treaty" (ibid.) The Rio Treaty was one instrument utilized by the United States to isolate the Castro regime. Thus, the time had come to ask if "the continuation of the Rio Treaty was incompatible with an objective analysis of the new conditions for peace" (ibid.).

Colombia had already arrived at a conclusion on this point: a total revision of the system was indispensable, and a new political accord with the United States should be reached. These points will be discussed in greater detail below. Here it should be noted that the IAS, or at least the collective security regime represented by the Rio Treaty, was not perceived to be performing in the interests of Latin American states. Ironically, it was the United States, not Cuba, that was isolated from the hemisphere. New thinking had changed the context of foreign relations.

The relationship between ideology and intervention arose again with respect to Chile, then governed by socialist president Salvador Allende. The reaction of the Nixon administration to the Allende regime is well known. The position of the United States in 1972 was substantially the same as its position in 1954 when the issue was Guatemala (and Richard Nixon was President Eisenhower's vice-president.) Colombia's position, however, was dramatically different in both tone and content. Colombia was less tolerant of ideological diversity and social

experimentation in 1954 than it was in 1972. The United States' attitude remained unchanged and its actions produced the same result.

Colombia's new orientation was reflected in its support for Allende's experiment and criticism of the United States' hostility as a throw-back to the Cold War. Thus the Foreign Minister noted that "Ideological crusades beyond national borders to overthrow governments was in vogue in the 1950s" ("El Pluralismo Ideologico: Base de la Convivencia Internacional" in Vazquez, 1972, p. 161). Meeting with Salvador Allende's Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, in 1971, Vazquez plainly stated Colombia's position. Vazquez asserted that "ideological pluralism was the basis for peaceful coexistence", then criticized United States policy, not Allende's ideology, as a threat to hemispheric solidarity: "What worries us now is the unity of the continent broken by the distancing of an American country from hemispheric relations, and for this reason we reiterate our faith in (the principles of ideological pluralism, international law, non-intervention and the free determination of peoples)" (ibid.). Finally, he stressed the demise of Cold War doctrine and the United States' ideological hegemony: "past is the epoch of the bosses (who) impose by force the global hegemony of a doctrine" (ibid.). Ideological conformity would no longer serve as the guiding principle of Colombian foreign policy, and was even thought to interfere with the proper performance of the IAS insofar

as the Latin America states were concerned. The linkage between ideological pluralism, international law and non-intervention is tremendously important.

In summary, the incorporation of this new principle and especially the central importance given to it, changed Colombia's orientation profoundly. Colombia was quick to point out that this principle, though new, was entirely consistent with the principles of the IAS. President Misael Pastrana, speaking at a luncheon in honor of the President Nixon's Secretary of State, William Rogers, was careful to make this point. Said President Pastrana: "Ideological pluralism is complementary with those principles that have inspired the IAS..(and does not) imply a change of friends or partners in our international relations" ("Mensaje del Presidente" in Vazquez 1975, np). Nonetheless, once embraced, the principle of ideological pluralism was going to determine how the United States was perceived, and which of its policies and actions were legitimate within the normative framework of the IAS as interpreted by Colombia and its Latin American neighbors.

(3). The Propriety of United States Hegemony

The adoption of the principle of ideological pluralism would eventually alter Colombia's perceptions of the United States' policies and actions, and its views about the propriety and utility of aligning with the United States. This, in turn, would impinge upon Colombia's deference to the once unquestioned hegemonic power. Moreover, the perception of enhanced national capacity would grant Colombia a degree of "permissibility" to become more active, and eventually, more autonomous. But what would eventually occur, did not immediately occur. There is a tremendous amount of ambivalence toward the United States in the period of Colombia's apertura. This is understandable in light of Colombia's long unquestioned adherence to the doctrine of Respice Polum.

Between 1966 and 1978, references to the United States that are indicative of the attitudes of Colombian leaders are found in the context of a broad spectrum of issues. These include economic dependence or subordination, economic and technological aid under the rubric of the Alliance for Progress, problems relating to the on-going confrontation with Cuba, perceptions about the (bi-polar) distribution of power in the international system, and perceptions about the freedom to pursue autonomous foreign policy. In other words, attitudes about the United States represent the touchstone of virtually all other considerations, a finding

which underscores that Colombia viewed itself as a participant in a hegemonic order and either had to rationalize that fact, or alter it.

In section (1) it was noted that the attitude expressed early in the Lleras period is still distinctly pro-American. To cite a key example, in his report to the Colombian Congress in 1967, Foreign Minister German Zea Hernandez, devoted considerable space to the state of United States-Colombian relations. The tone of the report was distinctly apologetic. In it, the United States is described as "the unrivaled world power in the contemporary world" ("Informe del Ministro" in Zea 1968, p.26). Moreover, Colombia's economic dependence on, and special affinity with, the United States, is acknowledged in a manner entirely consistent with the doctrine of Respice Polum.

In this important report, the Foreign Minister observed that Colombia, like other Latin American nations, "has observed a policy of closeness and adherence to the great powers of the west since the Second World War" ("Informe del Ministro" 1968, p. 26). Colombia's adherence to the principles of the IAS and its position within the concierto americano were thought to make alignment with the United States natural, but the text of the report adds that despite "this (political) affinity" the IAS is not comparable with the "monolithic socialist bloc" (ibid., p.26). The report then addresses the sensitive issue of Colombian autonomy. Latin America's economic dependence on, the United States is

clearly perceived.

"Without denying the exorbitant influence and unrivaled power of the United States in the contemporary world or the economic dependency that follows from the fact that the United States is the most important for our exports, relations between Colombia and the United States...are maintained on a plane of mutual respect and total independence...

"Both in multilateral fora and in bilateral relations with the United States, Colombia has cordially differed with the United States although it is often in agreement with it. Nothing has limited Colombia's liberty to act in the international field, especially in international organizations" (ibid. p.27)

Some interpretative comments are in order. First, this is the last time that Colombian leaders will discuss the degree of Colombia's economic dependency on the United States without palpable alarm. Hereafter, the recognition of dependency will be accompanied by calls for a new dialogue, or more dramatically, the profession of non-alignment as the only viable alternative to the unacceptable condition of subordination to the United States. Second, the assertion that, despite economic dependency, the freedom to act is not constrained is noteworthy because of the air of defensiveness about it. The passage appears to be a response to an (implicit) charge that Colombian foreign policy is excessively deferential. Of course, the Lleras cuareño marks the beginning of the end of a long-period of deference, but whatever deference was shown to the United States was not necessarily the product of Colombian

compliance. The coincidence of Colombian and United States policies is not the product of United States manipulation of Colombia's economic dependency, rather, it is the result of consensus. So, Zea's point that Colombia is free to differ cordially with the United States is mute. There would be no reason for open dissent with the United States until the adoption of the principle of ideological pluralism began to affect an attitudinal change among Colombian leaders.

In view of these observations, there is nothing surprising in terms of the respective roles of the United States and Colombia. The natural affinity sensed by Colombian leaders with the United States and the recognition of its tremendous power translate naturally into an acknowledgment of its unique role. This implies equally that Colombia is cast into a subordinate role despite the assertion that Colombia is free to disagree with the United States. The documents are specific about Colombia's expectations of the United States in its role as the regional and global power. The United States' preponderance of economic power obliges it to meet certain responsibilities, but the United States does not necessarily enjoy additional rights such as the right to prescribe Colombia's foreign policy. Two examples illustrate the point.

The first example has to do with the Alliance for Progress. As noted in Chapter Three, Colombia was a major recipient of aid from this program. The Foreign Ministry's

report to Congress, already cited, notes that Colombia as a signatory of the agreement of Punta del Este "has committed itself along with the United States to a great enterprise of collective development" and that "the United States' economic and technical assistance was foreseen as natural." But "Colombia does not accept (the aid) as a donation nor... is it necessary to renounce our autonomy." The second example comes in the form of a reference to President Lleras' trip to Washington in the summer of 1969. The minister noted "the excellent disposition of the North American chief executive toward (Colombia), a spirit which is manifested principally in the volume of economic aid" ("Visita del Canciller de Panama" in Zea, 1968 p. 40) This was of course prior to the cut-off of aid during the Lopez administration. Passages of this sort are common, and they support the proposition that members of a hegemonic order like the IAS will attempt to secure a free-ride on the hegemonic power. The United States' preponderance and hegemony are very much appreciated when it comes to foreign investment and economic, technological, and above all, security assistance, but Colombia does not interpret its participation to mean that foreign policy compliance is due to the United States in exchange for benefits received. But as the case of Cuba makes clear, at this point, consensus (rather than compliance) accounts for Colombia's deference toward the United States.

Near the end of the Lleras Restrepo's term in office, some of these attitudes would begin to change -- no longer would it be uncritically pro-American. As noted in Chapter Three, early initiatives in the direction of both greater activity and autonomy were undertaken in this period. This change of attitude toward the United States is also associated with the appearance in the Memorias of the theme of ideological pluralism, and evidence of the perception of changes in the international distribution of power, especially the relative decline of United States influence. Both of these findings tend to confirm propositions advanced in Chapter Two.

Speaking before the United Nations in 1969, Foreign Minister and later President, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (who had replaced German Zea Hernandez), noted that "there is a new distribution of power in the world..(consequently) the enormous responsibility for preserving peace (unilaterally) assumed by the United States after the Second World War is now a thing of the past" ("Discurso frente la Asamblea General de la ONU" in Lopez, 1971 np.). Ironically, the possession of nuclear weapons had rendered the superpowers impotent as was evident in Vietnam and the Middle East. Lopez concluded that "the balance of power is not the same as it was in 1946" (ibid.). Defense of the free world was one of the roles the United States had assumed as the hegemonic power. Colombia, as a member of the IAS, played a supporting role as evinced by the commitment of troops to

the Korean conflict. Thus, the foreign ministers remarks are important as an indication of the perception of the decline of the United States' ability to play this role. Criticism of United States involvement in Vietnam is also noteworthy.

These assertions do not appear as frequently in the documents from the Lleras period as they do during the next eight years, nor should too much be read into them. In fact, as Foreign Minister Lopez Michelson pointed out, President Nixon himself made these same points when he addressed the United Nations. But they are important for two reasons. First, the acknowledgment that Richard Nixon advanced these points suggests that Colombian leaders sensed a "degree of permissibility." The importance of this perception was outlined in Chapter Two. Second, regardless of the United States' analysis of events, the remark evinces the perception of expanding opportunity to open Colombia's foreign relations.

The documents are explicit on this latter point. Change in the distribution of power was not limited to nuclear parity between the state-mated superpowers, but it included the growing importance of the economies of Western Europe. In a meeting with ministers from the European Economic Community, Foreign Minister Lopez stressed that it was now imperative to expand economic and political contacts with the European Economic Community because "contemporary

diplomacy is based on these sorts of contacts". He went on to note that, in fact, such contacts "have become so frequent as to become first page news" ("Entrevistas a Nivel Presidencial y Ministerial" in Lopez, 1971 np.). This is significant in that it reflects the motivation to break out of the narrow confines of the IAS and to explore mutually beneficial economic and political ties with Europe. Diversification of dependency would be a result of, if not an explicit motive for, exploiting this perceived opportunity.

The importance of the still inchoate doctrine of Respice Similia figured in this context as well. Whereas those countries most like Colombia were increasingly involved in international politics in UNCTAD, G-77 or the NAM, Colombia was still generally inactive. President Lleras and Minister Lopez viewed this with alarm given the changing international environment and what they perceived as Colombia's increasing potential. Speaking at a meeting of the United Nations Council for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in New Delhi in 1968, Lopez Michelson addressed this issue. He noted Colombia's "indifference with respect to international questions" and lamented that while "in other countries sharing (Colombia's) characteristics foreign policy is a matter of controversy between political parties, among (our parties) hardly an allusion is made to international politics in the course of electoral campaigns" ("Discurso del Canciller, UNCTAD Nueva

Delhi" in Lopez, 1971 p. 25) The new doctrine of Respice Similia motivated Colombia to look to countries like itself, and having done so the Lleras administration concluded that its level of activity was inadequate. This would change.

The documents from the Lleras Restrepo cuareño, however, contain only one explicit formulation of Colombia's role. The desire to work more closely with other Latin American countries, particularly within the newly Andean Group, is expressed. But what this means in terms of a clearly articulated role conception is immediately clear. Foreign Minister Lopez Michelson could acknowledge only that Colombia was a potencia moral, reflecting its adherence to the norms of international law. Colombian leaders were not prepared to conceive of Colombia as a middle-power. But, as Colombia became more involved in organizations outside of the IAS, or in organizations such as the Andean Group which, although existing within the IAS, was formed independently of the United States, its motivation and ability to dissent from the United States would increase as well. The adoption and performance of the role of a potencia moral, that is a country determined to work with other like-minded countries to promote certain norms of international conduct in accordance with accepted principles of international law, would have important consequences for Colombia's relationship with the United States.

(4). The Struggle to Define a New Relationship

The documents from the Pastrana and Lopez administrations, 1970-1974 and 1974-1978, respectively, show a continued trend away from alignment with, and deference toward, the United States. This is the same period in which the principle of ideological pluralism was developed and given prominence. And, as was the case with the Lleras Memorias, there is documentary evidence of the clear perception that times have changed, and consequently that new opportunities and challenges confront Colombia as a member of the IAS. The end of the Cold War and the reality of multipolarity are themes that figure prominently in the documents. Colombia's, and more generally, Latin America's "maturity" are also cited by Colombian leaders as a reason for increased activity and greater autonomy.

The Memorias, however, exhibit considerable ambivalence towards the United States, a finding which reflects the difficulties inherent in any attempt to reorient a firmly established foreign policy. The United States' preponderant power is sometimes acknowledged and at other times perceived to be waning. The United States' rightful and perhaps pivotal position in the IAS is stressed even in the context of sharp criticisms of its policies and calls for a "new hemispheric dialogue".

Recognition of the United States' power appears frequently, and the consequences of that fact for United States-Latin American relations are clearly appreciated. Minister Vazquez summarized Colombia's position in an address before the OAS in 1971.

"We have formed with the United States a regional system, and (the United States) takes part in our obligations and rights.

"The United States is a planetary power which has a seat in our debates. We can dissent from the United States, but we ought to discuss (issues) with them" ("Discurso ante la OEA" in Vazquez, 1972 p.143).

Vazquez reiterated Colombia's position in 1973 using almost identical language in speeches before the Andean Group and once again before the OAS. Vazquez compared the United States to Rome to the ministers of the Andean Group, and elaborated on the implications of this fact for Latin America. He remarked that the United States "is a world power whose ascendancy and capacity over other nations could be compared to Rome's (thus) the absence of the United States from the IAS would be nothing less than the beginning of its demise" ("Informe del Ministro" in Vazquez, 1976 np.). Before the OAS, Vazquez was blunt: "The United States cannot divorce itself from the Latin American assembly" ("El Nuevo Dialogo entre America Latina y Los Estados Unidos" in Vazquez 1975 np.).

Several points are forthcoming. First, the hegemonic status of the United States is still acknowledged by the Colombian foreign ministry. The analogy with Rome requires no elaboration. Second, given its preponderant influence in both regional and international affairs, it is believed that the United States' absence from the IAS would lead to its collapse. This is entirely consistent with the thesis of hegemonic stability insofar as supporting members and free-riders in a system of related regimes look to a single power to guarantee that the system function. Third, Colombia's insistence on the United States' partnership and even leadership in the IAS indicates that Colombia remained conservative relative to some of its neighbors. Other countries were perhaps disposed to eject the United States especially after the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. In Chapter Four it was pointed out that insofar as the adoption of the "New Latin American Foreign Policy" was concerned, Colombia was somewhat hesitant. Colombia was not so eager to cast out the United States. This is notable, because, as will be shown, Belisario Betancur was not reluctant to draw this conclusion when he examined the state of United States-Latin American relations and prescribed solutions. Fourth, the reference to the right to dissent demonstrates that the exchange of foreign policy deference is not automatic where there is no consensus. Once again, Colombian officials contend that precisely because it is ascendant, the United States must assume unique

responsibilities. But, Colombia does not perceive that it is in any way bound to defer to the United States. To the contrary, Colombia is committed to achieve a greater degree of autonomy from the United States.

The ambivalence of Colombian leaders is sharpened by the fact that, despite its demonstrable importance as the dominant power, the United States' policies were perceived to be obsolescent and ill-suited to a changing world and continent. From the Colombian and Latin American perspective the IAS was performing poorly and the policy of the United States was believed to be the cause of its poor performance. Thus the policies of the United States are criticized more vigorously in the documents from this eight year period than had been evident previously. Now that Colombia was free to dissent from the United States, it was re-evaluating United States policy. But this process of re-evaluation involved more than the assessment of individual US policies or actions: for the first time, Colombian leaders express grave doubts and misgivings about the very idea of a "special relationship" between the United States and Latin America, and begin to express a sense of solidarity with the Third World.

There are numerous examples of Colombian criticisms of United States' policies during these eight years. Common to all of them is the judgment that the basic premise underlying United States policy in the region, namely, that containment of communism is of the utmost importance and

that the IAS is important only insofar as it functions to promote containment, is flawed. Latin American states are no longer willing to lend themselves to the United States' efforts. Thus in a 1974 report to Congress, the foreign ministry asserted that "the regional crisis derives from the absence of a common policy between the United States and Latin America" ("Informe del Ministro" in Vazquez 1976 np.) With respect to some issues, for example the application of the General System of Preferences to Latin American products, the Palacio de Narino could lament "the lack of a clear U.S. policy toward our countries" and even confess that "it is not exactly known whether or not the United States will apply the GSP to the countries of the hemisphere" (ibid.). Generally, however, it was not the lack of a clear policy but the nature of the policy that displeased them.

Colombian officials had the Nixon administration's "low profile" policy in mind. According to a foreign ministry memorandum prepared in 1974, "the cause of the crisis, its gravity and intensity, is eminently (US) policy...It is the question of the 'low profile'" ("El Nuevo Dialogo entre America Latina y Los Estados Unidos" in Vazquez, 1975 np). Colombian officials fully understood that the Nixon administration subordinated Latin America to other geo-strategic considerations, and increasingly they resented it. The 1974 Foreign Ministry report to Congress refers to Latin America's "disillusionment with the United States",

attributing it to the fact that the United States "seems disinterested in this hemisphere." In fact, the report goes on to note, the "low profile" is a policy of "calculated disinterest" ("Informe del Ministro" in Vazquez, 1976). As part of the Nixon Doctrine as applied to Latin America, the reason for assuming a low profile was to permit the United States to concentrate on matters of greater strategic importance and to leave regional issues to regional powers like Brazil. The Colombians understood that this obviated any rhetorical claim that a "special relationship" exists between the United States and Latin America. Thus, in his report the Foreign minister asserted that "it would be an illusion to believe that Latin America is tied to the United States by any 'special relationship" (ibid.). This is an important acknowledgment.

The United States took an interest only in those issues deemed to impinge upon its national security. This calculated disinterest had catastrophic consequences in terms of the economic development of the region. Because the United States was uniquely capable of guaranteeing the adequate performance of the IAS, its policy "translates into the incapacity of the organs (of the OAS) to fulfill tasks of any importance in the economic and social fields" ("Informe del Ministro" in Vazquez, 1975). The report concluded that the reform of the OAS charter, though desirable, would not be sufficient to overcome the inherent deficiencies of United State policy.

Thus between 1970 and 1978, but especially after 1973, the Memorias contain numerous appeals for a "new regional dialogue", and a "new relationship" between the United States and Latin America. The consequences of a failure to initiate such a dialogue were perceived to be serious. IAS "could be salvaged" only "if it fulfilled its role as a forum for the convergence of the United States and Latin America" ("La Crisis de la Politica Hemisferica" in Vazquez, 1975 p. 6). Vazquez later indicated that a "total revision of the Interamerican system is indispensable but was subordinated to (the achievement of) a prior political accord between the United States and Latin America".

As an obvious first step, a new dialogue had to be initiated. In 1974, the foreign minister noted that "the future depends on (the adoption by the United States of an attitude) that would take into account the free determination of our peoples, respect for our sovereignty, and for our political, social and economic institutions" ("El Nuevo Dialogo entre America Latina y Los Estados Unidos" in Vazquez, 1976 np.). The foreign ministry's 1975 report to Congress summed up Colombia's position using language that appeared several times in speeches before the UN, OAS and in press conferences. The report noted that

"The United States and Latin America ought to cooperate with one another in a new relationship based on realistic criteria which depart from the obsolete practices of the Monroe Doctrine and Dollar Diplomacy and which guarantee the full respect for national autonomy" ("La Crisis Hemisferica" in Vazquez

1975)

Even president Pastrana joined in the calls for a new relationship. On the occasion of Secretary of State William Roger's visit to Bogota in 1973, Pastrana told the visiting envoy that "there exists in Latin America a generalized sentiment about overcoming the old method of dealing among states", a reference to unilateral U.S. practices. He went on to point out that Latin America "is shaken by feelings of intense nationalism, particularly economic nationalism" ("Discurso del Presidente" in Vazquez, 1976 np.). It was important that the United States be made cognizant of these new realities, because Colombia's foreign policy was beginning to reflect them.

Increasingly, Colombian leaders felt estranged from the United States and identified Colombia with the Third World. For example, speaking before the United Nations Security Council in 1973, Vazquez noted that "outside its region, Latin America forms part of a grouping of 'proletarian' nations that has been called the 'Third World' ("Panama, Un Problema Internacional" in Vazquez, 1975 np). Speaking before the OAS that same year, Vazquez stated that Colombia favored "coordination among the proletarian nations of the Third World" ("La Crisis Hemisferica" in Vazquez 1975, p.9).. Such coordination was to encompass the activities of the IAS as well. The foreign ministry went on to note the need "to define mechanisms of inter-american economic cooperation" so as to enable greater Latin American

participation "in international fora on the side of the peoples of the Third World" (ibid. p 10). This striking language is the mark of the Memorias between 1970 and 1978.

The struggle to redefine a relationship with the United States is associated with two sorts of perceptions of the international environment. The first relates to the emergence of a multipolar international system and the relative decline of the United States. The second pertains to the perception of the attainment by Latin America of a degree of "maturity" that enables and perhaps obliges them to become more active, and the somewhat contradictory assessment that the international environment in which Third World countries like Colombia find themselves is unfavorable.

The perception that important changes were occurring in the international system figures prominently in the texts. Some of those changes imply an increased degree of permissibility insofar as the United States is concerned. For example, in a speech given before the OAS in 1973, the foreign minister made repeated references to Richard Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China and to detente. The end of the cold war is cited and although the implications of the end of "ideologically motivated confrontations" for Latin American foreign policy are not drawn out, it is clear that they are perceived to be favorable. Vazquez notes dramatically that "the world is entering into an epoch of change and transformation of humanity" ("La Reforma del

Sistema Interamericano" in Vazquez, 1975 p.41). Unfortunately, the minister was mistaken if he believed detente would impact favorably in Latin America. As the Nixon administration's efforts to destroy the Allende government demonstrated, "ideological crusades" (to use Vazquez's phrase) were still very much in vogue in Washington.

The relative decline of the United states is also explicitly mentioned. A 1974 report to Congress cites nuclear parity between the super-powers as an important factor. Perhaps of more importance is the fact that "Western Europe has definitively forged its economic unity" ("Informe del Ministro" in Vazquez, 1976 np.) Again, the implications of this fact are not discussed at length. Betancur will devote considerable attention to this development and its meaning for Colombia's ability to diversify its dependency. But at this point, the importance of multipolarity for Colombian foreign policy is not fully appreciated.

In general, the documents convey the impression that international politics have changed, or that change is a real possibility. In a Foreign Ministry memorandum about the Rio Treaty, Colombia officially expressed the view that "the circumstances that justified the rupture of diplomatic relations, the suspension of commerce and maritime traffic (with Cuba) have changed" ("El Memorandum de Colombia sobre

el Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca" in Vazquez, 1976 np.). These same perceptions were evinced in remarks made on the occasion of Allende's Foreign Minister to Colombia in 1971. In those remarks, which were cited in the previous section, Vazquez observed the passing of "the epoch of bosses (jefes)" who imposed "by force the global hegemony of a doctrine."

At the same time, the Latin American nations themselves had achieved a measure of maturity that permits them to act on their own initiative. Regional solidarity is a pervasive theme. For example, in a 1973 speech before the United Nation's Security Council, the foreign minister proclaimed that "Latin America is a continent which takes cognizance of its own personality in order to project it in the service of peace" (Panama, Un Problema Internacional" op. cit., p. 39) Elsewhere Vazquez noted with satisfaction that "the grade of maturity at which Latin America has arrived (enables) it to establish its own political, economic and social regime without interference of any nature" ("La Reforma del Sistema Interamericano" op. cit.). Before the OAS in 1970 Vazquez noted that

"There is a Latin America consciousness of international life, and that we are not simply spectators of conflicts which are occurring on other continents.

"We have, it is true, acquired an early maturity in international politics". ("Los Problemas del Sistema Interamericano" in Vazquez, 1972 p. 49).

At the same time the Palacio de Nariño was aware that all is not well. The foreign ministry recognizes Colombia's precarious economic situation, and using the language of the Non-Aligned Movement, discusses Third World dependency at some length in several documents. The concerns raised and the prescriptions offered are those of the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. In his annual address before the OAS in 1971, Vazquez observed that "the Latin American states are found (to be) detained by a series of developments in the world economy" ("Discurso ante la OEA" in Vazquez 1972 np.). A year later he reiterated Colombia's concerns: "the anguish of social and economic development (in the Third World) profoundly worries us, we would not want this basic undertaking of the OAS to be weakened or retarded" ("Colombia fija su Posicion en el Problema de la Limitacion de los Gastos Militares" in Vazquez, 1972 np.). Most dramatically the minister noted in 1973 that "the circle of international action of Latin America has been reduced by force of economic necessity" ("Panama, Un Problema Internacional" op. cit.).

Some of the passages just cited appear to contain puzzling discrepancies. First, the United States' power is pronounced to be unprecedented, while elsewhere it is asserted that the ability of the great powers to assert their hegemony has waned. Second, the maturity of Latin

America is proclaimed while the gravity of their economic condition is noted. It may be unrealistic to expect diplomatic documents to reflect a consistent vision of the world, especially when they span several years. But there may be another explanation for the apparent contradictions.

The assertion that United States hegemony has declined is largely a defiant one. It is an assertion of Colombia's policy in solidarity its Third World counterparts rather than an assertion of fact. If this is correct, it is an important indication of the end of Colombia's deference. But the issue under consideration here is whether the end of deference is, in part, the product of the perception the fragmentation of international power and the diversification of Colombia's economic dependency. The evidence is mixed on that point. However, it does appear that Colombian leaders perceived a trend. Although United States hegemony has not ended, it has been weakened, and although the changes occurring in the world will not make an immediate impact on the third World, Colombia included, they inevitably will. The perception that the door has opened a little seems to embolden Colombian leaders to push on it in order to learn how far it will go.

The claim about Colombia's "early maturity" is equally puzzling in view of the perception of a constraining international economic environment. Two points warrant consideration. First, Colombian leaders perceive Colombia's

and the Third World's dependency on the industrialized nations. Although that fact is constraining, it is not the same as the perception of dependency solely or primarily on the United States. It was noted in Chapter Two that diversification of dependency is not identical to the elimination of dependency. If the issue is continued foreign policy compliance after consensus has disappeared, than the fact that Colombia is "a dependent nation" is less important than the fact that Colombia is specifically and primarily dependent on the United States because the industrialized world does not share with the United States specific preferences about the foreign policies of the Latin American members of the IAS.

Second, the assertion of autonomy despite the perception of economic difficulty is closely linked to appeals for Third World solidarity, and more specifically, renewed Latin American efforts toward economic integration and political cooperation. This means that, although Colombia does not feel capable of acting alone, it believes that acting in concert can more than off-set the currently unfavorable circumstances. In fact, there is no alternative. This latter point in particular is important because in later documents it will become apparent that the attempt to assert Colombia's autonomia periférica is made precisely because the foreign ministry perceives a crisis situation.

Although the documents for these eight years contain numerous passages which reflect the perception of global change, they do not explicitly articulate an expanded role conception consistent with that perception. Colombia's foreign policy was clearly changing in this period, as discussed in Chapter Four. But Colombian officials still conceive of Colombia only as a potencia moral. This is not a very dynamic role conception. The documents do not provide evidence that Colombian foreign policy-makers envision Colombia in a leadership role, despite some instances in which Colombia took the initiative such as the formation of the Andean Group. Instead, calls for regional solidarity accompany virtually every assertion that structural change has occurred, and that such change necessitates a more active foreign policy. Occasionally, the scope of requisite cooperative efforts is broadened to include all Third World or developing countries in a manner consistent with the emerging doctrine of Respecto Polum.

There is, however, an implicit change of role. The nearly unconditional acceptance of United States hegemony, and the role expectations that follow from that acceptance, had cast Colombia into a subordinate role in hemispheric and international affairs. This could be inferred from the documents analyzed from the Lleras Restrepo period, especially German Zea's apologetic report to the Colombian Congress noted earlier. The "adherence" to the United States and the western powers reflected implicitly the

acceptance of a subordinate role within the American bloc. The perceptions of change and the decline in importance of Cold War attitudes signaled a change in this implicit role conception. Already by the early 1970s, subordination was no longer considered an attractive position. The perception of changing circumstances perhaps suggested further that it was not necessary to tolerate subordination. The novel principles incorporated into Colombian leaders thinking suggested the contours of a more autonomous foreign policy.

III Viraje: 1978-1988

(1). Turbay: The Partial Renaissance of Consensus

The documents analyzed thus far provide evidence that a new orientation was evolving between 1966 and 1978. This section of the chapter will demonstrate that the adoption of non-alignment as a foreign policy principle was the logical outcome of that evolutionary process. But that process was slowed by Turbay Ayala who brought Colombian policy back into alignment with that of the United States. Colombia voted with the majority of Latin American states in blocking United States efforts in the OAS to send an Inter-American peace force to Nicaragua. But Nicaragua's territorial claims on the islands of San Andres and Providencia damaged chances for a cordial and mutually beneficial relationship between these states. As Drekonja and others characterize it, Colombia was, in effect, burned by the Sandinistas, and consequently recoiled from its recent active and autonomous

foreign policy orientation.

How much of this can be attributed to the imprudent actions of the Sandinistas is unclear, but what amounted to realignment with the United States permitted Colombia to benefit from active United States security guarantees. However, an examination of the themes expressed between 1978 and 1982 lends support to the view that it was not compliance so much as consensus that influenced the policies of the Turbay Ayala administration.

Many of the themes found in the Memorias of previous (and subsequent) administrations, including ideological pluralism, are echoed by Turbay Ayala and his Ministers of Foreign Relations, Carlos Lemos Simmonds and Diego Uribe Vargas. However, those themes that imply a foreign policy reorientation appear less frequently, in different contexts, and generally are de-emphasized. In fact, ideological pluralism is supplanted by the commitment to democracy as the guiding principle of Colombia's foreign policy during this period.

These findings suggest three conclusions. First, new themes had been incorporated into Colombia's diplomatic discourse and Turbay was unable to dispense with them entirely. But, second, Turbay did not assent to their more sweeping implications. This is supported, for example, by the continued use of the themes of the NAM, despite the fact that at the VI Summit of the NAM in Havana in 1979, the Turbay administration expressly distanced itself from a

movement then chaired by Fidel Castro. Third, Colombia's realignment with the United States and its deference to the United States' Central American policy especially after 1981 reflect a partial renaissance of ideological consensus.

The deemphasis of the principle ideological pluralism is the most important feature of the Turbay Memorias. The prevalence of this theme comes to an abrupt end in 1978. Ideological pluralism, or related concepts, were encountered only four times between 1978 and 1982, and all four references are found in joint declarations. Its conspicuous absence from unilateral pronouncements suggests the Turbay administration did not embrace it unreservedly. Moreover, when the theme does appear, it appears in different contexts than it did during the previous eight years, and is not given the pivotal importance that had come to be attached to it.

As in previous instances of its usage, ideological pluralism is acknowledged to be an "effective means for better understanding among peoples" ("Declaracion Conjunta con Honduras" in Uribe, 1981 p. 18) and that "it makes possible the peaceful coexistence among states" ("Declaracion Conjunta con El Salvador" in Uribe, 1981 p. 85). But there are also notable dissimilarities in the contexts in which the theme is inserted. First, the principle of ideological pluralism is included in the short list of basic principles of Colombia's foreign relations

only once. In the previous eight years that list of basic principles had been expanded to include, inter alia, ideological pluralism. Second, only once is the theme of ideological pluralism explicitly linked to the principle of non-intervention. In the previous eight years they are linked five times, and the linkage was developed extensively as the discussion of the Cuban and Chilean cases makes clear. The single reference is encountered in the context of a discussion of the developing crisis in Central America and the Caribbean in 1981, where it is argued that the political normalization of the region would emerge if there were "greater respect for the principle of non-intervention in conformity with ideological pluralism" ("Comunicado Conjunto con Honduras" in Uribe, 1981 p. 82).

The opening of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China provides an illustrative example of the downgrading of this principle. Turbay Ayala's decision to open relations in February, 1980 reflected the commitment to broaden Colombia's foreign relations made earlier by Lleras. This move was entirely consistent with the policy of the United States as exemplified by Richard Nixon's historic visit to Beijing, and Jimmy Carter's overtures to the People's Republic. In other words, although the diplomatic opening reflects the trend toward apertura, it does not signify movement in the direction of greater autonomy vis-a-vis the United States.

What is noteworthy in this context, however, is that in justifying the diplomatic move to the Colombian Congress Turbay Ayala's Minister of Foreign Relations did not invoke the principle of ideological pluralism, despite the fact that this is a natural context for the theme to appear. Instead, Colombia's Minister of Foreign Relations, Diego Uribe Vargas, cited the criteria of "realism" and "objectivity" in place of the principle that had gained considerable importance and had appeared with such frequency in the previous eight years ("Informe Del Ministro" in Uribe, 1981 p. XIX).

More important than the mere deemphasis of the principle of ideological pluralism is the fact that that between 1978 and 1982, commitment to democracy replaced it as the prevalent concept both in terms of frequency and significance. There are only four references to ideological pluralism in the documents examined in this four year period, in contrast to twelve references to democracy. This stands in sharp contrast to the previous eight years in which the theme of ideological pluralism appeared sixteen times in speeches as well as joint declarations, and in which there was only a single passing reference to democracy.

More important than the frequency with which the theme appears is the significance attached to it. Virtually all the importance previously attached to ideological pluralism in the previous eight years (for example as the key to the

respect of the other constitutive principles of the IAS) is attached to representative democracy for the remainder of the Turbay Ayala cuarenio. Alfredo Vazquez, as foreign minister for both Pastrana and Lopez, had contended that the acceptance of ideological pluralism, especially by the United States, was the aine qua non of the proper performance of the IAS. None of the other objectives could be achieved unless this principle actually guided the foreign policies of the members. During the Turbay years it is democracy that has this catalytic quality. Thus, while "ideological pluralism is required for the better understanding among peoples", much more important is the fact that "the democratic system is the one that best responds to human aspirations" ("Declaracion Conjunta con Honduras, op. cit. p.82), and that "it is only through it that peoples can reach their political maturity" (ibid., p.82). In another example it is argued that "the integral development of peoples is made possible only thorough the mechanisms of democracy" or "the principle of full participation" ("Declaracion Conjunta con El Salvador" op. cit., p.85). Democracy benefits the process of regional integration. Indeed, "the democratic process which is underway in Latin America serves to revitalize hemispheric solidarity" (ibid., p. 85).

In two instances the theme of democratic resurgence follows immediately the reference to ideological pluralism. The effect of this juxtaposition is to elevate the former at

the expense of the latter. Although respect for ideological pluralism is urged to the degree that it contributes to the normalization of politics in the Caribbean or to peaceful coexistence, the preference for democratic forms of government is strongly communicated.

This preference is indicated most dramatically by a proposal to create a special "Peace Fund" made by the Turbay administration during ninth meeting of the General Assembly of the OAS. The purpose of the fund would be to grant "preferential aid to countries with democratic institutions which are found to be in danger" ("Informe al Congreso Nacional: Organismos Internacionales" in Uribe 1981, p. XLI). More specifically, the aid was intended to foster cooperation among "those countries that are orienting or restructuring themselves along the lines of representative democracy" (ibid., p. XLI). Especially interesting is the fact that in proposing the fund the Foreign Minister felt compelled to note that "there will be countries which, on the basis of ideological pluralism, do not share these ideas, and we respect them" (ibid., p. XLI).

This representative passage reflects the orientation of the Turbay administration and is reminiscent of those passages, encountered as late as the mid-1960s, that conveyed the overriding importance of ideological compatibility. Although the principle of ideological pluralism, which Turbay inherited from his predecessors,

counsels respect for non-democratic regimes (those that do not share these ideas), it is clear that they do not belong to the fold. Colombia's foreign policy initiative, then, should be to promote democracy elsewhere on the continent. Turbay would do just that in the form of participation in the Nassau Group.

The passage does not advocate the isolation of non-democratic regimes such as Cuba or Nicaragua much less intervention in their internal affairs. But neither does it rule out "ideological crusades" as would the unqualified commitment to ideological pluralism. In fact, the idea that democracies should band together is essentially what prompted the Reagan Administration in 1982 to organize the Enders' Forum (in which Colombia briefly participated before forming the Contadora Group) and the Central American Democratic Community (CADC). Notably, both were intended to isolate Nicaragua (LeoGrande in Bagely, 1987 p. 90; Cepeda, 1985 p. 21). Turbay was not adverse to the idea of diplomatic isolation, as witnessed by the dispute with Cuba over the seat on the U.N. Security Council.

It should be noted here that both democracy and ideological pluralism have been codified as basic principles of the IAS according to the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty. Representative democracy as a constitutive principle was written into the original OAS Charter of 1948. The principle of ideological pluralism, implicit in the 1948 draft, was made explicit in the Charter as amended by the

"Protocol of Cartagena de Indias" in 1985 (see Article 3, [d] and [e] respectively, in Monry Cabra, 1986 p.30). Similarly, Article 12 of the Protocol of Amendment of Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Or Rio Treaty) drafted in 1975 (though not yet in force) incorporates the principle of ideological pluralism.

Given support for both principles, questions of emphasis and relative importance are possible. Monry Cabra (1986, p 30) argues that "as respect for human rights is also established in Article 3, one has to conclude that ideological pluralism cannot ignore human rights nor representative democracy." It is possible, based on this reasoning, to fashion a tautological argument which holds that non-democratic regimes, and more specifically a Marxist-Leninist ones, inherently tend to deny human rights, to obstruct representative democracy and intervene in the internal affairs of other states. In other words, returning to the language of the Caracas and Punta del Este declarations, "communism, by its anti-democratic nature and interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom", i.e., the IAS. If such an argument is advanced, as it was by the Reagan administration, the ideological grounds for intervention are laid notwithstanding the principle of non-intervention. "Ideological crusades" become justifiable in the 1980s just as they were in the 1950s.

This is not to argue that the Turbay Ayala government would have advocated the more aggressive policies of the Reagan administration toward Nicaragua (many of which became a matter of public knowledge only after Turbay Ayala left office). But this emphasis on democracy over ideological pluralism is consistent with the Colombia's cooperation with the Reagan administration in El Salvador (by sending observers to United States sponsored elections) and with its desire either to participate in the Caribbean Basin Initiative or to advocate parallel programs such as the "Peace Fund".

In summary, it is possible to interpret this renewed emphasis on democracy rather than ideological pluralism as an indication of ideological consensus between the United States (particularly under Ronald Reagan) and Colombia. Although the Turbay line hardened after 1980, that is after the Sandinista government made provocative territorial claims on the islands of San Andres and Providencia, the basic features of Turbay's foreign policy orientation were already apparent. Additional evidence of this is offered below when the Betancur documents are examined. In those documents the implicit notion that commitment to democracy could be used to justify the Reagan administration's Central American policy is specifically, repeatedly and vigorously rejected. Turbay, by contrast, did not specifically rule out such a possibility.

(2). Colombia and the United States: The Quiet Partnership

The first section of this chapter presented evidence which indicated that in the 1970s there was some association between the incorporation of the principle ideological pluralism and a reevaluation of the United States' policies, and ultimately Colombia's relationship with United States. If that pattern holds, the attitude of the Turbay administration toward the United States as revealed in the documents should look very different. That prediction is supported by an analysis of the documents, although there are some interesting surprises.

Most interesting is the fact that the United States is hardly mentioned at all: its power is not heralded, and its policies are not criticized. This is true of both the policies of the Carter administration, which was in office when Turbay assumed the presidency, and of the policies of the Reagan administration which entered office as the Turbay cuarenio was drawing to a close. Absent too are references to the need for a "new dialogue" with the United States. The Turbay government appeared to be in near complete agreement with the Reagan administration with respect to basic principles. Certainly its foreign policy demonstrated deference.

Colombia's deference to the United States, demonstrated most dramatically by its position on the Falklands/Malvinas question, did not impress other Latin American governments

favorably. Given their criticism of its deferential posture toward United States policy, the Turbay administration might have found silence to be advisable. Certainly, there is no need to mention the obvious. This could explain the paucity of explicit references to the United States, and the lack of any elaboration on the state of United States-Colombian relations. If this interpretation is correct, the Turbay administration differed not only from the two administrations that preceded it and the two that followed it, but it differed from the Lleras Restrepo administration also. As was seen, initially the tone of the documents from Lleras Restrepo years was distinctly apologetic. Adherence to the United States was confessed, and an effort was made to justify it. Turbay apparently made no such effort.

The Turbay Memorias contain only two references to a hegemonic power. The first reference concerns Brazil, not the United States, and is found in a Joint Communique with Brazil. The fear expressed (and assuaged by Brazil) is one of a Brazilian economic Colossus of the South. Ironically, the fear among Latin American nations about Brazil's possible emergence as a regional hegemon grew out of the Nixon doctrine which promoted Brazil as a regional power. Previous Colombian leaders were harshly critical of the Nixon policy of "low Profile" which sought to use regional powers like Brazil to safeguard U.S. interests.

The second reference to a hegemonic power is vague. It is also encountered in a Joint Communique, in this case a communique released on the occasion of a visit by the Honduran Foreign Minister. The text mentions a visit paid by Vice President Mondale to a meeting of the Andean Group and states that the presidents of the Andean Group "made clear with complete frankness their points of view about the realities of hemispheric relations." The document goes on to express the hope that tensions which are present in some areas of the hemisphere will be overcome, and further that the countries of the region will be able to select their "own course...without foreign pressures or efforts to use them as trump cards in a game of foreign economic, strategic and hegemonic interests" ("Comunicado Conjunto" in Uribe, 1981 p.125). Although the reference appears to be to the United States, it is also vague enough to be interpreted to apply to the hegemonic pretensions of the Soviet Union or Cuba. The documents from the Pastrana and Lopez periods, or from the Betancur Foreign Ministry, are seldom vague on such points.

The text of the Communique of the Presidents of the Andean Group itself contains several favorable references to the United States, principally for the support and aid it provides. For example, the document cites with satisfaction the support "given by the United States to the policy of the 'New Dimension' which permits the establishment of new forms and responsibilities of

cooperation which would favor democratic institutions in (Latin) America" ("Declaracion de Los Presidentes de los Paises del Grupo Andino" in Uribe, 1981 p. 126). Elsewhere in the same document cooperative links between the United States and the Andean Group countries in the areas of finance, commerce, and science and technology are cited with approval. This is the closest the Turbay administration comes to repeating some of the themes of its predecessors or successors with respect to the United States. Its support is applauded while concerns about its intervention are expressed.

In contrast to the documents of other administrations, reference to the United States is not sharply critical. Any criticism is veiled. Moreover, it can be pointed out once again that these critical comments are found only in the context of joint communiques. During the Turbay period these attitudes are never expressed by Colombian officials on their own initiative, rather they appear to reflect the broader sentiment of other Latin American leaders.

The Betancur documents are full of critical comments. One explanation for this is that Turbay determined that it was not advisable to make pronouncements about Colombia's close relations with the United States whereas Betancur and others need to distance themselves from it. This would account, in part, for the number of references to the United States made by Betancur, since one of his foreign policy objectives was to repair the damage caused by his

predecessor, Turbay. To accomplish that, both rhetoric and action were necessary.

Another indication of the Turbay administration's disinterest in gaining greater autonomy from the United States relates to its relationship with the Non-Aligned Movement. By the mid-1980s, under Virgilio Barco, non-alignment was afforded the status of the key principle of Colombian foreign policy, superseding ideological pluralism. This evolution began in the mid-1960s. As Colombia officials drew closer to the NAM, beginning with Lleras, many of the themes encountered in the texts of the summits of the NAM found their way into the Memorias. For example, concern over the Cold War and associated dangers such as the arms race, and calls for arms control and Detente are common themes in the memorias throughout the entire twenty two year period under study. This is true of the Turbay documents as well, but Turbay was less committed to close association with the NAM, and certainly was unprepared to upgrade Colombia's participation from observer to full member.

Symbolically, involvement in the NAM has connotations in terms of political affinities and alignments. In 1966, German Zea was sharply critical of the NAM. In the report to Congress, cited previously, he denounced "the socialist countries, including the so called non-aligned ones" for attempting to "exploit in their propaganda" Latin America's "subordination to the United States" ("Informe del Ministro" in Zea, 1968, p. 26). At that time, of course, Colombia was

strictly aligned. But acceptance of the NAM developed gradually so that by the time Turbay assumed office, it had become customary to make positive references to the Movement. Turbay's foreign minister did so -- within limits. In a speech before the NAM in 1979, Foreign Minister Diego Uribe Vargas noted that "there is no doubt that one of the major risks to collective security is constituted by institutionalized strategic alliances". Thus, the NAM deserves credit as "the organization of countries that have no part in the military interests of the blocs contributes in a decisive manner to the strengthening of the climate of Detente". Though this is an endorsement of the NAM, Turbay's support for the Third World forum is not unqualified. In particular, Colombia puts itself on record as opposing any effort to shift the orientation of the movement. Fidel Castro, then chairman of the movement, had sought support for the idea that the Socialist bloc was the natural friend of the NAM. Turbay's foreign minister stated his government's opposition: "Colombia has watched, not without concern, as the NAM has also suffered internally the tension caused by the powers in their eagerness for dominance...The risk of losing equidistance from the great centers of world power not only constitutes a threat to the original objectives of the Movement, but threatens to weaken it" ("Declaracion en la VI Conferencia Cumbre de los No Alineados" in Uribe, 1981 p.137). Non-alignment connotes autonomy from the United States as well as from the Soviet

Union. But that was not the message Turbay intended to send. His successors were not reluctant to do so.

An analysis of themes relating to perceptions of change, opportunity and constraint also buttress the interpretation that ideological consensus, rather than the perception of constraints imposed implicitly or explicitly by the United States, accounted for the deferential stance of the Turbay government. In this regard too the Turbay documents differ markedly with those of his predecessors and successors. Just as the United States is not singled out for extensive mention, neither are there references to the passing of the Cold War or the emergence of multipolarity, although there are some references to change. These documents do not pronounce the end of the Cold War as earlier documents did (perhaps prematurely.) From the perspective of the Turbay administration, the Cold War is not over, it has flared up in Central America with dangerous implications for Colombia.

Perceptions of opportunities derived from the end of the Cold War are replaced by perceptions of the gravity of the international economic crisis, and its unfavorable repercussions on developing nations. The general perception is one of constraint not opportunity. These themes will reappear in both the Betancur and Barco documents, especially the prominence given to the constraining effects of the global economic crisis.

The absence of references to the United States appearing in the context of perceptions of the end of the Cold War has clear implications for the attitude Colombian officials about their country's relationship with the United States. Notably, there are no calls for a new dialogue or new relationship. This was a dominant theme during the previous eight years and will be again during the four years of Batancur's term. Implicitly, the traditional reasons for deference still obtain. The world is divided and Colombia, though lending itself to the NAM as a "pacifist nation" or a "potencia moral", understands its place.

With respect to Colombia's role, therefore, implicit subordination is conceived, since there is not even a rhetorical effort to develop a more autonomous position. Moreover, any efforts at diplomatic action must occur within the context of the IAS. Regional solidarity is a constant theme. For example, regional solidarity, especially the strengthening of regional mechanisms for integration, will serve to mitigate the economic crisis. The communique of the Andean Group refers to the potential of the subregional group to become a "valid interlocutor" in the international arena which in turn enhances its "negotiating power" ("Declaracion de los Presidentes de los Paises del Grupo Andino" in Uribe, 1981 p. 127). At one point it is acknowledged that the Andean Council (the newest regional mechanism) "should acquire a political and not merely

economic projection" ("Declaracion Conjunta con Honduras" in Uribe, 1981 p.124). But it should be recalled that Turbay sought to use mechanisms at his disposal to isolate Cuba and Nicaragua. Again, the preferential treatment of democracies envisioned in the Peace Fund comes to mind as do U.N. votes blocking Cuba's temporary participation in the Security Council.

There is a notable exception to these general tendencies. Although there is no effort to establish Colombia's autonomy from the United States through pronouncements that clarify its independence or reflect Colombia's identification with the Third World, a more active role in the Caribbean Basin is envisioned. The apertura to the Caribbean became a project the Turbay administration pursued with as much intensity as any of his predecessors. The clearest evidence of this is found in a report entitled Apertura Al Caribe, which discusses Colombia's "new policy" toward the area ("Apertura al Caribe" in Lemos, 1984 p.18).

The document is concerned with Colombia's involvement in the Nassau Group, and describes its successful efforts to become involved after initial exclusion. This accomplishment is characterized as a "diplomatic victory of extraordinary importance" (ibid. p. 124). Colombia had been excluded, the report speculates, "perhaps due to the absence of a concrete plan which would determine the point

to which (Colombia) was capable of contributing to the improvement of the living conditions of the countries of the region" (ibid., p. 19). At any rate, Colombia's incorporation into the Group reflects "the full recognition of (Colombia's) preponderant role in this vast and conflictual region" (ibid., p. 20). The report goes on to state that involvement "gives Colombia a role it has never before had" Colombia's specific role would be that of "an effective agent for economic and social development, and a factor which would contribute to the political stability of a particularly critical zone of the world" (ibid., p. 20). Ultimately, the report concludes, this all demonstrates that "Colombia has achieved a level of political maturity" (ibid., p. 20).

Several points stand out. First, there is the enunciation of a specific role conception beyond that of a potencia moral. Colombia now intends to play the role of "an effective agent for economic and social development." Second, the passage provides evidence of the perception of change, specifically Colombia's attainment of political maturity. Third, the report indicates clearly the perception that the stakes in the region are serious insofar as Colombia is concerned.

What is noteworthy is that the decision to play a more active role is prompted not by the perception that the end of the Cold War or the emergence of a multipolar

international system has created opportunities to do so, but by the discovery of a degree of political maturation. This role is not conceived in relation to the United States. The conception is neither one of implicit subordination nor of determined insubordination to the United States. Colombia is doing this because its leadership perceives it potentially to be an "effective agent."

(2) Betancur: From Deference to Open Dissent

Turbay's successor, Belisario Betancur, initiated Colombia's viraje in 1982. Analysis of the themes encountered thus far suggests the conclusion that the viraje was the product of an evolutionary process in which the basic principles of the IAS were reinterpreted in light of the perception of changing circumstances or were supplemented by additional ones that undercut the rationale for a deferential policy toward the United States. The beginning of that evolutionary process was already apparent by late 1960s. This interpretation is supported by the finding that virtually all of the themes that had come to dominate the Memorias of his predecessors, with the obvious exception of Turbay, appear frequently and prominently. It is clear that consensus was breaking down long before Betancur assumed office. But the Betancur documents are distinctive inasmuch as they reveal that Betancur and his foreign ministers were not reluctant to grasp the dramatic implications of adopting these principles. Betancur was

prepared to follow those implications to their logical conclusion and elevated Non-Alignment itself to the status of a principle guiding Colombia's foreign relations.

Another noteworthy finding is that the speeches and communiques of Betancur and his ministers not only reveal a return to themes that had received so much attention prior to Turbay, many of the arguments developed in Betancur's speeches appear to be specifically intended as refutations of the arguments that Turbay had advanced in the previous four years. Turbay departed from a discernible trend by deemphazing the theme ideological pluralism and replacing it with commitment to democracy, but he did so without attempting to distance himself from his predecessors. By contrast, Betancur frequently appeared to be refuting Turbay (and Ronald Reagan) point by point. This is most obvious, and most relevant, in the case of their divergent treatment of the theme of democracy. Although Betancur also embraced democracy, he resisted the temptation to allow professed commitment to the principle of representative democracy to guide Colombia's foreign policy in the direction of deference towards the United States' Central American policy.

Several points are relevant. References to democracy appear in the Betancur documents with the same frequency as they did in the Turbay Memorias: the eleven explicit references to democracy match the twelve noted in the previous four years. Obviously, in both cases this is

partially a reflection of the fact that regime transition was occurring throughout the region. But the frequency with which the theme is encountered is misleading. The context in which the theme occurs and its linkage to other themes are more revealing. In many of those passages in which the theme is encountered Betancur or his ministers expose and criticize the efforts of the Reagan administration to manipulate the theme for the purpose of gaining support for its belligerent policies. Commitment to democratic principles does not imply the resuscitation of ideological compatibility as it did during the Turbay cuarenio.

This interpretation is strengthened by the reappearance of the theme of ideological pluralism and the restoration of the status it had been granted before Turbay emphasized commitment to democracy in its place. The theme appears frequently in important speeches (as opposed to joint declarations or communiques as during the Turbay years) and occupies a privileged place in a network of guiding principles that includes the universalization of both the U.N. and the O.A.S. (three times), the need to end the Cold War and ideologically motivated confrontations, especially in Central America (four times), non-intervention and self-determination (four times), and Non-Alignment (five times).

It is clear from the texts that Betancur and Turbay concur that "the process of democratization" currently underway in Latin America "contributes fundamentally to the

integral development of the peoples of the region and relates significantly to the strengthening of regional solidarity" ("Comunicado Conjunto con Mexico" in Lloreda, 1986 p. 58). Furthermore they agree that the "principles of representative democracy are the only ones that guarantee the free and sovereign expression of the popular will" ("Declaracion de Cancun sobre la Paz en Centroamerica" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 469). But agreement between Turbay and Betancur virtually ceases at this point. Unlike his predecessor, Betancur treated the theme in a way that undercut much of the Reagan administration's rationale for pressuring the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The position of the Betancur administration is strongly reminiscent of the position espoused by Vazquez in the Cuban and Chilean cases.

Betancur devoted considerable attention to the theme of democratic resurgence in a series of speeches pronounced in Mexico in December 1984. It is noteworthy that this theme is taken up after the Contadora Group was formed to frustrate United States policy in Central America. In each speech, the professed commitment to democracy is followed by an equally clear reiteration of Colombia's adherence to the principles of non-intervention and its overriding belief in the importance of ideological pluralism. A noteworthy example is found in an address given in Tlatelolco. In it, Betancur stated that "our (Colombia's) intransigent defense of the general principles of law, and in particular American

international law, is in consonance with our adherence to the ideal of democracy, and with our efforts to put it in practice" ("Brindis por Mexico" in Lloreda, 1986 p. 44). It is clear that adherence to international law takes precedence over any desire to promote democratization through the sort of intervention in which the United States was engaging in Central America. Thus the president emphasizes that "we repudiate violence between countries, threats, harassment, polarizations and all that puts in danger the autonomy of people to decide their own fate" (ibid., p. 43). It is clear that Betancur has the United States in mind, and he notes that the principles of the IAS apply to it equally: "the obligations of the members of the American community are for all of them, consequently it is inadmissible that violations (of American international law) could be made in the name of strategy, or bipolarity or alliances" (ibid., p. 43). In fact, according to the president, Colombia "condemns any postulate whatsoever that proclaims intervention and violates the principle of self-determination" (ibid., p. 43). For Betancur, ideological compatibility, in this case a shared commitment to democracy, does not imply a deferential posture toward the United States, or even alignment with it. To the contrary, according to the president: "if each nation adopted the principle of pluralist democracy grounded on each nation's distinct national, cultural and political traditions, Third World nations would be better able to overcome their submission to the powerful nations of the planet" (ibid., p.

43).

Betancur was convinced that the Reagan administration was manipulating the theme of democracy to justify its interventionist policies, and refused to lend his government to this effort as did Turbay Ayala -- albeit implicitly. Despite Colombia's preference for democratic forms of government, the president made clear Colombia's "rejection of ideologisms" especially those that would implicitly condone an ideological crusade to promote democracy as a foreign policy aim. This is how the Betancur administration viewed the Reagan administration's attempts to compel the Sandinistas to democratize. Thus, during a trip to Washington the president reiterated his position. For example, in highly critical speech given at Georgetown University, Betancur pointed out that the United States is "revamping old expansionist doctrines and obsolete doctrines about a manifest destiny, about the United States' vocation to be the tutor of our nations, and our grand dispenser of peace" ("America Latina tras la Utopia de la Paz y Libertad con Igualdad" in Lloreda, 1986 p.90). This, of course, was the self-proclaimed role of the United States as the hegemonic power. But the president was critical of the fact that "that North American governments historically have undertaken to teach Latin Americans about democracy, speaking softly but brandishing the big stick, by the force of canon, invasions, open and clandestine violations of our sovereignty" (ibid., p. 91). Colombia's participation in

Contadora reflected the members' refusal to allow the United States to revive ideological struggles. The Contadora groups rejects the basic premise of US policy in Central America: "The conflict in Latin America is not an East-West conflict, it is against underdevelopment" (ibid., p. 91).

Betancur, however, not only rejected the United States' efforts to base its Central American policy on the notion that democracy is a fundamental principle of the IAS, he revived the principle of ideological pluralism, and restored its status. The frequency with which the theme appears in the Betancur Memorias has already been mentioned. An example is in order. Speaking before the OAS in 1985, Betancur developed the concept of "reciprocal pluralism". As in previous instances, this theme appears in the context of a call for the improvement of the OAS ("Soñar una America Unida" in Lloreda, 1986 p.107). As always, the performance of the IAS is foremost in the minds of Colombian leaders. The president advocated the "up-dating of the OAS Charter in order to strengthen it, to make it more dynamic, and to convert it into a forum in which all the actors of the 'reality' of the hemisphere would participate, and in which their transitory differences would be settled" (ibid., p. 108). This could only occur, he argued, if the principle or "political pluralism" or what he further specified as "reciprocal pluralism" (ibid., p. 108) were adopted. Reciprocal pluralism, which he characterized as "a universal obligation", is conceived to involve "a synthesis of the

principles of non-intervention, self-determination and peaceful solution (of conflicts)" (ibid., p. 108). In this conceptualization, exclusion on the basis of ideology is unacceptable and even detrimental to the performance of the IAS. Certainly it does not reflect the "hemispheric reality." By invoking ideological pluralism, and giving it privileged place in the network of the principles of the IAS, Betancur's orientation is entirely consistent with that of his predecessors with the exception of Turbay. Adherence to democratic principles, then, does not provide the basis for diplomatic much less military pressures against Nicaragua or Cuba. To the contrary, it necessitates adoption of the principle of ideological pluralism and stricter compliance with the principle of non-intervention.

Ideological consensus had vanished. The trend begun in the late 1960s, and only partially vitiated by Turbay Ayala, culminated in Betancur's viraje. The primary focus of this study is on consensus on specifically Cold War or security issues, but there is ample evidence that consensus on economic policy had been affected as well. So, for example, in an important speech given in Mexico during a visit in which many of Betancur's positions were outlined, the president noted that "we do not believe that orthodox formulas would resolve" the debt crisis ("Brindis por Mexico" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 41). In another speech made during the aforementioned trip to Mexico, Betancur noted further that "the economic crisis...obliges us to think of

systems of development, to establish priorities and to imagine objectives that differ from those that we have believed to be valid until now" ("La America Presentida" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 48). Speaking in Washington in 1985 during a visit in which the president's philosophy was further developed, Betancur specifically referred to economists associated with the Dependency school such as Sweezy and Baran ("America Latina tras la Utopia" in Lloreda, 1986 p. 91). Thus, Colombia's rejection of the post-war security order mirrored its rejection of the economic order associated with it. The language of the Non-Aligned Movement, which began to be encountered after Foreign Minister Lleras' speech at the UN in 1969, now permeated the Memorias.

(4) From Dissent to Non-Alignment

Inevitably, Colombia's relationship with the United States was affected by these attitudes. The logical culmination of the trend described in this chapter is non-alignment, and neither Betancur nor Barco after him saw reason to deny it. Ideology was no longer an appropriate guide for Colombia's foreign policy. Concluding his now famous remarks on the occasion of Ronald Reagan's visit to Bogota in 1982, Betancur noted that Colombia has come to understand that "in order to seek our proper identity, we ought to make non-alignment our philosophy" ("La Propia Verdad de America Latina y el Caribe" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 104). Similarly,

speaking before the United Nations in late 1983, Betancur was critical of "exclusive ideologies" born of the Cold War, and went on to state that Colombia intend to be "neither a satellite nor a dependent of anyone, nor enemy of anyone" ("Politica Multilateral" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 738) Accordingly, he viewed Colombia as occupying "a position of equidistance and coexistence within the Non-Aligned Movement" (ibid., p. 738). In the same speech the president proclaimed that "we, the nations of the South, maintain our commitment to western values -- the living essence of our militancy for democracy" (ibid., p. 738). The language used here is reminiscent of the language encountered in German Zea's report to Congress in 1966.

In that text, Colombia's affinity with the West was also cited. But here the President identifies Colombia with the Third World rather than the concierto americano and adds that the commitment to democracy should be free of "ideological distortions" (ibid., p. 738). Colombia's commitment to Western values, does not translate into alignment with the United States. In fact, the Colombian leadership perceives that "the East-West bipolar dimension (of international relations) and its corresponding vertical dichotomy between rich and poor is (unjust)" (ibid., p. 738).

Colombia's incorporation into the NAM as a full member is comprehensible in light of these observations. The end of ideological consensus and the influence of the doctrine

of Respice Similia suggest the contours of Colombia's new foreign policy. In the Tlatelolco address already cited, the president noted that

"We draw near our brothers in the Third World because we want to pursue a line that permits us to occupy a just place which corresponds to us as a sovereign and independent state. We seek equidistance between the superpowers because we want to be independent; and, affirming historical and cultural reasons, we aspire to a truly pluralistic interamerican order without ostracisms for anyone."
("Brindis por Mexico" in Lloreda, 1986 p.43.)

Betancur has received appropriate credit for initiating Colombia's viraje, but it is worth noting that the language of this passage is reminiscent of the language of Alfredo Vazquez. Recall the aforementioned speech in which Vazquez noted that "ideological pluralism...enabled Colombia to seek new courses and parameters for the principles, purposes and methods of the IAS." Here Non-alignment, a concept that developed from commitment to ideological pluralism, permits Colombia to pursue a new line and to perfect an IAS from which no state will be excluded on the basis of ideology.

The fundamental reorientation just described is associated with a distinctively negative attitudes toward the United States. The Memorias from this period resound with the themes that had gained currency before Turbay, but the intensity of the rhetoric is entirely Betancur's. No Colombian president has been as critical of the United

States nor as staunch an advocate of Colombian autonomy vis-a-vis the United States as Belisario Betancur.

The contrast between Betancur and Turbay again is sharp. Turbay scarcely mentioned the United States and did not have a critical word to say. Betancur is critical of virtually every policy action undertaken by the Reagan administration. Turbay had enunciated a role for Colombia relating to its involvement in the Nassau Group without implying the end of automatic alignment with the United States. Betancur could not discuss Colombia's role or foreign policy without stressing that autonomy from the United States was both necessary and desirable. Turbay was not prepared to pronounce the end of the Cold War. Betancur insisted that the Cold War was an anachronism despite the Reagan administration's efforts to perpetuate it. Again, Turbay appears to be the exception that proves the rule: the thinking of Colombian leaders was evolving, and that perceptions of a changing international environment accounted, in part, for that evolution.

There is a near total absence of positive references to the United States in the Betancur documents. Nearly all of the actions of the United States are condemned. Beginning with the United States' decision to abandon the policy of neutrality in the Malvinas conflict, the documents proceed to condemn the invasion of Grenada, joint US-Honduran military maneuvers, protectionism and the hesitancy of the United States to recapitalize the Interamerican Development

Bank. Obviously, the entire Central American policy of the Reagan administration is strongly criticized.

On several occasions, Betancur advocated a new relationship or dialogue with the United States. Appeals of this sort were made frequently in the 1970s. The question of the need for a new relationship was taken up in at least five important speeches or Foreign Ministry reports between 1970 and 1978. There were no calls for a new political arrangement between Latin America and the United States during the Lleras Restrepo period, which represented the beginning of the evolutionary process described here. For very different reasons, the Turbay Memorias contain no references to the need for dialogue. Betancur developed the theme five times in a series of speeches in just four years. Colombia's apertura, and certainly its viraje, came at a time when Colombian leaders were noticeably dissatisfied with, and even alarmed by, the state of United States-Latin American relations.

It is interesting to note both how Betancur and his Foreign Minister Lloreda conceived of this new relationship, and the reasons why a new relationship was believed to be so necessary. In his critical remarks to Ronald Reagan in Bogota in 1982, Betancur made clear Colombia's disagreement with United States policy. He called for an end of United States' "pressures and efforts to isolate" ("La Propia Verdad de America Latina y el Caribe" in Lloreda, 1985 p.

104). He urged the United States to provide "indiscriminate economic aid, and (to engage in) a broad dialogue" within international fora, especially the OAS (ibid., p. 104). Betancur made clear Colombia's vision of the IAS: "Why not eliminate exclusions in the IAS...so that all the nations of the hemisphere would have an open forum which would represent the reality of the hemisphere such as it is?" (ibid., p. 105). The question was entirely rhetorical. Given the premise that the United States' policy is fundamentally wrong, Betancur went on to propose a New Social Alliance that would ameliorate many of the problems of the region.

In doing so, Betancur invoked the name of John Kennedy and the era of the Alliance for Progress -- a point which could not have favorably impressed the conservative Republican. Betancur expressed the hope that the United States would again implement something like the Alliance for Progress ("ojalá de vuelta a su gran país, se traduzcan en decisiones concretas similares a los resultados de esta gira") (ibid., p. 105). Invoking the memory of the Alliance for Progress before a president that had only recently proposed the CBI could only be interpreted as an indication of Colombia's perception of the inadequacy of the proposed program.

In its place Betancur proposed a New Social Alliance. The contours of this new alliance were sketched in this speech, and in two speeches given in Washington in 1985 in

which the conceptualization of the New Alliance was broadened until it had become "an Alliance for Peace, Development and Democracy between the United States and Latin America" ("La Alianza para la Paz en Centroamerica" in Lloreda, 1986 p. 97). When Betancur's remarks are examined closely, it becomes obvious that Betancur was not proposing a grandiose new scheme as did, for example, Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek, when he proposed Operação Panamericana. Rather, the president's rhetoric served his purpose of underscoring the deficiencies inherent in United States policies, both economic and political.

In the economic sphere, the new social alliance would be one "without dependent nations" ("La Propia Verdad de America Latina y el Caribe" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 105). Latin America would be on equal footing with the United States, and regional cooperation would expand. In contrast to an ambitious scheme such as operação panamericano or the Alliance for Progress, the New Social Alliance would involve little more than just payment for Latin American exports, stabilization of the prices of primary products and an end to protectionism. Latin American economic integration and cooperation would be a crucial feature of the alliance, with the clear implication that the United States was to be peripheral in this scheme. The United States was not expected to be enthusiastic about the idea, and would perhaps even be hostile toward it. Thus, Betancur advised that "it would be an error if, as in the past, the United

States saw inter-Latinamerican cooperation as a potential enemy or a factor of exclusion" (ibid. p. 105) In order to establish this new social alliance, however, an "emergency plan" would have to be put into effect in frank recognition of the gravity of the economic crisis. The United States' cooperation was important. For example Betancur stressed that "the emergency plan requires that the United States change its policy with respect to the capitalization of the Inter-American Development Bank and to increased contributions to the International Monetary Fund" (ibid. p. 105).

In the political sphere, the New Social Alliance, which was also referred to as an "Alliance for Peace, Development and Democracy between the United States and Latin America" would reflect the principles advocated and promoted by Contadora ("La Subversion de Subdesarrollo en America Latina" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 102). It reflected the perception that the cause of the Central American crisis was not communist intervention, but under-development. Speaking before the House of Representatives in 1985, Betancur called for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, and the "liquidation of clandestine exiles...based on the conviction that all ideologies fit in democracies without fear" (ibid., p. 102). Referring to the Kissinger Commission's report, the president noted bluntly that "we disagree with the manichean philosophy of support for social infrastructure only for those that behave well." The

principles on which this new relationship would be based are clearly at variance with those that ensured deference to the United States at the height of United States influence. At the same time, this proposal differs from Turbay's call for a "Peace Fund" which would favor democracies. Although the goal was the promotion of democracy, the implicit distinction between compatible and incompatible regimes is dismissed as manichean.

Betancur's Foreign Minister Rodrigo Lloreda elaborated on the theme of a new relationship, and in doing so raised the most serious doubts about the performance of the Inter-American security regime since Vazquez questioned whether the continuation of the Rio Treaty was consistent with new "objective conditions" in the hemisphere. In a speech before the OAS in 1983, Lloreda remarked that this new regional dialogue would involve a new conception of hemispheric security ("Discurso del Canciller ante la OEA" in Lloreda 1985, p. 153). The continued exercise of United States hegemony in security affairs was considered intolerable: "We can no longer continue with the paternalistic scheme of the Post War according to which the defense and security of the hemisphere against real or imagined enemies rests finally with the United States" (ibid., 153). The maintenance of that relationship would amount to "the extemporaneous prolongation of the Monroe Doctrine" (ibid., 152). The new conception of regional security would be based on a "Latin American version of the 'Good Neighbor' policy." Thus,

"the internal cohesion of our peoples cannot be founded on presumed external threats or in potential border conflicts" (ibid., p. 152). The security concerns of the United States would no longer provide the rationale for the IAS.

These passages indicate that Colombia no longer considered the United States the primus inter pares of the IAS. The example of Betancur's call for a new alliance is illustrative: this is the closest that Betancur came to echoing the views of predecessors with respect to the special obligations of the United States as the preponderant economic power. There were frequent calls for a new dialogue or a new relationship with the United States in the 1970s. But there is a crucial difference. When this theme of a new relationship was encountered in the Pastrana and Lopez Memorias, the ambivalence of Colombian officials with respect to the role of the United States was apparent. By contrast, the Betancur documents provide no evidence that Betancur viewed the United States' participation, much less its hegemony, as indispensable to the IAS. This was for Latin American states to do on their own. Contributions would be expected from the United States as reflected in Betancur's insistence that the United States concede to debt reduction and fulfill its obligation to recapitalize the Interamerican Development Bank as a crucial part of an overall "emergency plan" for the region. But there is no trace in the documents from this period of the implicit

assumption that the United States as a hegemonic power bears special responsibilities and obligations.

The era in which Colombia conceived of itself as subordinate to the United States as a member of an IAS dominated by the United States had ended. In fact, Betancur and his foreign minister viewed the IAS as a counterweight to United States' hegemony. Foreign Minister Lloreda noted in a speech given before the Seventh Summit of the NAM that Bolivar himself "understood that the struggle of the (Latin American) peoples did not end with emancipation, and he was able to visualize the increasing power of the United States and the necessity to compensate for it by creating strong, unified nations" ("Colombia y el Movimiento de Países No Alineados" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 164).. Foreign Minister Lloreda noted before the Assembly of the OAS that "initially, the IAS was, in a certain sense, conceived of as hegemonic. The United States saw the need of grouping nations as part of a national security scheme...and the United States maintained a privileged position within the concierto americano" ("Discurso del Canciller" in Lloreda, 1985 p.154).

Participation in a hegemonic order was now perceived as detrimental. Foreign Minister Lloreda was explicit on this point in an address before the United Nations General Assembly ("Debate General" in Lloreda, 1985 p. 77). In it he observed that "military and economic predominance creates conditions of dependency" (ibid., p. 77). The result is that

"the backward nations of the planet are obliged to sacrifice dignity before necessity, and conceptual independence before threat" (ibid., p. 77). Moreover, "the concentration of the factors of power explains ...the humiliating condition of those countries that have been obliged to subject themselves to respective spheres of influence" (ibid., p. 78). Not surprisingly, in a speech in which the theme of ideological pluralism is developed extensively, Lloreda concludes that spheres of influence reflect ideological conflicts that would disappear if ideological pluralism were adopted as a foreign policy principle.

Latin America, therefore, must seek greater autonomy from the United States. At the same time, Betancur cautioned Latin American governments not to rely on others to promote regional integration. Speaking of Latin America's potential role in the emerging global economy, the President remarked in 1984 that "we have never spoken about this among ourselves, and only with ourselves, because the voice of the 'other', of the United States, of Europe, and now of the Third World, interferes with, aids or distorts our own voices" ("La America Presentida" in Lloreda, 1986 p. 49).

These, then, are the ideas that guided Betancur to reorient Colombia's foreign policy. Guided by new principles, or a reinterpretation of previously accepted ones, Betancur advocated non-alignment. The reorientation

is entirely consistent with the principles espoused by his predecessors in the 1970s, but Betancur did not hesitate to put them into practice. These findings are consistent with Proposition Five stated in Chapter Two. Propositions Three and Four also stated in that Chapter hypothesize that perceptions of diminished dependency and enhanced national capacity should also account for Colombia's viraje. There are some surprising findings in this regard.

There is some evidence that Betancur initiated the viraje at a time of perceived opportunities to break with the United States. This reflects perceptions of change in the international environment. The reorientation of Colombia's policy also came at a time when Betancur perceived the growing importance of the European Economic Community -- a finding that would appear to be consistent with the proposition that the perception of diminished dependency would embolden Latin American leaders to alter their policy provided they preferred to do so. But, interestingly, the Memorias also reveal that Betancur undertook to transform Colombia's policy precisely because Colombia was dependent.

With respect to the European Community, Betancur grasped the need for, and advantages of, political and economic cooperation with the European community. However, neither Betancur nor Lloreda were looking for Europe to replace the United States as a hegemonic power capable of facilitating Latin America's integration efforts. Addressing

a meeting of the European Economic Community in Brussels in 1983, Betancur stressed the importance of both economic and political ties between Latin American and Europe. Said President Betancur:

"Since the 1970s, Latin America understood that it would be unable to advance toward greater political independence without eliminating or at least reducing its dependence. It sought to diversify its commerce tending toward Europe as the principal challenge, and Europe was receptive. It is equally true that in the field of politics the time has come to make these relations more pragmatic" ("Discurso del Presidente" in Lloreda, 1985 p.46).

Betancur concluded by arguing that the strengthening of European Latin American relations is indispensable and that it is the way "to increase (Latin America's) negotiating power relative to the superpowers, and to contribute to world equilibrium" (ibid., p. 46). Contributing to world equilibrium, a recurrent theme of the NAM, is explicitly cited as a role made possible by the increased bargaining power associated with the diversification of Latin America's dependency. Turbay pursued a policy of economic apertura, but the Memorias of his administration provide no evidence that he saw the diversification of markets as a means of gaining additional political leverage or attaining autonomy from the United States.

Similarly there is some evidence in the Betancur documents that the Colombian leaders perceived that the United States was less capable of inducing or compelling the

compliance of developing countries. For example, the Foreign Minister in an aforementioned address to the NAM acknowledged that "it is undeniable that the great powers still exercise economic power and military predominance, but they are no longer able to impose their will on great political decisions" ("Colombia y el Movimiento de Países No Alineados" in Lloreda, 1985 p.168). There are a few passages that make this point, and it is worth noting that they are reminiscent of Vazquez's claim that "the epoch of bosses that could guarantee the hegemony of a doctrine" has past.

The maturation of Latin American states is also discussed in this connection. The perception of opportunity resulting from the awareness that Latin American countries had reached a threshold of economic development and political maturity had been encountered in the documents from other administrations. This continues to be an important factor. However, in at least one instance, Betancur does not associate Colombia's political maturity with its level of economic development. At Georgetown, the president noted that "the political maturity that Colombia has maintained is not due to any "greatness" because Colombia has hardly itself ever experienced winds of prosperity" ("America Latina tras la Utopia" in Lloreda, 1986 p. 89) Instead, he attributes Colombia's maturity to its long-standing democratic traditions. In fact, Betancur's insistence that Latin America play a more active

and autonomous role does not derive exclusively from the perception that Colombia has the potential to diversify its dependence or has gained a degree of maturity. More importantly, the call to greater involvement is prompted by a somewhat contradictory perception of generalized crisis and Colombia's dependent status.

The international economic situation figures prominently in this regard as it did in the Turbay documents. Betancur is aware of Colombia's commercial links to the United States. Speaking before a group of businessmen in Washington in 1985, he acknowledged that "the United States is Colombia's principal commercial partner and has been so for many years" ("El Comercio Internacional como Motor del Desarrollo" in Lloreda, 1986 p. 106). He then notes that Colombia is one of the few countries that runs a trade deficit with the United States. Despite this fact, or perhaps because of it, "Colombia is active on different fronts in the international arena: as a member of Contadora, it seeks regional peace, through the 'Consensus of Cartagena' it seeks to find solutions to the debt crisis, it works for regional integration, the strengthening of the international coffee accord, and for the struggle against narcotics" (ibid., p. 105). The prevalence of economic issues is noteworthy.

So, it is the perception of dependency, not necessarily its diminution, that makes it imperative for Latin American

leaders to gain autonomy. In a speech given in Mexico in 1984, Betancur noted that "we Latin Americans (have) gained a new perspective about who we are and where we are in the intricate tapestry of world politics" ("La America Presentida" op. c.it. p. 49). Developing countries are at an historic juncture, he remarked, because they were confronted by "economic problems caused by dependency, the condition of being nothing more than potentially useful spectators in the East-West confrontation" (ibid., p. 50). To counter this they need to adopt "the cause of autonomy and the political protagonism of the peoples of the Third world" as Colombia had done when it expressed its "solidarity with Argentina" over the Malvinas issue (ibid., p. 50). If, however, Third World nations failed to "reclaim an independent personality...in international fora" they would inevitably suffer the "loss of the authority to freely decide their own destiny, the mechanisms of international entities and their own organic constitutions." Ultimately, the failure to act would result in "the loss of its soul -- its culture" (ibid., p. 50).

The linkage between the legacy of dependence and the urgent need to adopt measures to put an end to it is stressed again by the foreign minister in a speech explaining Colombia's incorporation in the NAM ("Debate General" op. cit. p. 85). In this instance, the Foreign Minister noted that Colombia is "neither an economic or military power", and even that "occasionally it has been

considered a dependent nation", but he went on to stress that it is precisely for this reason that the Betancur government "understands and accepts its obligation to contribute to (the strengthening of South-South relations)" (ibid., p. 85).

The War between Argentina and Great Britain, and more importantly, the United States' response to it, also awakened Colombia. Speaking before the Chiefs of State of the Member-States of ALADI, Betancur stated that the Malvinas war "manifested the integral vulnerability of Latin America, the fragility of its mechanisms for defense, the crisis of its economic, political and strategic stability" ("La Paz, Esa Libertad Tranquila" in Lloreda 1986 p. 71). As a result "there was, then, an awakening of the Latin American consciousness" and the recognition that "the interests of Latin America in the world are not exhausted with the interests of the great powers" (ibid., p. 71). This recognition, in turn, should lead to the "affirmation of Latin American identity, our proper and distinct personality" and to the "consolidation of its autonomy" (ibid., p. 71).

Nearly twenty years earlier, the Colombian foreign minister noted the extent of Colombia economic dependence on the United States. The conclusion German Zea drew from that observation was very different from that drawn by Betancur. For Lleras' foreign minister, dependency cemented a close association with the United States that was already made

possible, and acceptable, by ideological consensus. In the absence of such a consensus, the fact that the United States was the principal commercial partner was a matter of concern. Colombia's complacency and inactivity were no longer perceived to be in the national interest.

The perception of dependency and vulnerability, but also of a regional consciousness, suggested Colombia's role in concert with its Latin American and Third World cohorts. In terms of specific roles enunciated in the documents, no new formulation appears, but Betancur is not hesitant to draw out the implications for action that the previously enunciated roles suggest. Betancur, like all of his predecessors, refers to Colombia as a potencia moral. In the ALADI speech just cited, Betancur noted that the consolidation of Latin America's autonomy would make it "a valid and independent interlocutor in the dialogue and negation of world power" (ibid., p. 71). This role conception is similar to one enunciated by Turbay except that Turbay did not view the consolidation of Latin America's autonomy as a prerequisite for the performance of that role.

Turbay, though eager to play a more active role in the Caribbean by committing resources there, did not make the connection between a more active role and a more autonomous foreign policy. Lleras Restrepo, Pastrana and Lopez Michelson, had all vocalized the intention to achieve

greater autonomy but did not enunciate a role consistent with that intention. What distinguished Betancur, therefore, was the activation of a role rich in implications for United States-Colombian relations. In forming and participating in the Contadora Group, Colombia performed the role it had conceived for itself more directly and actively than had thus far been the case.

(g). Barco: The Permanence of the Viraje

Virgilio Barco Vargas assumed the presidency in 1986 and immediately made clear his intention to continue the line Betancur had delineated. The sense of continuity the documents convey reaches all the way back to the 1970s. Barco is completely comfortable with Colombia's more neutral stance.

The Memorias from the Barco administration resemble those of his immediate predecessor in two respects. First, in establishing the priority among foreign policy principles, Barco made clear that support of the process of democratization underway in Latin America in no way justifies foreign intervention. Colombia's participation in Contadora is mentioned frequently in this context because while Contadora favored democracy and even considered it to be integral to the resolution of the Central American conflict, its members actively resisted intervention based on the principled belief that commitment to democracy and intervention are incompatible. As was the case with the

Betancur documents, these two themes are frequently encountered together, and the unequivocal thrust of the administration's treatment of these two basic principles of the IAS is to favor non-intervention.

Second, like Betancur, Barco acknowledges Colombia's non-alignment. Turbay refused to adopt non-alignment as the basic principle of Colombia's foreign policy despite the fact that movement in that direction had gained considerable momentum in the 1970s. He thus slowed the evolutionary process described in this chapter. By contrast, Barco made no effort to step back from the positions taken by Betancur, although Barco did temper some of the rhetoric of his predecessor especially insofar as criticisms of the United States were concerned. A general finding of the analysis of the Barco documents, therefore, is that the evolutionary process had reached its logical conclusion, and that themes that were once indications of a foreign policy reorientation had now become routine statements of an established foreign policy orientation.

As was uniformly true of all the Memorias examined, the standard principles of the IAS are routinely cited in the Barco documents. As was increasingly true of the documents from the Pastrana and Lopez periods and from the Betancur cuarenio, the language of the Non-Aligned Movement appear prominently. From the perspective of Colombia, the IAS served essentially the same purposes of the NAM, in other

words, it had become a forum for the Third World rather than the instrument of the United States supported by its hemispheric partners.

Although Colombia's position was now settled, the documents continue to evince signs of the the conflicting interpretations of Colombia and the United States with respect to the meaning and purpose of regional cooperation and solidarity. The focal point of the conflict again relates to the importance of democracy relative to other principles such as non-intervention, sovereignty, ideological pluralism, the universalization of international organizations (especially the OAS) and ultimately non-alignment. In other words, the debate between Turbay and Betancur (or between Betancur and Reagan) is reproduced in the Barco Memorias.

The theme of democracy was found eight times during the Barco period from 1986 to 1987. However, in five of those instances the themes of non-intervention and autonomy are also invoked, and this juxtaposition has the same effect as it did in the Betancur documents. As usual it is acknowledged that democracy is the preferred social and political system, and that the spread of democracy will have positive consequences for all countries of the region. So, for example, before the first meeting of the Colombo-Venezuelan Interparliamentary Forum in February 1987, Barco noted that "democracy is the best guarantee for the respect of international treaties" ("La Instalacion del Primer foro

Interparlamentario Colombo-Venezolano" in Ramirez, 1987 Anexo #19). But the concern that the commitment to democracy not serve as a pretext for intervention colors virtually every discussion of democracy. As a general principle, commitment to ideological pluralism rather than the desire to promote democracy, ought to guide foreign policy. Given that foreign policy principle, non-intervention becomes the overriding norm of inter-state behavior.

There are some prominent examples of this line of reasoning. The Joint Declaration of the Contadora Group issued in October 1986 asserted that "as Latin Americans we demand space to act. We want the advance of pluralist democracy and economic and social development in Central America (but) without foreign intervention." The Foreign Ministers went on to note that the Contadora Group "does not want Central America to be converted into a focal point of increased East-West tension, (nor) does it want the principles of free determination and non-intervention to be sacrificed in the name of national security or the name of democracy" ("Declaracion de los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los Grupos de Contadora y Apoyo" in Ocampo, 1987 p. 91). Speaking on behalf of Colombia alone, Foreign Minister Lodoño reiterated Colombia's position at the Eighth Conference of the Chiefs of State of the NAM in Harare, Zimbabwe. On that occasion he stated that Contadora supports "a democratic, pluralist process but rejects any

type of foreign interference in a state's economic, political or social system" ("Octava Conferencia de Jefes de Estado" in Ocampo, 1987 p. 160).

Perhaps the most interesting treatment of these themes is encountered in a speech given by Londoño before the OAS in 1986. It is interesting because Londoño found himself defending Contadora against the charge that it was in fact promoting a foreign ideology. Said the Minister :

It should be very well understood that the states which make up the Contadora Group with the support of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, do not constitute, as some affirm, a supposed instrument for the consolidation of foreign ideologies, nor much less, to support through its indifference external intervention in the internal affairs of some states of the continent

My government rejects any type of intervention whatsoever in the internal affairs of states. It is not possible that the American continent could characterize and distinguish between "good" interventions and "bad" interventions, rejecting the second and endorsing the first. Such conduct would diminish the value of the principles of self-determination and the freedom of the continent. ("Discurso del Canciller ante la OEA" in Ocampo, 1987 p.147).

A number of points of interpretation are forthcoming. First, the defense of Contadora is interesting, because generally the activity of Contadora was commended, at least rhetorically, by all interested parties. This included the United States, although quite clearly the Reagan administration's agenda was not compatible with the stated

intentions of the Group. Thus, the challenge to the Group's efforts is somewhat novel. However, it is not unlike criticisms directed against the Betancur administration's decision to incorporate Colombia into the NAM as a full member. Critics of Betancur charged that that move, and by extension the entire viraje, was the product of a plot to bring Colombia into the Cuban orbit. Ideological consensus with the United States was alive in important sectors. This suggests that the Foreign Minister had a domestic audience in mind.

Second, the basis of the charge appears to reflect the view that ideological compatibility is, or ought to be, an important feature of political relations on the "American continent". Seen from that perspective, non-intervention based implicitly on the adherence to ideological pluralism amounts to intervention on behalf of foreign powers espousing foreign ideologies. This is reminiscent of the influential Santa Fe Committee's criticism of the Carter administration's attempt to adhere to the principle of non-intervention. The Committee's report, published in 1980, noted that "we (the United States) are by omission encouraging our southern neighbors to embrace the Soviet bear" (A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties Washington: Council for Inter-American Security, p. 52) Indifference to such matters is almost as bad as active intervention. Also seen from that perspective, it is possible to distinguish good interventions from bad, since

self-determination is less important than ideological compatibility at least in the context of a crisis such as was unfolding in Central America.

By 1986, however, the belief that adherence to the principle of ideological pluralism was the key to the resolution of the conflict was firmly established and Colombia, as a member of Contadora, was not about to abandon that belief. Thus, in that same speech, the foreign minister went on to discuss the universalization of OAS, a familiar theme in the 1970s. In fact, the argument he advanced was no different than that advanced by Vazquez or Betancur: "it is indispensable in the judgment of Colombia that all American states be represented in the OAS regardless of (their) ideologies or systems of government" ("Discurso del Canciller ante la OEA" op. cit., p. 148). Ideological pluralism takes pride of place over compatibility due to the belief that adherence to the former produces superior results in inter-state relations. The principle of compatibility implicit in the Monroe doctrine and the declarations of Caracas and Punta del Este, holds that peace and democracy are inseparable. By contrast, the principle of ideological pluralism states, as the foreign Minister stressed in this speech, that "the (OAS) could not have a true dynamism if states which undoubtedly play a preponderant role in Latin America are excluded" (ibid., p. 148). Regime principles reflect beliefs about cause and effect. Very different beliefs about international

relations, and about how peace is best achieved, are reflected in competing principles of ideological pluralism and ideological compatibility.

(6). Assessments of US Policy and the International Environment

All that has been stated thus far about the principles which guide Colombia's foreign policy suggests that the attitude of the Barco administration toward the United States, its evaluation of US policies and the perception of the utility of alignment with the United States, should resemble the attitude exhibited by Betancur. Generally this is the case, except that some of Betancur's harshest criticisms are toned down. The substance, however, remains essentially the same.

The documents from the first year of President Barco's term in office contain no harsh, direct criticisms of the United States. Nonetheless, it is clear from the speeches of President Barco and his Foreign Minister, and from the reports and communiques issued by them, that they basically shared the same attitude as Betancur. There are no positive appraisals of United States policy, and several thinly veiled criticisms of the Central American policy of the Reagan administration. The protectionist trade measures adopted by the United States (and Europe), and the high levels of consumption of cocaine in the United States are also identified as serious problems requiring a change of US

policy.

The most extensive criticism of the United States is found in the aforementioned Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group released in October, 1986. That declaration begins by noting that the Central American situation was deteriorating rapidly in 1986, then offers the judgment that "those who believe in a military solution do not recognize the true dimension of the problem" ("Declaracion de los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los Grupos de Contadora y Apoyo" op. cit. p. 91). The text goes on to observe that the Contadora Group does "not want Central America to be converted into a focus of more East-West tension" (ibid., p. 91). This last point in particular indicates that these are criticisms are directed primarily at the United States, and are only tangentially directed at other actors. The Kissinger Report, though mentioning regional conditions that made revolutionary upheaval possible, cites Cuban and Soviet attempts to capitalize on dissatisfaction. The struggle, then, is perceived by the United States in East-West terms.

These same concerns are raised by Foreign Minister Lodoño in a speech before the OAS in 1986. Lodoño presented a list of concerns including external debt, protectionism, narcotrafico, subversion and terrorism. Then, in the context of the Central American crisis, the Minister invoked the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts, and

criticized "open or covert intervention in the affairs of other states" ("Discurso del Canciller ante la OEA" op. cit., p. 146). In fact, in the summer of 1986 the Reagan administration was considering whether to request one hundred million dollars in military aid for the Contras. Colombia, of course, opposed the militarization of the Central American conflict and had just gone on record in the United Nations as "accepting the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice at the Hague" ("Discurso del Presidente ante la ONU" in Ocampo, 1987 p. 138) which had found the United States guilty of aggression against Nicaragua.

The Barco documents, however, contain no references to the need for a new relationship with the United States. Expressed another way, there is no evidence that Barco or Lodofo conceived of a new dialogue as a the solution to Latin America's problems. There are, however, calls for the "improvement of the IAS". For example, in a speech given before the Andean Parliament, President Barco expressed the expectation that improvement of the mechanisms of the IAS would "secure the political gains with which we have been able to consolidate our democratic institutions" ("Discurso del Presidente ante la Reunion del Parlamento Andino" in Ocampo, 1987 p. 83.). Like virtually all of his predecessors, Barco saw Latin American integration as the key to the achievement of "greater negotiating capacity" (ibid., p. 83) especially vis-a-vis the United

States. But as was true of the Betancur documents, there is no reference to the role of the United States. The effort is to be entirely Latin American.

Thus, the documents spanning the years from 1966 to 1988 provide evidence of a gradual disappearance of the belief that the United States is an integral and pivotal member of the IAS. The documents from the Lleras Restrepo Cuarenio openly acknowledged Colombia's place in orbit around the United States. Alfredo Vazquez, spokesman for Pastrana and Lopez Michelson, was critical of the United States. But despite that (perhaps because of it), he was eager to establish a new dialogue. Turbay is silent on the point all together, though he was hardly indifferent to the United States. His efforts to pursue apertura were not accompanied by a reassessment of Colombia's relationship with the United States. Betancur was adamant with respect to non-alignment, and did not place much confidence in any new dialogue. Calls for a New Alliance were largely rhetorical. Colombia had come to identify itself with its Latin American neighbors, and the Third World by 1982. Barco picks up where Betancur left off. His assessment was that although the United States could do some good it could also do great harm. Thus, it is not indispensable. In fact, the first order of business for Colombia and Latin America was to gain greater negotiating power vis-a-vis the United States.

The era in which Colombia identified itself primarily as a member of the concierto americano, and professed a special affinity with the United States, had passed. Turbay could not re-establish that orientation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Barco administration frankly stated Colombia's non-alignment. Colombia is described variously as a developing, Third World or Non-Aligned nation. In his inaugural speech in August, 1986 President Virgilio Barco was unequivocal about Non-alignment, about the need to open Colombia's international relations still further, and about Colombia's role. Repeating a common theme, Barco stated that "we consider non-alignment to be an element of equilibrium in the international system, and an element of the opening of a dialogue between the industrialized and developing nations" ("Discurso de Posesion" in Ocampo, 1987 p.24). Speaking before the United Nations in September 1986, Barco raised the point again: "We have been active in the NAM because we are non-aligned by nature, by geopolitical inclination and for economic reasons" ("Discurso del Presidente ante la ONU" op. cit., p 137). Given those facts, Colombia as a member of the NAM "ought to play an important role...in the constructive dialogue between the great powers" ("Discurso de Posesion" op. cit., p 24).

The assertion that Colombia is non-aligned by geopolitical inclination is the most explicit indication of

the end of consensus yet encountered in the Memorias. The myth of a "Special Relationship" between the United States and Latin America promoted that idea that geographical proximity and shared commitment to a political ideology produced a unique relationship. The added comment that economic factors contributed to Colombia's reorientation is also important. The end of consensus clearly was not limited to the security regimes guiding inter-american relations, or international relations more broadly. Dissatisfaction with the performance of economic regimes, articulated via the vocabulary of the NAM, and implicitly dependency theory, is evident in the documents.

If non-alignment is natural, Colombia's proper role follows logically. Colombia is to perform roles expected of members of the NAM and other international fora, rather than as a subordinate member of the IAS led by the United States. As part of the NAM, Colombia is "an element of equilibrium and contributes to dialogue." In the Andean Group and the OAS, but especially in the Contadora Group, Colombia is prepared to offer "good offices" and "to contribute to a peaceful settlement" of the Central American crisis. As always, it is a potencia moral. These conceptualizations are light-years away from the one offered in the 1950s and cited earlier according to which Colombia stood ready to fulfill its obligation as a member of the IAS in the face of the threat of international Communism.

Whatever role or roles Colombia may perform, it is to do so in concert with nations sharing similar characteristics and interests. Virtually no thought is given to the possibility or feasibility of Colombia acting alone. This probably reflects the perceived need to find strength in numbers, but it is also consistent with Colombia's belief that multilateral action is inherently superior. Notably, the efficacy of regional integration is one of the constitutive principles of the IAS. There are numerous examples of this. Addressing the Venezuelan Foreign Minister in 1986, Barco characterized Colombia as a country that is "by vocation, an integrationist country. Its effective and notable participation in the Andean and Contadora Groups, in SELA and other regional organizations have defined Colombia's spirit of cooperation" ("Palabras del Presidente con el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela" in Ocampo, 1987 p. 66). Colombia's foreign relations are still very much regime-guided, only in 1988 the regimes are very different. Principles that have nothing to do with the IAS from the United States' perspective have now been grafted on to those of the IAS with important ramifications for deference to the United States.

At the attitudinal level, Colombia's reorientation is clear and profoundly important. But it has been assumed throughout this study that the loss of consensus alone is not sufficient to produce an end to deference. In the

absence of consensus, subordinate nations might nonetheless comply, and so continue to defer, unless there are perceptions of diminished constraints. Notably, however, there are no examples in the Barco documents of the perception that Colombia's economic relations had been diversified to the point that it is free to act more autonomously. The Betancur documents had cited the importance of expanding economic and political ties to the EEC. The Barco Memorias are silent on this point. There is no mention of the end of the Cold War, or the emergence of Western Europe as a counterweight to the United States. There are only implicit references to the grade of Latin America's maturation.

Like the Betancur Memorias, however, these documents convey the impression that the decision to play a more active and autonomous role is driven by the perception of regional crisis comprising economic, social, political and security issues. Although neither Barco nor his foreign ministers refers to Colombia as dependent, as Betancur and Lloreda had done, the perception that Third World countries must act in concert to avert disaster is evident throughout. A prominent example is found in president Barco's address to the Andean Parliament in 1987. After pointing out that "greater integration will lead to greater negotiating capacity" the president adds that integration is

"indispensable if we intend our voice to be taken into account in the great international fora. Fundamental modification, such as are occurring in the area of foreign investment,

are forms of adopting to the changing circumstances of the economies of our countries, and of the global economy" ("Discurso del Presidente ante la Reunion del Parlamento Andino" op. cit., p. 83).

Later in the same speech the president notes that solidarity is imperative: "(it is necessary) to form a common front in the battle against poverty in the countries of the Third World. What is required now is a concerted action of all the organizations designed to promote economic integration in the region" (ibid., p. 83).

Speaking before the United Nations later that same year Barco lamented that "we live in unfortunate times in which the capacities of countries and the structures of international organizations are put to the test" ("Discurso del Presidente ante la ONU" op. cit. p. 137). He went on to cite the effects on Latin America of the debt crisis, the decapitalization of Latin America and the protectionist policies of the industrialized states. These problems indicate the "necessity of establishing an international economic order which would constitute a true strategy of generalized growth." No less than the achievement of peace, the purpose of the United Nations ought to be "the struggle against absolute poverty" (ibid., p. 137).

These remarks do not evince the perception of Colombia's enhanced capacity to act in the international arena, rather they convey the belief that inaction is unthinkable given the magnitude of the crisis facing

developing nations. There are references to "fundamental changes" in the international economy, but the trends are not favorable. The rise of the European Economic Community is not mentioned, thus the insistence that action is necessary is not prompted by the perception of the diversification of dependency. To counteract the unfavorable trends, greater activity in solidarity with other Third World countries is crucial. Autonomy and non-alignment are crucial as well.

IV Summary

The aim of this chapter was to explore the relevance of propositions five and six to Colombia's viraje. Those propositions reflect two assumptions: that the leaders of small, dependent states exercise constraint in their foreign policy in proportion to their economic dependency, and that foreign policy is to a significant degree regime-guided. Both factors can produce foreign policy deference but for different reasons. When there is agreement about basic foreign policy principles and the policy implications of those principles, deference is a matter of consensus; but when consensus breaks down, small states defer as a matter of compliance unless their leaders perceive themselves to be poised to pursue an independent policy.

In order to gain insight into these issues, the research reported here was designed to discover the principles and norms that have guided Colombian foreign

policy, Colombian leaders' perceptions of the propriety and utility of close alignment with the United States, their perceptions of constraints on, or opportunities for, greater involvement in regional and international affairs and greater autonomy vis-a-vis the United States, and their conceptions of Colombia's role or roles in the international arena.

A number of findings merit review. First, Colombian foreign policy is regime-guided, and always has been. Its adoption of, and commitment to, the principles of the IAS are the primary determinant of its national role conception, that of being a potencia moral. Moreover, at the beginning of the period under study here, the Colombian leadership understood the constitutive principles of the IAS in a manner that the suggested propriety and utility of close alignment with the United States. Acceptance of the principles of the politico-security regime of the IAS led Colombian leaders to perceive the world in essentially bipolar, Cold War terms, and to profess Colombia's "adherence" to the western powers. Their interpretation of the norms of international behavior followed from that principled understanding.

Second, consistent with proposition six, an evolution of principles occurred. This evolution had two distinct facets. One involved a reinterpretation of the implications of accepted principles for Colombian policy, especially the

policy of close alignment with the United States. This was reflected in the debate about the primacy of ideological compatibility (democracy equated with anti-communism) versus ideological pluralism. The other facet involved the incorporation of new principles, especially those most frequently associated with the Non-Aligned Movement or more broadly considered to reflect tercermundismo. The process was gradual but the effect was dramatic. The constitutive principles of the IAS came to be interpreted differently under the influence of tercermundismo, and the Colombian leadership came to understand that Colombia had a natural affinity to, or "special relationship" with, the developing world rather than with the United States. There was an exceedingly important cognitive shift given the fact that in IAS deference was largely the result of the ideological hegemony of the United States.

Third, perceptions of the United States, including both evaluations of its specific policies and assessment of the utility of alignment with it, were colored by the shift just described. Colombian leaders became increasingly critical of the policies and actions of the United States, especially those designed to contain communism. Accordingly, the politico-security regime formed to enlist the cooperation of IAS members for the purpose of containment was eventually deemed to be inadequate and obsolescent. This change of attitude first became apparent with respect to the rationale for the ostracism of Cuba.

By 1975, Colombia was fully prepared to join its neighbors not only in reopening diplomatic and trade ties with the Caribbean nation, but also to amend the Rio Treaty to reflect the importance of the principle of ideological pluralism. The Contadora peace process was a product of the same intellectual forces. Since consensus with the United States had eroded, automatic alignment with the United States and deference with its policies were no longer considered to be in the national interest.

Fourth, with respect to national roles, this study corroborates the findings of Holsti (1970) and others with respect to the importance of national role conceptions. Colombia's role conception, that of being a moral power, is derived from its adherence to the principles of international law more than to perceptions of national capacity. Moreover, its actions in the international arena reflect those role conceptions -- or using the vocabulary of role analysis, actuate that role.

Fifth, the analysis yields the following conclusions with respect to perceptions of the international environment, and their bearing on the question as to whether compliance or consensus was the basis for deference. The evidence presented in this chapter, along with that presented in Chapter Three, makes clear that Colombia's attitude toward the United States was initially very deferential. At the beginning of the period studied, Colombia had no foreign policy of its own, nor did it invest

much time or resources in diplomatic matters except those of immediate importance to it, such as the country's maritime boundaries and its concordant with the Holy See. On matters of great importance, i.e., those relating to the Cold War and hemispheric security, Colombia took its cues from the United States. Colombia was a participant in a security regime within the broader context of the IAS, and one of its basic tenets was that it was the responsibility of the United States to look out for the security of its neighbors.

There is no compelling evidence, however, that the deference shown by Colombian leaders was ever compliant. A careful reading of the Memorias over time conveys the impression that the consensus that counseled Colombian leaders to defer to the United States slowly eroded to the point that dissent and non-alignment appeared to better serve the national interest. Along the way, there are signs that Colombian leaders found it difficult to break with the United States, but those signs are not accompanied by clear evidence that they felt constrained from doing so by anything other than the inertia of tradition. The ambivalence about Colombia's relationship with the United States evident in the documents published during Alfredo Vazquez's long tenure as foreign minister stands out in this regard. Finally, when the break was made under Betancur, economic conditions were constraining, but there was no strong indication of compliance either in rhetoric or in behavior.

Foreign minister Zea's frank admission of dependency in his 1967 report to the Colombian Congress could be interpreted as the most direct indication of the perception of constraint likely to be encountered in the published papers of a foreign ministry. But there is no documentary evidence from this period that Colombian officials took issue with the United States on any salient matter, or even that its understanding of basic principles differed from the United States. It is not until Lopez replaced Zea towards the end of the Lleras cuareenio that the first inkling of a conceptual reorientation began to take shape, but it would take years for this to evolve.

The question of compliance is most relevant in the case of the policies of Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala. So much has been written on the apparently retrogressive policies of this Liberal president that this research sought to distinguish consensus from compliance as a rationale for deference in an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate about Colombia's foreign policy.

The dismal economic data presented in the previous chapter lend credence to the conclusion that Turbay's policy was compliant rather than consensual. The only economic consideration that might suggest otherwise relates to the fact that Colombia's economic dependency had been diversified considerably by the time he assumed office in 1978. But the circumstantial evidence is noteworthy. The

Colombian economy turned sharply downward around 1980, and until that time, Colombia's policy had been more in line with the revisionist policies of other Latin American nations. The rejection of the Carter administration's proposal to send peace-keeping forces to Nicaragua is evidence of that. Afterwards, Colombia's policies were not only compatible with those of the United States, they were supportive.

However, the evidence from the content analysis suggests that Turbay's disinclination to elaborate a more autonomous foreign policy reflected a shared view about what was occurring in the region. In other words, Turbay's apparently retrogressive policy reflected the renaissance of consensus in which Cold War categories and simplifications figured prominently. Although that consensus had been breaking down over the previous decade, the power of ideas dissipates slowly. This is certainly consistent with the regime literature which emphasizes time-lags. Viewed in this way, it is not surprising that a renaissance of consensus would occur; it is rather more surprising that the breakdown of consensus occurred as rapidly as it did in the 1970s.

Two points support this interpretation. First, although the Turbay Memorias provide abundant indications that the Colombian leadership understood the gravity of the economic crisis beginning to unfold in the region, there are

passages that convey the sense that Colombian leaders nonetheless perceived the opportunity to participate more actively. The eagerness to participate in the Nassau Group is a case in point. What is notable, however, is that Colombian actions were clearly not intended to establish autonomy. Second, the passages that provide the clearest insight into Turbay's understanding of foreign policy principles, give reason to believe that consensus was restored. The treatment of the theme of democracy, and the down playing of ideological pluralism, with all the ramifications of this emphasis, figure prominently in this context.

In summary, this chapter suggests that Colombia's viraje was motivated largely by a change in the way Colombia perceived the world, and Colombia's standing in it. This changed vision was a product of shifts in the distribution of world power, Colombia's own emergence, and significant, though subtle, changes in the politico-security regime of the IAS. The latter is important because, in the absence of ideological constraints on autonomy, consensus would no longer be a foregone conclusion; the former is important because, in the absence of economic constraints, deference would no longer be automatic.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: AN ASSESSMENT OF HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY

I Hegemonic Stability Theory as an Explanation of Colombia's Viraje

The analysis of the foreign policies of developing states, especially those considered middle-powers, has been hampered by the lack of theoretical orientation and guidance. Hegemonic stability theory has the potential to fill this conceptual void. This research represents an heuristic exploration of the utility of a model, derived from the basic premises of hegemonic stability theory, with applicability to the IAS. That model, elaborated in Chapter Two, has been useful in elucidating a phenomenon that has received substantial scholarly attention -- Colombia's much vaunted viraje described in Chapter Three. By way of defending this assertion, this section reviews the most salient findings reported in Chapters Three through Five, and relates them back to the model and propositions elaborated in the second chapter.

The initial concern of this research was to place an ongoing debate about Colombia's foreign policy shift in the context of a debate about the declining influence, or hegemony, of the United States in the region and in the world. A key assumption (buttressed by the evidence presented in a growing body of literature) was that Colombia's reorientation is a single case of a broader

phenomenon, albeit a crucial one. It is considered a crucial case because Colombia has long been considered one of the United States' most deferential allies in the region, thus any shift in its orientation could reasonably be considered a sign of broader change. The task then became one of finding some means of linking the foreign policy behavior of developing states to structural changes in the international system. Hegemonic stability theory provided an idiom to guide and organize the discussion.

Given the contours of the theory, and much common wisdom about what is occurring in the IAS, the first proposition to suggest itself related to the decline of United States influence. It was argued in the second chapter that influence is a matter of one country getting other countries to design and implement foreign policies that promote its interests, and of using existing international organizations to its advantage. If such influence is pervasive and overwhelming, it is possible to characterize it as hegemonic. The exercise of preponderant influence via these mechanisms is hegemony.

Common wisdom holds that the United States no longer possess this sort of influence: that the hegemony of the United States is in decline. Chapter Three was offered as partial evidence of this state of affairs, because it described a broadly recognized change in one country's foreign policy away from strict alignment, and to a lesser

degree, that country's inclination and ability to use the OAS to its advantage and even to block US initiatives. Taken together, the end of Colombia's distinctly deferential posture vis-a-vis the United States and its attempt to alter the performance of the organs of the OAS in concert with other Latin American nations, translate into a relative loss of United States hegemony.

This evidence, though supported by what approaches a scholarly consensus insofar as Colombia is concerned, requires corroboration since hypotheses can neither be accepted nor rejected on the basis of the analysis of a single case, even a crucial one. In the next section, the contours of research intended to provide such corroboration are sketched. Chapter Three, then, does not constitute a rigorous empirical test of propositions one and two. But the findings reported in that chapter, because they are consistent with those propositions, do indicate the value of the model. Future research into the IAS could profit by focusing on the United States' ability to control outcomes in the OAS, and to gain the foreign policy deference of its partners in the IAS.

The more important questions, however, relate to the extent to which the independent variables in the model elucidate Colombia's viraje. Propositions three through six state what factors are thought to account for the observed changes in Colombia's foreign policy, and by extrapolation, the political processes of the IAS. Those propositions

encompass both economic and perceptual factors, and the evidence adduced in chapters four and five provide preliminary support for them.

Proposition three states a relationship between foreign policy deference and the degree of a country's economic dependence on the United States. The underlying assumption is that deference is often a matter of compliance rather than consensus, and that hegemonic powers are able to use economic leverage to gain deference. Proposition four relates a country's foreign policy deference to its level of economic development based on the assumption that the more viable a country, the more likely it is to take an active part in diplomacy and to resist the pressures of a great power. Proposition six directly addresses the issue of consensus, and states that the reinterpretation of existing regime principles and norms, or the incorporation of new ones into the thinking of leaders affects consensus and foreign policy deference. The assumption behind this proposition is that the changes in the foreign policies of Latin America states observed by many analysts of inter-american relations results from an attitudinal shift as much as a redistribution of economic power.

The theory of hegemonic stability basically holds that structural changes, i.e., those involving the distribution of power resources, affect political processes guided by regimes or accepted sets of principles and norms of

international behavior. The IAS is just such a system of inter-related regimes. This basic proposition was restated in a manner that reflects the perspective of secondary members of a system of interrelated regimes in conformity with the broader objective of this project: to formulate a model of inter-american relations. Viewed from the perspective of the Latin American countries, changes in the global distribution of economic power are important to the degree that they translate effectively into the diversification of their economic dependency, involving, inter alia, the opening of new markets and the availability alternative sources of capital.

A leader's decision to become more actively involved in regional or international diplomacy may be influenced more by the perception of the country's economic viability than by the perception of its dependency since an active foreign policy can also be deferential, as the Turbay policy indicated. But the active pursuit of a more autonomous foreign policy requires the perception, if not the reality, of diminished dependency because in the absence of consensus, deference may nonetheless follow from compliance.

The evidence presented in Chapter Four shows an association between Colombia's foreign policy reorientation and the success of its efforts to diversify its dependency as measured by the percentage of US purchases of its exports and the percentage of official development assistance. Despite the existence of constraining economic conditions,

Colombia had managed to diversify its dependency by the time Betancur initiated his bold foreign policy of active resistance to the Reagan administration's designs in Central America. In fact, Colombia's dependency had been diminished since about the middle of the 1970s.

There was also evidence of the association between Colombia's level of economic development, and that country's foreign relations, especially the extent of its diplomatic activity. Influenced by Jaguaribe's (1984) reasonable supposition that only the more "economically viable" Latin America countries would be in a position to take advantage of the greater degree of "permissibility" created by changes in the distribution of power, proposition four stated that foreign policy deference would be influenced by national capacity.

The level of industrialization was examined because it is common to conceive of industrialization as a solution to dependency, and as a mark of national, economic capacity or "maturity" to use the language of Colombian policy-makers encountered in Chapter Five. From a dependency perspective, of course, this notion over-simplifies the issues, because it is quite possible that in the process of industrialization dependency can be deepened rather than diminished, that while the "form" of dependency changes, the "fact" of dependency does not. Nonetheless, what is important in the present context is a country's capacity to

become active in international and regional affairs, and in this sense, the level of industrialization is a useful indicator.

The level of industrialization, however, was not fully adequate, and additional measures of Colombia's economic viability were examined in Chapter Four. Economic viability, conceived as a prerequisite for more active involvement in international affairs, may or may not be directly linked to the level of industrialization. Indeed, in the Colombian case, the favorable economic trends of the 1970s were generally associated with the external sector, especially the international prices for an agricultural product, coffee. The key is that leaders perceive that the country is in a position to act, especially when the contemplated action entails controversy or conflict with the United States. Being in a position to act means possessing the capacity to do so, and not being vulnerable to economic sanctions that might be imposed as a consequence. This is related to, but distinct from, the degree of dependency on a single nation.

In assessing the amount of support for the proposition, several points stand out. First, Colombia was undoubtedly "more developed" by the time it became apparent that Colombian leaders were on intent initiating a diplomatic apertura, and certainly by the time Betancur launched Colombia on a decidedly autonomous course. The Colombian economy had grown substantially since 1966, and often at an

impressive rate. Though the increase in the absolute size of the economy is largely a function of time (few economies shrink overtime unless they suffer war, Nicaragua is a case in point), the trend in the rate of growth is another matter. Not only did Colombia clearly possess greater national capacity when it became more involved in the mid-1970s than it ever possessed prior to that time, for much of the time Colombian leaders had good reason to believe that the rate at which national capacity was expanding afforded them the opportunity, and even obliged them, to redefine Colombia's standing in the region.

Second, it turns out that the level of industrial development, measured in Chapter Four in terms of manufacturing as a percentage of GDP, and the growth of the manufacturing sector, does not shed a great deal of light on the issue of Colombia's foreign policy deference. The obvious problem is that Colombia was no less developed by this measure under Turbay than it was under Betancur. Indeed, it was more so if manufacturing as a percentage of the total GDP is used as the measure for industrialization. A statistical analysis relating the foreign policies of the entire set of Latin American countries to their level of industrialization would certainly provide better insight, providing the dependent variables were adequately quantified.

For this reason, trends in the country's overall economic performance evincing Colombia's "viability" proved more helpful in providing clues. There is evidence of improving trends in Colombia's economic performance throughout the 1970s, and the data were for the most part consistent with the proposition that activism and autonomy would be associated with sound economic performance. This was true of both the main economic indicators, GDP growth and growth of manufacturing, and the performance of the external sector.

These findings suggest the utility of retaining the variable, level of economic development, in any model of inter-american relations. However, this variable should be conceived more broadly so as to encompass the notion of economic viability. Even so, this variable did not solve the riddle pertaining to the very different postures of Turbay and Betancur. On the one hand, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Turbay was motivated to change his tune half-way through his cuareenio by an economic downturn. But, then Betancur's audacity is incomprehensible. On the other hand, the diversification of dependency offers a plausible economic rationale for Betancur's foreign policy, but not so for Turbay. These findings point in the direction of the cognitive component of the model explored in Chapter Five for clues to resolve this quandary.

The cognitive and perceptual component of the model was explored in Chapter Five. The contents of the Memorias of

the Colombian foreign ministry were analyzed for evidence in support of propositions five and six. Proposition five related Colombian leaders' perceptions about constraint and opportunity to the country's increased activism and greater autonomy from the United States. Proposition six stated that Colombia's less deferential foreign policy was motivated by a reinterpretation of existing principles and norms or an infusion of novel ones.

More specifically, proposition five stated that observed changes in Colombia's foreign policy reflect the leadership's perception of enhanced economic capacity, the diversification of its dependency, and to a lesser extent, the degree of permissibility. This attempt to ascertain the subjective perception of Colombian leaders with respect to the existence of opportunities or constraints was done in an effort to ascertain whether Colombia's historical deference towards the United States was a matter of compliance or consensus. This question is most relevant in the case of Turbay's retrogressive policy.

There are several basic findings with respect to the relationship between the policy-makers' perceptions of the international environment and Colombia's capacity to act on the one hand, and the country's foreign policy on the other. There is evidence that Colombian leaders perceived the opportunity to intensify and broaden Colombia's international relations and more importantly to establish

greater autonomy from the United States before they made concerted efforts to accomplish these goals. More interestingly, the Memorias yield evidence that Colombian leaders perceived an opportunity afforded by the diversification of the country's dependency even before that perception had a solid basis in reality, and even that they perceived the opportunity to act at the height of the economic crisis of the 1980s. Some examples are in order.

German Zea, President Lleras' first foreign minister, clearly perceived Colombia's economic dependency on the United States. His 1967 report to Congress cited the futility of "denying the exorbitant influence...or the economic dependency that follows from the fact that the United States is the most important for our markets." The data presented in Chapter Four attest to the accuracy of the perception. But only two years later, in 1969, Lopez, having replaced Zea as foreign minister, observed that "there is a new distribution of world power." Around this same time, Lopez boasted that contacts with the European Economic Community "have become so frequent as to be front page news", but the economic data do not substantiate this until after 1974.

The same language about the changing distribution of world power appears frequently between 1970 and 1974. Vazquez even asserted before the OAS that Latin America has "acquired an early maturity in international politics" and spoke at length about Latin American states as no longer

being mere "spectators". Nonetheless, viewed against the data presented in Chapter Four it seems reasonable to conclude that Colombia was not yet in a position to translate this talk into meaningful action, either in terms of its own economic viability or its diversification of dependency. But it soon would be. After 1974, reality caught up with the rhetoric. Perceptions of opportunity were evident, and increasing the economic data substantiated them. Not only was the Colombian economy experiencing a prolonged period of expansion and viability, its dependence on the United States was chipped away substantially.

There is some evidence that Colombian leaders perceived a greater degree of permissibility during this period, but it is scant. An important example relates to president Richard Nixon's visit to China. Colombian leaders apparently thought Detente would affect regional politics as well. It is in this context that the notion of the universalization of international organizations begins to acquire meaning and momentum. But, Colombian leaders were mistaken if they believed the Cold War was coming to an end in the IAS. The Nixon administration's destruction of the Allende government soon thereafter indicated that perceptions of permissibility were erroneous.

After 1980, the economic situation was abysmal, even to the point that the relative importance of United States nearly returned to levels that existed prior to the Lopez

administration's successful efforts to diversify the country's dependency. Accordingly, perceptions of crisis replace perceptions of opportunity that existed through the late 1960s and 1970s. Were it not for the fact that there is also evidence of consensus (discussed more below), it would be reasonable to conclude from this that Turbay's deference was complaint.

But, even the Turbay Memorias are not without evidence of opportunities, although they relate to Colombia's enhanced national capacity rather than to a favorable international economic environment. That perception motivated Colombia's decision to involve itself in the Nassau Group, the forerunner of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Turbay's foreign minister boasted of Colombia's economic assistance as a "diplomatic victory of extraordinary importance", and noted that the United States had overlooked Colombia when searching for potential contributors because of doubts about "the point to which (Colombia) was capable of contributing to the living conditions of countries of the region." Whatever the United States' perception of Colombia's capacity to act may have been, Turbay perceived his administration to be capable to asserting a more active role. Notably, there are no references to the importance of economic contacts with Europe, much less that Colombia's economic relations were by then sufficiently diversified to encourage Colombia to chart a more autonomous course.

Colombia was in deep economic trouble when Betancur assumed office, and taken in isolation, Chapter Four casts doubt on the notion that the viraje had anything to do with favorable, objective economic trends. The Betancur documents are full of reference to the gravity of the economic crisis. But Colombia had by this time had come to identify itself with dependent, Third World countries, and apparently Betancur believed like many of his counterparts that the situation of dependent countries called for revisionism. Participation in NAM is entirely consistent with this.

More importantly, Colombia was far less dependent on the United States when Betancur initiated the viraje, and there is evidence that the Colombian leadership perceived that to be the case. Speaking to the foreign ministers of the EEC, Betancur noted that "since the 1970s, Latin America understood that it would be unable to advance toward greater political independence without eliminating or at least reducing its dependence." Accordingly, Colombia "sought to diversify its commerce tending toward Europe as the principal challenge, and Europe was receptive." The frequency, and importance of contacts with the EEC that foreign minister Lopez called "front page news" in the late 1960s were documented facts by the mid-1970s. Betancur knew he could afford to offend the United States.

There is no clearer example of the perception that

Colombian leaders believed they were poised to act in a manner consistent with a new understanding of its national interests than the one found in a speech Betancur's minister gave (notably) before the NAM: "it is undeniable that the great powers still exercise economic power and military predominance, but they are no longer able to impose their will on great political decisions." This observation may be dismissed as rhetorical, but Colombia's actions suggest the country's foreign-policy makers were convinced of its validity, and the economic data presented support that conviction insofar as economic dependency is concerned.

The finding that the perception of opportunity preceded changes in the country's foreign policy is consistent with proposition five. However, the discovery that perceptions of opportunity sometimes preceded the existence of opportunity is puzzling. Although time lags figure prominently in regime change, the expected relationship is the opposite one. Perceptions of change should lag behind the changes themselves. The inconsistency may be an example of the disjunction between reality and perception in human affairs, and in this sense it may reflect wishful thinking. If this interpretation is correct, the finding lends credence to an assumption underlying this research, that subordinate, dependent states are eager for opportunities to alter regime performance in order to restore national sovereignty compromised by subordination to a hegemonic power -- so eager that they see mirages.

Alternatively, it may be that as early as the late 1960s, Colombian leaders were able to perceive favorable trends and to forecast the outcome of those trends in terms of diminished dependency and enhanced capacity to act, and the data subsequently confirmed the accuracy of their perceptions. This would account for the fact that only small steps were taken in the direction greater activity, and dramatic steps in the direction of autonomy had to be postponed. Those, in fact, occurred after the data were in. This interpretation too would be consistent with proposition five.

The analysis of themes reflecting Colombian leaders' perceptions of constraint and opportunity does not in itself yield sufficient information to make a judgment as to whether or not deference was ever a matter of compliance. In the concluding section of Chapter Five it was stated that there is no conclusive evidence that this was ever the case. If there were, the economic data presented in Chapter Four indicate that it would be found in the documents from the Lleras, Turbay and Betancur periods. The analysis uncovered evidence of the perception of economic dependency (in the case of Lleras), and the gravity of a generalized economic crisis (both Turbay and Betancur). But several findings complicate this interpretation.

In the case of Lleras, foreign minister Zea's admission of economic dependency cannot be taken as evidence that the deference shown in this period was a matter of compliance

because there is no supporting evidence that Colombia differed with the United States on basic policy issues until around 1969. To the contrary, there is evidence of consensus. The conditions for compliance existed, but at the time they were irrelevant. It is not until Lopez took over as foreign minister that themes indicative of the intention to pursue a more autonomous policy became evident. The erosion of consensus was just beginning when Lleras left office.

Moreover, both Turbay and Betancur grasped the extent of the economic crisis facing the country, but only Turbay's policy was deferential. If the deference displayed after 1982 was only a question of compliance, then Betancur should have behaved in a like manner. This suggests that Turbay's policy decision to defer, somewhat like Lleras, was based on consensus. When that proposition is examined directly, the evidence supports it.

Proposition six stated that foreign policy change would result from the reinterpretation of existing principles or the infusion of new ones if, in either case, the ideological foundations of deference were undercut. The findings of the content analysis with respect to this question could well constitute the most significant contribution of this research for two reasons, one substantive the other theoretical. First, the findings themselves largely conformed to the propositions and so provided important

insights into Colombia's foreign policy viraje. Second, this substantive contribution attests to the theoretical utility of conceiving of the IAS as a set of interrelated regimes, and examining the politics of its members accordingly.

The analysis of the Memorias provide supporting evidence for the proposition that Colombia's foreign policy reorientation was made possible by a gradual, yet exceedingly important, evolution of basic foreign policy principles. The reinterpretation of accepted principles and the infusion of novel ones eroded consensus. But the erosion occurred gradually, even haltingly. This attests to the difficulty involved with altering traditional views and simplifications. The United States is not immune from such difficulties: one recalls in this context how premature and politically costly was President Carter's assertion that the United States had lost its "inordinate fear of Communism".

This accounts for the policies of Turbay Ayala. The fact the themes that appeared with such frequency in the other documents are deemphasized in the Turbay Memorias suggests that he was uncomfortable with the new orientation. In one sense, what is surprising is not that he slowed the process which produced the viraje, but that the process was not slowed earlier. Remarkably, Colombia's foreign policy reorientation occurred in the space of a little more than one decade.

This view would be supported also by findings related to the Memorias of both the Pastrana and Lopez cuareños. The ambivalence of foreign minister Vazquez with respect to the United States is relevant in context. The infusion of new principles began as early as the late 1960s when Lopez replaced Zea, but although the logical terminus of the new principles might have been discernable, Vazquez was not prepared to break cleanly with the United States. The frequent calls for a new dialogue bear this out. A decade later, Betancur was less sure that Colombia's interests could be served by renewing its special relationship with the United States.

The broadest conclusion drawn from the analysis is that Colombian foreign policy is regime guided. In terms of the politico-security regime of the IAS which was largely concerned with Cold War issues, Colombia's understanding of the principles and norms of the IAS evolved from one of strong consensus with the United States on the need to contain communist expansion and the propriety of United States hegemony in the hemisphere, to a principled commitment to non-intervention and ideological pluralism which eroded the prior consensus, led to sharp conflict on the Central American question, and ultimately motivated Colombia to profess its non-alignment.

A related finding is that the viraje was not the product of Betancur's own initiative, rather it was the

consequence of an evolutionary process slowed but not reversed by Turbay. The first inklings of a new orientation could be discerned as early as the end of the 1960s, with the appearance of the notion of the universalization of international fora, first the United Nations, then the OAS. This paved the way for the incorporation of the concept of ideological pluralism, and eventually the loss of Colombian consensus on the wisdom of the continued isolation of Cuba. The logical terminus of this course was non-alignment, and the Colombian leadership pursued it to that end.

In summary, it is worth noting that the observations of Tugwell and Mechem, cited in the first chapter, proved to be insightful. Tugwell (1977 p 199) noted that Latin American states were inclined to "modify US designed hemispheric institutions created originally to handle Cold War problems." But, as Mechem (1966 p. 472) cautioned, they would nonetheless exercise self-restraint both in their use of the instruments of regional cooperation and in their foreign policies until they managed to "increase their own capacity to work with their North American partner on more equal terms."

This study discovered that the hallmark of Colombian foreign policy is no longer self-restraint either in terms of its use of regional institutions or its own foreign policy initiatives. Moreover, insofar as Colombian leaders are concerned, the politico-security regime of the IAS is obsolescent. The regime has weakened to the point of

collapse not only because it has not performed well or in the interests of Latin American states, but more importantly because consensus on its underlying principles has eroded. As that consensus eroded, the inclination of Colombian leaders to defer to the United States diminished. If it is correct that lasting hegemony depends on the ability of great powers like the United States to count on the deference of its allies, then the implications of this turn of events are potentially far reaching.

II Prospects for Related Research

Many theoretical frameworks have been heralded as unifying paradigms only to disappoint when efforts are made to fulfill this apparent promise. Dependency theory and hegemonic stability theory, both of which have, to different degrees, informed and guided this research, are prime examples of this. When disappointment inevitably sets in, there is a tendency to downgrade the theory in question. The process verges on being counterproductive, but it need not be.

An important sign of the utility of any model is its provocativeness. A theoretical framework has value to the degree that it raises questions for future research. Again, both hegemonic stability theory and dependency theory are prime examples of provocative theoretical frameworks in the sense that they continue to generate solid research, despite

the fact exponents of these theories no longer make grandiose claims about them. Snidal's (1985a, p. 580) observation about hegemonic stability theory warrants reiteration in this context: "hegemonic stability theory does point toward fertile ground for analytical and empirical investigation of international politics...(and) a revised formulation...offers the prospect of a better understanding of regime performance." Likewise, John Walton's (1987, p. 199) point with respect to dependency theory is well taken: "If the theoretical advance of dependency theory has stalled, the same is not true of the empirical work stimulated by the tradition." Accordingly, the most appropriate way to defend the assertions made in the first section of this concluding chapter, namely that hegemonic stability theory has clear utility when applied to the IAS, would be to demarcate paths for future research.

As an obvious first step, future research must accomplish what this research was not designed to accomplish: a rigorous empirical test of hypotheses suggested by the model. The decision to conduct a focused case study of Colombia's foreign policy conformed to one of the methodological imperatives of dependency theory: it is necessary to examine the individual dynamics of specific countries through time in order to arrive at a proper understanding of them. Conversely, a more comprehensive study (perhaps one employing statistical analysis of the sort suggested below) would likely be oblivious to

subtleties that only more focused studies can detect. But selection of the case study approach entailed the imposition of obvious limitations both in terms of ability to test that model in a rigorous manner and in terms of a cursory examination of certain components of the model. Thus, future research should be designed with the intention of overcoming those methodological and substantive limitations.

The first major task, therefore, is guided by a methodological consideration relating to the need to increase the number of cases in order to establish the conditions for a proper empirical test of the model, or specific components of it. This could be accomplished by adopting one of the approaches mentioned in the following paragraphs. A more statistically oriented study would serve this purpose.

Future research efforts should also be directed at examining features of the model treated only briefly here. Beginning with the dependent variables, more attention could be efficaciously focused on regime performance. Some examples of Colombia's activity in the OAS were provided in Chapter Three, and attention was focused on the subjective dynamics of regime change in Chapter Five. But a more expansive treatment of how regime performance has changed over time would certainly shed light on the question of United States hegemony in a region undergoing discernible change.

Such a study could adopt one of two approaches. One would involve a comparative case study of bargaining in different organs of the the OAS at various times in the forty two year history of the regional organization. This approach would entail delving into the minutes of OAS meetings to get a sense of the give and take -- or push and pull -- of bargaining, and would result in a narrative report of the findings much like Chapters Three and Four of the present study. The narrative study would describe the dynamics of bargaining to ascertain whether, or to what degree, the United States has lost ability to utilize a given regime to its advantage, and would inquire whether the hypothesized loss of the ability to control regime performance is generalized, or whether it is more advanced in some regimes than in others. Nye and Keohane (1977) suggested that power varies with issue-area, and across regimes. An examination of bargaining in various OAS organs or specialized councils would be sensitive to that possibility since they exist to oversee different regimes.

A second approach would be to examine voting patterns (rather than bargaining sessions and outcomes) in order to answer some of the same questions. But this approach would differ from the one just described both in the sense that it would involve the compilation and analysis of a set of votes, over time, on specific issues by all members of the OAS. Such an effort would have two advantages. The voting data could be employed as rough measures of both regime

performance and foreign policy deference, and when correlated with the kind of economic data presented in Chapter Four, would lend itself to a more sophisticated statistical analysis of change in the IAS and test of some of the propositions stated in Chapter Two.¹

Turning now to the independent variables, more attention needs to be focused on the willingness of the United States to lead. As noted early in this study, hegemonic stability theory has only rarely generated empirical research into foreign policy behavior (as opposed to regime formation and transformation) despite the fact the participation of sovereign states in regimes and membership in the international organizations associated with them necessarily involves a prior foreign policy decision by policy-makers. Moreover, when foreign policy is studied, it is usually the policies of great powers rather than subordinates. An intended contribution of this research was to address the question raised by Keohane (1984) as to why subordinate states participate.

Focus on the motivations and action of subordinate members of the IAS centered on the issue of the willingness of hegemonic powers to lead from the perspective of the degree of permissibility. In Chapter Five there was some evidence of Colombian leaders' perceptions of permissibility stemming either from the fact that the United States was not overly concerned with an issue at a given time (Nixon's

overtures to China, Carter's more accepting posture) or the view that the United States was not in a position to force compliance because of debilitating debates at home (this could well have affected Betancur's thinking.)

Nonetheless, more attention needs to be focused on the question of the willingness to lead from the perspective of the United States. As alluded to briefly in the first chapter, one way to do this might be to examine the strength of congressional support for presidential initiatives in Latin America over time, to assess the degree to which there was consensus in the United States with respect to the prudence of hegemony. One would expect that Congress is much more involved, and that there is much less consensus, in the eighties and nineties than in the sixties and seventies (on this point, see Schoultz, 1987.)

The model elaborated in Chapter Two proved useful in elucidating Colombia's foreign policy viraje. If the Colombian case is properly assumed to be a crucial one, then there are ample reasons to conduct additional research utilizing the model elaborated here. If for no other reason, the absence of a theoretical framework to analyze interamerican relations commends the model. The wealth of descriptive detail relating to the emergence of Latin American nations as independent actors serves an indispensable informative function. But it does not yet contribute to a systematic understanding of what is

occurring in the IAS, because isolated, descriptive studies are not being conducted to confirm or disconfirm a coherent set of propositions as part of an ongoing, critical process of theory-building. This study of Colombian foreign policy is much like others that have been written. The principal distinction is that it is offered in the context of a larger project.

NOTES

- 1 A notable problem with this approach is that resolutions in the OAS are generally based on passive consensus and no record of votes, per se, exists. Thus, to construct such a data set would entail careful examination of the Actas or proceedings of various meetings to ascertain which countries voiced opposition to some aspect of a resolution during any of the sessions leading up to its adoption.

Another problem relates to using votes as an indicator of foreign policy deference because it would not be sensitive to the distinction between consensus and compliance as Moon (1985) correctly observes.

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